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WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
VI. CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE
A. The Burden of Proof in Murder Cases
The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees that no state will deprive an individual of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.1 Due process demands that the
government bear the burden of producing evidence to convince the fact-
finder that the accused is guilty of the crime charged.' The Constitution
protects a criminal defendant against an erroneous conviction by impos-
ing a standard of proof that demands a defendant be proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.' The reasonable doubt standard applies to
every element of the criminal offense with which the prosecution charged
the defendant.4
In Mullaney v. Wilbur,5 the Supreme Court held that the Constitu-
tion prohibits a state from shifting any burden of proof to the defendant
that would require him to disprove an element of the crime.' The
I See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law"). Whenever the government deprives a person of
his liberty without due process of law in violation of the United States Constitution, the
remedial process is to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Ex parte Watkins, 28
U.S. 193, 201-02 (1830) (defendant claimed that court that convicted him lacked jurisdiction
over criminal offense for which he was convicted).
2 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958).
' In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970). The Winship Court stated that the require-
ment that the prosecution prove a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt insures the
due process goals of fairness, reduction of error, and community respect for the law. Id. at
363-64. See generally 9 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2497 (3d ed. 1940) (two defini-
tions of reasonable doubt).
The reasonable doubt standard aims at striking a balance between competing societal
and individual interests. Winship, 397 U.S. at 363-64. The Winship Court stated that a society
that values the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for
commission of a crime when reasonable doubt exists about his guilt. Id. The Winship Court
labeled the reasonable doubt standard indispensible to command the respect and confidence
of the community in the criminal justice system. Id. at 364.
4 See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697-98 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970). In Ferry v. Ramsey, the Supreme Court stated that the government must prove the
material elements of a crime. See 277 U.S. 88, 93-95 (1928). Justice Holmes delivered the
Court's opinion and enunciated the "greater includes the lesser" theory. See id. at 94. Ac-
cording to the theory, the only material elements of a criminal offense are the elements that
due process requires a legislature to incorporate in a statute before imposing criminal
liability. See id. at 93-95. Holmes' view never received support and the Supreme Court re-
jected it in United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 142-44 (1965). See also McCormick, The
Validity of Statutory Presumptions of Crime Under the Federal Constitution, 22 TEX. L.
REV. 75, 80 n.18 (1943) (greater includes the lesser theory may deny equal protection or in-
fringe specific constitutional privileges).
' 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
Id. at 704. The Mullaney Court held that the fourteenth amendment, as the Court in
In re Winship interpreted it, requires that the state prove every element of a criminal of-
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Mullaney Court ruled that jury instructions which shift the burden of
proof to the defendant by means of a presumption7 are unconstitutional,8
even as to facts affecting only the degree of criminal culpability.' In Pat-
terson v. New York,"° however, the Supreme Court held that a state may
impose upon the defendant, as an affirmative defense,1 the burden of
proving any defense that does not negate an element of the crime
fense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.; see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The
Mullaney Court held that a Maine murder statute violated due process because the state
imposed on the accused the burden of reducing the charge of homicide to manslaughter.
Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 703. Maine required the accused to prove he acted in the heat of pas-
sion upon sudden provocation in order to reduce homicide to manslaughter. Id.
Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 686. A presumption requires the party against whom the
presumption operates to produce evidence to rebut the presumption. Wilson, Shifting
Burdens in Criminal Law: A Burden On Due Process, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 731, 740
(1981). If the defendant introduces no evidence that contradicts the proven or presumed
fact, then the court instructs the jury that the presumed fact has been proven. Id.; see also
Laughlin, In Support of The Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 MICH. L. REv. 195, 196-207
(1953) (presumption may have as many as eight different consequences).
, Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 704; see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2551, 2651 (1964)
(manslaughter, murder statutes). The Maine statute involved in Mullaney defined murder as
the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, either express or implied.
Id. at § 2651. The statute defined manslaughter as the unlawful killing of a human being in
the heat of passion, on sudden provocation, without express or implied malice aforethought.
Id. at § 2551. The trial court in Mullaney read the statutory definitions to the jury and told
the jury that "malice aforethought is an essential and indispensable element of the crime of
murder," without which the homicide would be manslaughter. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 686.
The court, however, further instructed the jury that if the prosecution established that the
homicide was both intentional and unlawful, then the jury should imply malice aforethought
conclusively unless the defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he
acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. Id. The trial judge stated that heat of
passion means that, at the time of the act, passion obscured the reason of the accused to an
extent that an ordinary man of fair, average disposition would be apt to act irrationally and
from passion rather than judgment. Id. at 687 n.5.
Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 697-98. But cf. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 214 n.15
(1977) (narrowing Mullaney language which suggested that due process requires prosecu-
tion to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any fact affecting degree of culpability); see infra
text and accompanying notes 10-15 (discussion of Patterson).
" 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
I, See id. at 207. The criminal code of New York contained 25 affirmative defenses that
exculpate or mitigate but which are inoperative unless the defendant establishes their ex-
istence. Id. The Patterson Court noted that New York was not alone in imposing the burden
of proof on the defendant through affirmative defenses. Id. at 207-08 n.10.
Since the American Law Institute completed the Model Penal Code in 1962, 22 states
had reformed their criminal law statutes. Id. At least 12 of the 22 states had included the
concept of an affirmative defense and had required the defendant to prove the existence of
an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. The Patterson Court noted
that, at that time, at least six proposed state criminal codes and four successive versions of
a revised Federal Criminal Code used the same procedural device. Id. Even states that do
not employ the concept of affirmative defense nevertheless shift the burden of proof to the
defendant on particular issues. See Low & Jeffries, DICTA: Constitutionalizing the
Criminal Law?, 29 VA. LAW. WEEKLY, No. 18, at 1 (1977).
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charged. 2 The Court thereby specifically confined the Mullaney ruling to
elements included in the definition of the offense." The Patterson Court
noted that state legislatures could reallocate the burden of proof simply
by labeling some elements of a crime as affirmative defenses. 4 The
Court stated, however, that the Constitution limits the extent to which a
legislature can change elements of the crime into affirmative defenses.
Further protecting the rights of the criminally accused, the Court in
Sandstrom v. Montana" ruled that the constitutionality of an ambiguous
jury instruction depends on the way in which a reasonable juror could
have interpreted the instruction. If a reasonable interpretation of a
"2 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 207. The Patterson Court examined the affirmative defenses
listed in the New York murder statute and held that an affirmative defense constitutes a
separate issue on which the defendant must carry the burden of persuasion. Id.; see N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 125.25(1)(a)-(b) (McKinney 1975) (affirmative defenses to murder). Id. at § 25.00(2)
(affirmative defenses in general). Therefore, the Patterson Court held that the New York
statute did not violate due process and upheld the defendant's conviction. Patterson, 432
U.S. at 216.
3 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210. The New York statute identifies two elements of second-
degree murder. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1975). The first element is intent to
cause the death of another person and the second element is causing the death of such per-
son or a third person. Id. The New York statute permits a person accused of murder to
claim, as an affirmative defense, that he acted under the influence of extreme emotional dis-
turbance for which he has a reasonable explanation or excuse. Id. The most notable dif-
ference between the New York and the Maine murder statutes is the absence of the ele-
ment of malice aforethought in the New York statute. Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25
(McKinney 1975) (malice aforethought not element of murder) with ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17, § 2651 (1964) (malice aforethought is element of murder).
" Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210. The Patterson Court stated that whenever due process
guarantees depend upon the laws that the legislative branches define, courts must consider
the possibility that the legislature abused its legislative discretion to the detriment of the
individual. Id. at 211 n.12; see also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. at 698-99 (redefining
crimes). Since the prosecution must prove every element of the offense, the reasonable
doubt standard always has been dependent on how a state defines the offense that is charged
in any given case. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 211 n.12. Nevertheless, states have not rushed to
shift the burden of disproving the traditional elements of criminal offenses to the accused.
Id.
15 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210. The Patterson Court noted a few past Supreme Court
decisions as vague guidelines for the constitutional limits on statute redefinition. Id. A legis-
lature cannot declare an individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime. McFarlan v.
American Sugar Refining Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86 (1916). Furthermore, a legislature cannot
declare that the finding of an indictment or the mere proof of the identity of the accused is
enough to create a presumption that all the facts essential to guilt exist. See Tot v. United
States, 319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943); see also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523-26 (1958) (citing
McFarland and Tot); Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 90 (1934) (citing McFarland).
442 U.S. 510 (1979).
17 Id. at 514. The Supreme Court, in Sandstrom, held unconstitutional a jury instruc-
tion stating that the law presumes a person intends the ordinary consequences of his volun-
tary acts. Id. at 513. In Sandstorm, the state argued that the only authoritative interpreta-
tion of the effect of a presumption in a Montana statute is the interpretation of the Supreme
Court of Montana. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 516. The possible interpretations by a jury are
irrelevant under the state's theory to the extent that they differ from the Montana
[Vol. 40:459
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presumption in the instruction would shift the burden of proof to the
defendant, in violation of the Mullaney rule,8 then the instruction is un-
constitutional under Sandstrom." The Fourth Circuit recently applied
the Mullaney-Sandstrom test and held, in Guthrie v. Warden,2 that a
jury instruction explaining the Maryland murder statute violated due
process by relieving the state of its burden of proving an element of the
crime.2 '
In Guthrie, defendant petitioner Walter Guthrie hitchhiked a ride
Supreme Court's interpretation. See id. According to the Montana Supreme Court, the pre-
sumption only imposed on the defendant the burden of producing some evidence to rebut
the presumption and therefore did not violate due process. Id. at 513-14.
The Sandstrom Court held that a jury could have interpreted the challenged presump-
tion as conclusive or as shifting the burden of proof. Id. at 517; see also United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 446 (1978) (conclusive presumption); Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702 (1975) (burden shifting); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,
275 (1952) (conclusive presumption). Therefore, the Sandstrom court held the instruction un-
constitutional because either interpretation by the jury would violate the fourteenth amend-
ment's requirement that the state prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 514-17; see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970) (every ele-
ment of crime must be proven); infra text accompanying notes 18-20 (effect of ambiguous jury
instruction).
" See supra note 6 and accompanying text (Mulaney rule on burden shifting instruc-
tions).
" United States v. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979); see supra note 17 (discussion of
Sandstrom).
Guthrie v. Warden, 683 F.2d 820 (4th Cir. 1982).
" Id. at 826. The trial judge in Guthrie instructed the jury as follows:
1. Murder is ... the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.
2. [mlalice is ... the intentional doing of a wrongful act to another without legal
excuse or justification.
3. [t]he law presumes all unlawful and felonious homicides to be committed with
malice aforethought and to constitute murder.
4. to elevate the presumption of second-degree murder to first-degree murder,
[the jury] must find that the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
the murder was willful, deliberate and premeditated, or committed in the
perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a robbery.
5. the burden is on the accused to reduce the presumption of second-degree
murder to manslaughter.
6. in order for the accused to reduce the presumption of second-degree murder
to manslaughter, [the accused must show] to the satisfaction of the jury, that
the killing was done in the heat of passion which had temporarily dethroned
him of his reason, and which was induced by adequate provocation.
7. the burden of showing that [the accused] lost control of his reason because of
sufficient provocation ... is upon the accused.
8. a person who uses a deadly weapon such as a knife directed at the vital parts
of the body of another person is presumed in law to intend the natural and
probable consequences of that act.
9. the defendant must show that he was so intoxicated that he was robbed of
his mental faculties ...
Id. at 822; Brief for Appellant at 5-6, Guthrie v. Warden, 683 F.2d 820 (4th Cir. 1982) [herein-
after cited as Appellant's Brief]; Brief for Appellee at 3-4, Guthrie v. Warden, 683 F.2d 820
(4th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Appellee's Brief].
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with the victim.2 The two men drank beer and whiskey while driving
and stopped at two taverns along the way. 3 The defendant's testimony
is the only source available for the details of the events that occurred
after the two men left the second tavern..2 4 The defendant testified that
the victim made homosexual advances toward the defendant, which the
defendant rejected. 5 After convincing the victim to stop the car, the
defendant got out of the car and attempted to remove his luggage." At
that point, the victim pulled out a hand gun27 and threatened the defen-
dant, which led to a struggle, during which the defendant pulled a knife
from his pocket.28 During the fighting, the defendant, who testified that
he was scared and thought the man was going to kill him, stabbed and
killed the victim.' Despite the defendant's claims of insanity, intoxica-
tion, heat of passion, and self-defense"0 the jury found the defendant to
be sane and guilty of first-degree murder.31
A Maryland county court dismissed the defendant's Petition For
Post Conviction Relief3" and a Court of Special Appeals denied his Ap-
plication For Leave to Appeal that dismissal.3 The defendant filed a
Petition for Habeas Corpus with the District Court of Maryland.' The
district court found that the trial judge's instructions to the jury
violated the defendant's constitutional rights,35 but denied the defen-





' Id. The gun with which the victim threatened the defendant later proved to be a
harmless starter's pistol. Appellant's Brief, supra note 21, at 4.
' Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 821.
9 Id.
' Id. The State of Maryland conceded that Guthrie's version of the incident suffici-
ently raised the issue of self-defense. Id.
31 Id. at 820.
Appellee's Brief, supra note 21, at 2. The defendant filed a petition for a new trial in
the circuit court for Garrett County, Maryland, under the Maryland Post Conviction Proce-
dure Act. Appellant's Brief, supra note 21, at 2; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 645A (1977
(post conviction procedure). In the Petition For Post Conviction Relief the defendant alleged
that the jury instructions on self-defense, heat of passion, direction of a deadly weapon at a
vital part of the body, and voluntary intoxication erroneously shifted the burden of proof to
him. Appellee's Brief, supra note 21, at 2; see supra note 21 (jury instructions). The circuit
court for Garrett County, Maryland, dismissed the defendant's petition. Appellant's Brief,
supra note 21, at 2. The court decided that the defendant's conviction of first-degree murder
rendered the Constitutional errors harmless. Id.
* Appellee's Brief, supra note 21, at 2. The defendant's Application for Leave to Ap-
peal addressed the impropriety of the self-defense instruction but did not contest the other
instructions. Guthrie v. State, Application For Leave to Appeal No. 125 (Md. App., per
curiam opinion filed Sept. 21, 1977); see supra note 21 (jury instructions).
" Guthrie v. Warden, 518 F. Supp. 546, 547 (D. Md. 1981); see supra note 1 (discussion
of habeas corpus).
11 Guthrie v. Warden, 518 F. Supp. 546, 554-56 (D. Md. 1981).
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dant's Petition for Habeas Corpus, holding that the jury verdict of first-
degree murder cured the constitutional errors.38 The defendant appealed
the district court's decision to the Fourth Circuit.37 The Fourth Circuit
reversed the district court and held that the instructions, considered as
a whole, erroneously placed on the defendant the risk of nonpersuasion
on the issue of self-defense.-'
The Fourth Circuit based the reversal of the district court on the
legal distinction between defenses of mitigation and defenses of
justification or excuse. 9 The court first addressed the defendant's
I Id. at 556-57; see infra text accompanying notes 46-52 (district court's reasoning).
The district court did not rule on the constitutional validity of the self-defense instruction.
Guthrie, 518 F. Supp. at 554-55. The district court did express the view that the instruction
could have conveyed to the jury that Guthrie had the burden of proving self-defense, but
held that the first-degree murder verdict cured the error. Id. at 556.
, Appellee's Brief, supra note 21, at 4. After the district court denied the defendant's
Petition for Habeas Corpus, the defendant filed a timely appeal to the Fourth Circuit. Id.
The district court granted a certificate of probable cause on August 13, 1981. Id. A judge
issues a certificate of probable cause if there is probable cause for appeal. See Garrison v.
Patterson, 391 U.S. 464, 465 on remand, 405 F.2d 696, 698, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 880 (1971);
People v. Ribera, 92 Cal. Rptr. 692, 694, 480 P.2d 308, 311 (1971). Probable cause for appeal
exists if an appeal presents debatable questions and if honest differences of opinion exist.
Garrison, 391 U.S. at 465. A certificate operates to stay execution of the judgment. Ex
Parte Mayen, 193 P. 813, 816, 49 Cal. App. 531 (1920).
- Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 826. The Fourth Circuit quoted Evans v. State extensively. Id.
at 824-25; see Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 349 A.2d 300 (1975), aff'd, 278 Md. 197, 362
A.2d 629 (1976); infra note 63 & 71 (discussion of Evans).
The defendant argued that the self-defense instruction was erroneous and required
reversal regardless of the degree of felonious homicide of which the jury convicted him. Ap-
pellant's Brief, supra note 21, at 12. The state of Maryland contended that the instructions,
as a whole, did not impose on Guthrie a burden to prove self-defense. Appellee's Brief, supra
note 21, at 8-9. The state emphasized that the trial judge told the jury at least five times
that the state carries the burden of proof on every element of the crime. Id. at 9. The state's
main contention was that the general charge on the burden of proof operated to cure any
jury confusion. Id.; see infra note 67 and accompanying text (Maryland's argument on ap-
peal). The state also argued that the first-degree murder verdict necessarily indicated that
the jury rejected the self-defense claim. Appellee's Brief, supra note 21, at 10. Maryland
reasoned that the trial judge imposed on the state the burden to prove the element of
malice, defined as the intentional doing of a wrongful act to another without legal excuse or
justification. Id. Therefore, Maryland concluded that when the jury convicted the defendant
of first-degree murder, the jury necessarily rejected beyond a reasonable doubt the
possibility that self-defense justified the defendant's actions. Id.
- Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 824; see infra text accompanying notes 71-79 (Fourth Circuit
finding that defenses of mitigation and justification have different effects). The distinction
between a defense of mitigation and a defense of justification or excuse, as the Guthrie
court used the terms, is the effect upon the charge against the defendant. See W. LAFAvE &
A. ScowT, CRIMINAL LAW § 68 (1972). A mitigator is a partial defense in that the final result
is a finding of a lesser included offense. Id.; see Wilson, supra note 7, at 760, n.186. Mitiga-
tion defenses, such as intoxication and heat of passion, go only to the distinction between
second-degree murder and manslaughter. Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 824. On the other hand, a
justification or excuse is a complete defense and will result in an acquittal of the defendant.
Wilson, supra note 7, at 760. A justification or excuse can either negate the existence of an
1983]
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challenge to the jury instructions explaining the mitigation defenses of
intoxication and heat of passion.4" While recognizing that the Constitu-
tion permits a state to require a criminal defendant to prove affirmative
defenses, 1 which can include mitigating defenses,42 the Guthrie court
held that the Maryland murder law prohibits the state from exercising
the constitutional privilege of shifting to the defendant the burden of
proving intoxication or heat of passion.41 Since malice is an element of
second-degree murder in Maryland, under Mullaney the state must
disprove any mitigating factors that would negate the element of
malice.44 The Fourth Circuit therefore held that the instructions impos-
ing the burden of proof on the accused for the defenses of intoxication
and heat of passion were plainly invalid.45
The Guthrie court, however, upheld the district court's decision that
the first-degree murder verdict cured the erroneous instruction. 8 Since
the trial court adequately charged the jury concerning the elements of
first-degree murder,47 the Fourth Circuit held that the burden-shifting
instructions concerning heat of passion were harmless error.48 The court
element of the crime or sufficiently explain the act committed so as to bar the imposition of
criminal liability. LAFAVE & SCOTT, § 8. As examples of justifiable or excusable homicides,
the Mullaney Court noted a soldier in battle, a policeman in certain circumstances, and an
individual acting in self-defense. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 685 n.1 (1975).
" Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 822-23; see supra note 21 (jury instructions).
" Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 823 n.4; see Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977)
(state can require defendant to prove affirmative defenses); supra notes 11-12 and accompa-
nying text (state can impose on defendant burden of proving affirmative defenses).
," See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text (when mitigation defenses can be
labeled affirmative defenses).
'" Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 823 n.4, The Supreme Court has ruled that a state may require
the accused to prove affirmative defenses by a preponderance of the evidence. Patterson v.
New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977); see supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text (Patterson
decision).
4 Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 823 n.4; see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 (1975). To
prove malice the state must disprove intoxication and heat of passion, when the evidence
fairly raises the issues, because these defenses are inconsistent with malice. Guthrie, 683
F.2d at 823 n.4.
"5 Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 822; see Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 513-14, 524 (1979)
(instruction that law presumes person intends ordinary consequences of voluntary acts is
unconstitutional if jury could interpret it as conclusive presumption or burden-shifting
presumption); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703 (1975) (violates due process for state to
impose on accused burden of reducing murder charge to manslaughter by proving that he
acted in heat of passion upon sudden provocation); supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text
(Mullaney) and notes 16-19 and accompanying text (Sandstrom).
48 Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 823.
" Id.; see supra note 21 (jury instructions).
48 Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 823; see Wilkins v. Maryland, 402 F. Supp. 76, 80 (D. Md. 1975),
aff'd mem., 538 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1976) (first-degree murder conviction cures erroneous heat
of passion instruction), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1044 (1977). Harmless error exists whenever a
court errs but the error does not prejudice the substantive rights of the defendant. See Har-
rington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969) (6th Amendment violation was harmless
beyond reasonable doubt); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (constitutional error
[Vol. 40:459
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
reasoned that the state, by proving the elements of first-degree murder
beyond a reasonable doubt, necessarily disproved manslaughter beyond
a reasonable doubt.49 The jury, by finding that the murder was willful,
premeditated, and deliberated, rejected the defendant's claim that
mitigating factors were present. 0 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the
erroneous instructions concerning mitigating factors addressed only the
distinction between manslaughter and second-degree murder" and thus
did not affect the first-degree murder conviction.2
After concluding that the erroneous intoxication and heat of passion
instructions were harmless error, the Fourth Circuit addressed the
defendant's challenge to the instructions explaining the justification of
self-defense.- The Guthrie court noted that the Supreme Court ruling in
Patterson allows a state to impose on a criminal defendant the burden of
proving self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence.? Nevertheless,
the Fourth Circuit held Patterson inapplicable because malice is an ele-
ment of murder in Maryland.? The court reasoned that the state, in pro-
ving the element of malice, must disprove any defense which negates the
existence of malice. 6 The Fourth Circuit stated that malicious acts, by
definition,57 are without legal justification or excuseO and thus concluded
that the legal justification of self-defense is wholly inconsistent with
harmless only if court can declare the error harmless beyond reasonable doubt); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2111 (1976) (harmless error); FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) (harmless error).
" Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 823.
5 Id.
5' Id. at 824; see supra note 39 (mitigation defense concerns only distinction between
second-degree murder and manslaughter).
I Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 823; see supra text accompanying note 47 (Guthrie instruction
on first-degree murder elements adequate).
I Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 824-26; see supra note 39 and accompanying text (distinction
between defenses of mitigation and defenses of justification).
' Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 823, n.4; see Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206-10 (1977);
see also Baker v. Muncy, 619 F.2d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1980); Frazier v. Weatherholtz, 572 F.2d
944 (4th Cir.), cerL denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978). But see Wynn v. Mahoney, 600 F.2d 448, 451
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 950 (1979). In Baker and Frazier, the Fourth Circuit applied
Patterson and held that Virginia law allowed self-defense to be an affirmative defense
because unlawfulness or malice is not an element of murder in Virginia. Guthrie, 683 F.2d at
824, n.5; see Wynn, 600 F.2d at 451, n.4. In Wynn, the Fourth Circuit examined the North
Carolina murder statute, which includes unlawfulness as an element of murder, and decided
that Patterson did not allow North Carolina to label self-defense an affirmative defense.
Wynn, 600 F.2d at 451; see infra note 103 (discussion of Wynn).
I See Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 824 n.5; supra note 54 (Patterson applies when malice or
unlawfulness is not element of murder); infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (why
malice, as Maryland defined it, is inconsistent with self-defense).
Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 824 n.5.
, Id. at 822. The Guthrie Court instructed the jury that malice is the intentional do-
ing of a wrongful act to another without legal excuse or justification. Id.; see supra note 21
(jury instructions).
" See supra note 39 (distinguishing between justification defenses and excuse
defenses).
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malice. 9 Therefore, the state must disprove self-defense to establish the
element of malice, which is necessary for a murder conviction in
Maryland.'
Although the burden is on the state to disprove self-defense, the
Fourth Circuit held that the Guthrie instructions, considered as a
whole,6' shifted the risk of nonpersuasion to the defendant.2 The Guthrie
court noted that Maryland law, at the time of the defendant's trial,
placed the burden of proving self-defense on the defendant3 and from
that fact inferred that the trial court probably intended the burden of
proof to be on the defendant. 4 The court held that the jury, which had
received instructions that the burden is on the defendant to prove the
mitigation defenses,'5 likely understood, in the absence of a specific
charge to the contrary, that the same burden applied to the justification
defense of self-defense.6 The court rejected Maryland's assertion that
the general instruction explaining the state's burden of proof, con-
sidered with the sequence of instructions given, operated to negate any
potential jury confusion."' The Guthrie court emphasized that the trial
" Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 824 n.5.
'°Id.
" Id. at 826; see infra text accompanying notes 65-66 (jury likely understood instruc-
tions to shift burden to defendant).
" Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 826.
Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 825; see Squire v. State, 280 Md. 132, 134, 368 A.2d 1019, 1021
(1977) (summarizing Maryland law prior to Evans). The Maryland Court of Special Appeals,
however, ruled that the law of Maryland did not place the burden of proving self-defense on
the defendant. Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 664, 349 A.2d 300, 317 (1975), aff'd, 278 Md.
197, 205-06, 212, 362 A.2d 629, 635, 638 (1976).
" Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 825. The Guthrie dissent found no significance in the trial
judge's probable intentions concerning the allocation of the burden of proof. Id. at 826; see
infra note 82 and accompanying text (Guthrie dissent's view on probable intentions).
15 See supra note 21 (Guthrie jury instructions).
" Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 825; see supra note 39 (explaining justification and excuse
defenses).
" Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 826 n.9. In Guthrie, Maryland argued that, since the instruc-
tions on the mitigation defenses came after the self-defense instruction, the mitigation in-
structions could not have affected the jury's understanding of the burden of proof as to self-
defense. Id. Additionally, Mkryland argued that the general charge as to the state's burden
of proof, which came after the self-defense instruction, but made no specific reference to the
self-defense issue, cured the risk of jury confusion. Id. The Fourth Circuit considered the
two Maryland arguments logically inconsistent. Id. If the subsequent instructions as to
mitigation could not have influenced the jury on the self-defense claim, then the Fourth Cir-
cuit stated that a subsequent generalized burden of proof instruction could not have in-
fluenced the jury concerning the self-defense claim. Id.
The Guthrie court, however, rejected Maryland's contentions for reasons more impor-
tant than faulty logic. Id. The court stated that the state's first argument assumed the jury
clearly recalled the sequence of the instructions, an assumption the court termed fanciful.
Id. The Fourth circuit further noted that both of Maryland's arguments view the instruc-
tions in segments and thereby contravene the well-established principle that jury instruc-
tions should be read as a whole. Id.; see Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1973) (well-
established that appellate courts should view jury instructions in context of overall charge).
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court improperly permitted the jury to rely upon a presumption of
malice and did not properly instruct the jury to apply the limiting
phrase "without legal excuse or justification," which is part of the defini-
tion of malice.' The Fourth Circuit concluded that the jury instructions,
viewed as a whole, erroneously relieved the state of the constitutional
burden of proving every element of the crime.61
After holding the self-defense instruction erroneous, the Fourth Cir-
cuit addressed the state's assertion that the error was harmless.7" The
Guthrie court reversed the district court and held that a verdict of first-
degree murder, returned after proper instructions on the elements of
the crime, does not render an erroneous instruction on self-defense
harmless.7' Although the Fourth Circuit held that the first-degree
murder verdict cured the erroneous instructions on mitigation,72 the
court distinguished the mitigation defenses from the defenses of
justification, such as self-defense.73 Self-defense renders a homicide
justifiable and thus constitutes an absolute defense.74 Any error in a self-
defense instruction, therefore, is necessarily prejudicial.75 Because self-
defense exonerates an accused of any degree of culpable homicide,7" the
Fourth Circuit held that a conviction of first-degree murder does not
cure an erroneous self-defense instruction.77 The Guthrie court emphasized
that self-defense would relieve an accused of guilt for a premeditated
and deliberated killing as well as for a killing in the heat of passion,
whereas the mitigation defenses would not reduce a premeditated and
Finally, the Guthrie court stated that Maryland's arguments rested on the mere hope that
the flawed instructions did not influence the jury. Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 826 n.9. The court
pointed out that the only excusable constitutional error is an error that is harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. Id.; see supra note 48 (harmless error).
" Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 836; see supra note 58 (definition of malice given to jury).
" Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 826; see supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text (constitutional
basis for requiring state to prove every element of crime).
7 Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 824-26.
I' d. at 824; see Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 656, 349 A.2d 300, 317 (1975), aff'd,
278 Md. 197, 362 A.2d 629 (1976) (effect of Mullaney decision on Maryland law). The Guthrie
court, applying language from Evans, held that instructions that relieve the state of the
burden of ultimate persuasion on the issue of nonjustification or nonexcuse, when either is a
fair issue in the case, are constitutional error. Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 824. The Guthrie court
further held that the constitutional error merits a reversal regardless of the degree of
homicide of which the defendant was convicted. Id.; Mullaney, 421 U.S. 684, 697 (1975); see
infra text accompanying notes 72-79 (Guthrie court's reasons for requiring reversal).
I See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text (erroneous mitigation instructions
cured by first-degree murder verdict).
73 Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 824; see supra note 39 (distinction between mitigation defenses
and justification or excuse defenses).
7' Wynn v. Mahoney, 600 F.2d 448, 450 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 950 (1979).
75 Id.
7' Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 825; see Wynn v. Mahoney, 600 F.2d 448, 450 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 950 (1979); supra note 71 (discussion of reversible error) and text accompa-
nying note 75 (self-defense exonerates criminal defendant).
Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 825.
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deliberated killing. 8 The Guthrie court concluded, therefore, that the er-
roneous self-defense instruction was not harmless error, reversed the
district court, and remanded the case with instructions to issue the writ
of habeas corpus or conduct another trial. 9
The dissent described as flawed and fictitious the majority's conclu-
sion that the jury instructions were prejudicial and constituted reversi-
ble error." The dissent maintained that the instructions could not have
led the jury to conclude that the defendant had the burden of proof on
the issue of self-defense.8 According to the dissent, the majority's
reliance on the trial judge's silent intentions was completely
unreasonable.82 Instead of holding the jury instructions to be unconstitu-
tional and reversible error, the dissent would have accepted Maryland's
contention that the sequence of the instructions coupled with the
general instruction on the burden of proof clarified the law for the jury.'
The dissent concluded that the instructions did not mislead the jury
about the state's burden of proof and therefore, the dissent would have
upheld the conviction. 4
While the dissent and the majority would have decided Guthrie dif-
ferently, the two opinions agree that an appellate court must decide the
constitutionality of a jury instruction in the context of the overall
charge." Other circuit courts agree with the Fourth Circuit and do not
judge the constitutionality of a jury instruction in isolation from the en-
tire charge. The circuit courts do, however, apply varying standards to
determine whether jury instructions viewed in their entirety, violate
due process. 7 The standard in the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, like the
' Id.; see Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 664, 349 A.2d 300, 317 (1975), aff'd, 278 Md.
197, 205, 362 A.2d 629, 635 (1976) (self-defense relieves accused of guilt for premeditated
murder, whereas mitigation defenses do not).
"' See id. at 826.
" Id. at 826-27 (Hall, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 826 (Hall, J., dissenting).
82 Id.; see supra note 64 and text accompanying notes 63-64 (majority's reference to
trial court's probable intentions).
Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 826-27 (Hall, J., dissenting); see supra note 67 and accompanying
text (Maryland's arguments).
', Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 826-27 (Hall, J., dissenting).
Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1973) (well-established that courts must
view jury instructions in context of overall charge); Boyd v. United States, 271 U.S. 104,
107-08 (1926) (same).
" E.g., Nelson v. Scully, 672 F.2d 266, 271-72 (2d Cir.) (decide instruction's constitu-
tionality by viewing instructions as a whole), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2301 (1982); Jacks v.
Duckworth, 651 F.2d 480, 486-87 (7th Cir. 1981) (same), cerL denied, 102 S. Ct. 1010 (1982);
United States v. Tecumseh, 630 F.2d 749, 754 (10th Cir.) (same), cert.' denied, 449 U.S. 961
(1980); United States ex rel Goddard v. Vaughn, 614 F.2d 929, 935 (3rd Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 844 (1980); Gagne v. Meachum, 602 F.2d 471, 473 (1st Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979).
See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (different standards that circuit courts
apply to decide constitutionality of instructions).
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Fourth Circuit, is whether the jury instruction could mislead a reason-
able juror.' The First, Second, Third, Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Cir-
cuits, however, hold that the erroneous instruction must infect the en-
tire trial so much that the resulting conviction violates due process. 9
Courts adopting the latter standard give greater weight to the curative
effect of a general instruction that explains the state's burden of proof."
Under either standard, however, the appellate court examines the in-
structions as a whole and decides whether the instructions relieved the
state of the burden of proving an element of the crime.91
The Fourth Circuit in Guthrie evaluated the jury instructions and
decided that, viewed as a whole, the instructions erroneously placed the
risk of nonpersuasion concerning self-defense on the defendant.92 The
Guthrie court's analysis is a sound application of the current Supreme
Court position on the burden of proof in criminal cases. 3 While the
Supreme Court in Patterson seemingly accorded legislatures tremen-
dous latitude in defining crimes,94 the Court has held consistently that
due process demands that the state prove every element of the crime
however defined. 5 The Supreme Court has not considered yet whether a
I See, e.g., Adkins v. Bordenkircher, 674 F.2d 279, 282 n.7 (4th Cir. 1982) (alibi instruc-
tion that could mislead jury is erroneous); Dietz v. Solem, 640 F.2d 126, 129 (8th Cir. 1981)
(Sandstrom type instruction not cured by presumption of innocence, burden of proof and
reasonable doubt instruction); Halloway v. McElroy, 632 F.2d 605, 620 (5th Cir.) (shifting
burden of proving self-defense to defendant is patently not harmless error), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 1028 (1980). But ef. Gore v. Leeke, 605 F.2d 741, 743 (4th Cir. 1979) (citing Cupp v.
Naughten, 414 U.S. 141 (1973)) (repeated instruction about reasonable doubt cured burden-
shifting instruction), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1087 (1980).
"' See, e.g., Nelson v. Scully, 672 F.2d 266, 271-72 (2d Cir.) (erroneous instruction must
infect entire trial to violate due process), cert. denie6, 102 S. Ct. 2301 (1982); Jacks v.
Duckworth, 651 F.2d 480, 486-87 (7th Cir. 1981) (same), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1010 (1982);
United States v. Tecumseh, 630 F.2d 749, 754 (10th Cir.) (erroneous instruction does not re-
quire reversal), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 961 (1980); Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107, 1111 (9th
Cir.) (erroneous instruction must infect entire trial to violate due process), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 922 (1980); United States ex rel Goddard v. Vaughn, 614 F.2d 929, 935 (3rd Cir.) (er-
roneous instruction does not require reversal), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 844 (1980); Gagne v.
Meachum, 602 F.2d 471, 474 (1st Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 922 (1979).
90 See, e.g., Jacks v. Duckworth, 651 F.2d 480, 486-87 (7th Cir. 1981) (presuming prob-
able consequences of voluntary act are intended), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1010 (1982); United
States v. Tecumseh, 630 F.2d 749, 754 (10th Cir.) (malice aforethought instruction), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 961 (1980); United States ex rel Goddard v. Vaughn, 614 F.2d 929, 931 n.2,
935 (3rd Cir.) (voluntary intoxication instruction), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 844 (1980). The
Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have no steadfast rule stating that a general instruction
will always cure an erroneous instruction. The cases cited, however, illustrate that the
courts will allow a general instruction to cure a burden-shifting instruction.
" Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 825-26. Compare note 88 and accompanying text (instruction er-
roneous if it could mislead a reasonable juror) with note 89 and accompanying text (instruc-
tion violates due process if infects entire trial).
Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 826.
See supra notes 5-19 and accompanying text (Supreme Court precedents).
" See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (Patterson holding).
' E.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 685 (1975) (state must prove every element of
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state can label self-defense an affirmative defense, which would allow
the states to shift the burden of proof to the accused." Until the
Supreme Court addresses the question of the proper allocation of the
burden of proof on the issue of self-defense, court decisions concerning
the question will depend on whether self-defense negates a statutory ele-
ment of the crime.
9 7
A state cannot impose upon a criminal defendant the burden of prov-
ing an affirmative defense that negates an element of the crime98
because that would relieve the state of the constitutional burden of prov-
ing every element of the crime.9 Therefore, variations in state statutes
defining the elements of murder will result in apparently inconsistent
rulings on the constitutionality of similar self-defense instructions. 19 The
decisions will vary however, according to the definition of murder in the
prosecuting state.9 ' Since self-defense is wholly inconsistent with
malicious or unlawful acts, a state can label the justification of self-
defense as an affirmative defense only if state law does not include
unlawfulness or malice as an element of murder."°2
The Fourth Circuit accepts self-defense as an affirmative defense
when consistent with state murder law."°3 Under Maryland law however,
offense); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (same); see Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.
197, 205-06 (1977) (state can shift burden of proof on nonelements to defendant).
See Wynn v. Mahoney, 600 F.2d 448, 450 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 950 (1979).
' See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (state can shift to defendant burden of
proof on affirmative defenses that do not negate element of crime).
"9 See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 207 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.
684, 698, 701 (1975); supra notes 5-15 and accompanying text (discussion of Mullaney and
Patterson).
" See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 207-08 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.
684, 698 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970); supra notes 3-4 and accompanying
text (discussion of Winship).
"0 See infra note 103 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit precedents).
101 Id.
" See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206-08 (1977) (defendant can not be given
burden of proving affirmative defense that negates element of crime); Wynn v. Mahoney,
600 F.2d 448, 450-51 (4th Cir.) (self-defense can not be affirmative defense if malice is included
in murder definition), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 950 (1979); supra note 21 (definition of malice
given to Guthrie jury).
"' Compare Baker v. Muncy, 619 F.2d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1980) (Virginia law does not
consider malice or unlawfulness element of murder, thus self-defense can be affirmative
defense) and Frazier v. Weatherholtz, 572 F.2d 994, 995-96 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 876 (1978) with Wynn v. Mahoney, 600 F.2d 448, 451 (4th Cir.) (North Carolina law con-
siders unlawfulness element of murder, thus self-defense cannot be affirmative defense),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 950 (1979). In Baker and Frazier the Fourth Circuit held that self-
defense is an affirmative defense under Virginia law and that the state may, under prin-
ciples set forth in Patterson, place the burden of proving self-defense on the accused. Baker,
619 F.2d at 331; Frazier, 572 F.2d at 995-96. The Fourth Circuit noted, in Baker and Frazier,
that nothing indicated that Virginia regarded unlawfulness as an element of murder and,
therefore, the state need not disprove self-defense to prove unlawfulness. See Baker, 619
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malice is an element of murder and therefore the state must disprove
self-defense when the evidence fairly raises the issue.0 4 Therefore, the
Guthrie court's decision that the burden-shifting instructions were
reversible error is sound reasoning and a correct application of the
Supreme Court's current position to the murder law of Maryland.
The Guthrie decision is in harmony with the Supreme Court prin-
ciples enunciated in Mullaney, Patterson, and Sandstrom."5 The decision
also reflects the Fourth Circuit's understanding of the need to balance
the state's right to label as an affirmative defense any defense that does
not negate an element of the crime, against the defendant's right to pro-
tection against jury instructions that unconstitutionally shift the burden
of proof to the defendant." 6 Until the Supreme Court decides the ques-
tion of the burden of proof on the issue of self-defense in a murder case
in which the evidence fairly raises the issue,"7 the Fourth Circuit will
continue to balance the conflicting rights of the states and the criminal
defendant as the court did in Guthrie. The general lesson from the
Guthrie decision for Fourth Circuit practitioners is that the court will
allow a state to shift the burden of proof to a criminal defendant by label-
ing certain defenses as affirmative defenses only if the defense does not
negate an element of the crime.
BARRY J. GAINEY
B. Double Jeopardy and Post-Verdict Judgments of Acquittal
The double jeopardy principle prohibits the Government from bring-
ing subsequent criminal prosecutions against the same defendant for the
same offense when the prosecution has failed to obtain a conviction in a
F.2d at 311; Frazier, 572 F.2d at 995. In Wynn, however, the Fourth Circuit had to apply the
same Supreme Court precedents to North Carolina law. Wynn, 600 F.2d at 450-51. Since
North Carolina statutes define unlawfulness, or the absence of self-defense, as an element of
murder, the rationale of Patterson, which applies only to affirmative defenses, was inap-
plicable in Wynn. Wynn, 600 F.2d at 451. The apparently contradictory rulings by the
Fourth Circuit are a result of the different definitions of murder in Virginia and North
Carolina. See Baker, 619 F.2d at 331; Wynn, 600 F.2d at 451; Frazier, 572 F.2d at 995.
1 Guthrie, 683 F.2d at 822; see supra note 21 (jury instructed that murder is unlawful
killing with malice aforethought).
... See supra notes 5-19 and accompanying text (discussion of Mullaney, Patterson and
Sandstrom).
" See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206-08 (1977); supra notes 10-15 and accom-
panying text (discussion of Patterson).
'" See Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 244-45 (1977). The Hankerson Court
declined to consider whether due process required the North Carolina prosecutor to
disprove self-defense because the parties did not raise the issue. Id. See Wynn v. Mahoney,
600 F.2d 448, 451 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 950 (1979).
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previous trial.1 The framers of the Constitution incorporated the
common-law double jeopardy prohibition2 into the fifth amendment of
1 See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957) (double jeopardy principle pro-
tects individuals from being subjected to hazards of trial and possible conviction more than
once for same offense); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 169 (1873) (double jeopardy
principle forbids multiple punishments for same offense); see also Schulhofer, Jeopardy and
Mistrials, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 449, 454 (1977) (prohibition against double jeopardy reflects
principles of res judicata by ensuring finality of judgment of acquittal and protecting
against multiple punishments for same offense); Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262,
267 (1965) (double jeopardy principle protects acquitted individuals from unnecessary
harassment that would result from reprosecution) [hereinafter cited as Twice in Jeopardy].
The double jeopardy prohibition against repeated prosecution reflects society's awareness
of the heavy strain upon individuals that accompanies criminal trials. United States v. Jorn,
400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (double jeopardy prohibition represents policy of finality for benefit
of defendant in criminal proceedings); see also Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978) (primary
purpose of double jeopardy prohibition is to protect integrity of final judgment). Society
seeks to spare the criminal defendant the anxiety, expense, and embarrassment inherent in
repeated criminal proceedings. Green, 355 U.S. at 187. Absent a double jeopardy prohibi-
tion, the state's superior resources and power would enable the state to make repeated ef-
forts to convict. Id. at 187-88. Through repeated prosecutions, the state could exhaust even
innocent defendants and obtain wrongful convictions. Id.
In American jurisprudence, jeopardy attaches when a criminal trial commences before
a judge or jury. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 479. Protection under the double jeopardy clause begins
when the jury has been empaneled and sworn. See Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734,
735-38 (1963). The guarantees of the double jeopardy prohibition, however, are not absolute.
See generally SchuIhofer, supra, at 454. Remnants of early restrictions remain, and
numerous competing interests have prompted the creation of new limitations. Id. For exam-
ple, the double jeopardy prohibition does not prevent reprosecution in all instances when a
competent tribunal does not issue a. final judgment. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688
(1949). In some cases, society's interest in fair and effective processing of criminal cases
must overcome a defendant's right to. have his trial completed by a particular tribunal. Id. at
689; see, e.g., Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271, 273-74 (1894) (double jeopardy pro-
hibition is inoperative when trial judge orders retrial due to jury bias); United States v.
Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824) (reprosecution permitted after mistrial declared
prior to verdict for reasons of absolute necessity).
2 See generally J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 1-37 (1969) (traces development of double
jeopardy prohibition) [hereinafter cited as SIGLER]. The concept of double jeopardy is one of
the oldest legal doctrines found in western civilization. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151
(1959) (Black, J., dissenting). The ancient Greek and Roman civilizations were familiar with
the double jeopardy principle. See SIGLER, supra, at 2 (Roman law permitted reprosecution
of acquitted defendant only within thirty days of former acquittal). The canon law recognized
the need to prevent reprosecution for the same offense. See id. at 3 (canon law's opposition
to placing individual twice in jeopardy was based on principle that God does not punish
twice for same transgression). At common law, special pleas dealt with the difficulties that
the prohibition against double jeopardy deals with today. Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 1,
at 262 n.1; see also SIGLER, supra, at 16-21 (Coke and Blackstone are most important con-
tributors to common-law development of double jeopardy principle). These special pleas in-
cluded autrefois acquit, former acquittal, and autrefois convict, former conviction. Twice in
Jeopardy, supra note 1, 262 n.1. The pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict
prevented retrial for the same criminal offense after the return of a verdict. 4 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *335-36; see also Schulhofer, supra note 1, at 453 (common-law
double jeopardy principle applied only in capital cases). See generally M. FRIEDLAND, Dou-
BLE JEOPARDY 5-15 (1969) (history of rule against double jeopardy).
[Vol. 40:459
FOURTH CIRCUIT RE VIE W
the Constitution.3 Prior to the Criminal Appeals Act of 1970 (the Act),4
statutes restricted the Government from appealing criminal cases to the
limit of the double jeopardy clause.' The Act, however, removes all
statutory barriers to Government appeals in criminal cases by allowing
the Government to appeal whenever the double jeopardy clause
permits.' Congress adopted the Act to allow courts to determine the
3 See U.S. CONST. amend V. The fifth amendment provides in part, "nor shall any per-
son be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .. ." Id. The
Supreme Court originally refused to apply the fifth amendment to the states through the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause. See, e.g., Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424,
426-27 (1953) (reprosecution of criminal defendant does not violate fundamental notions of
liberty and justice); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937) (same). But c. Palko, 302
U.S. at 328 (dictum) (flagrant violation of double jeopardy clause may violate fourteenth
amendment due process). Today, however, the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy applies to the states. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). See generally
Weston & Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 81
(1979) (analyzing Supreme Court decisions on double jeopardy); Recent
Developments-Emerging Standards in Supreme Court Double Jeopardy Analysis, 32
VAND. L. REV. 609 (1979) (discussing current status of law concerning double jeopardy).
' Criminal Appeals Act, Pub. L. No. 91-644, 84 Stat. 1890 (1971) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3731 (1976)).
1 See Criminal Appeals Act of 1907, ch. 2564, Pub. L. No. 59-223, 34 Stat. 1246 (1907)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976)) (authorizing Government appeals in limited
set of circumstances); see also United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 318 (1892) (Govern-
ment prohibited from appealing criminal case without statutory authorization). The
Criminal Appeals Act of 1907 (Act of 1907) permitted appeals from decisions dismissing an
indictment or an order arresting judgment when statutory invalidity or construction was
the basis of the judgment. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415, 416 (1956) (permit-
ting Government to appeal from order arresting judgment); United States v. Bramblett, 348
U.S. 503, 504 (1955) (same); see also State v. Efird, 186 N.C. 482, 482, 119 S.E. 881, 881 (1923)
(arrest of judgment is refusal of court to enter judgment for some reason that is apparent
upon record). See generally Note, Double Jeopardy and Government Appeals in Criminal
Cases, 12 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 295, 297 (1976) (several minor amendments prior to
1970 left Act of 1907 generally unchanged) [hereinafter cited as Double Jeopardy].
' See 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976). The Criminal Appeals Act provides in part:
In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals
from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an indictment or
information as to any one or more counts, except that no appeal shall lie where the
double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prose-
cution.
Id. In United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975), the Supreme Court concluded that the
legislative history of the Act reflects congressional intent to allow appeals whenever the
Constitution permits. Id. at 337; see also S. REP. No. 1296, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1970) (in-
dicated Judiciary Committee's intent to extend Government appeal right to constitutional
limits). Congress also intended that the courts should construe the Act liberally. See 18
U.S.C. § 3731 (1976) (courts must construe Act liberally in order to effectuate its purpose);
United States v. Correia, 531 F.2d 1095, 1097 (1st Cir. 1976) (same). But see United States v.
Comiskey, 460 F.2d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1972) (Act provides United States right to appeal
only within narrow instances specified); United States v. Hines, 419 F.2d 173, 174 (10th Cir.
1969) (strict construction of statute is required).
The Criminal Appeals Act of 1907 operated as a former statutory barrier to Govern-
ment appeals by specifying the cases in which appellate jurisdiction over Government ap-
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limits of Government appeals of criminal cases under the fifth amend-
ment's double jeopardy clause.7 The Act raises important questions con-
cerning the extent of appellate jurisdiction and the appropriate standard
of review once an appellate court has assumed jurisdiction over a
Government appeal.' In United States v. Steed,9 the Fourth Circuit ad-
dressed the issues of whether the Government may appeal a trial judge's
order overturning a jury's guilty verdict and by what standard an ap-
pellate court should review the trial judge's action."0
At trial, a jury found the defendant, Daryls Steed, guilty of furnishing
false statements to the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) in violation of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act."1 The
peals was proper. See supra note 5 (Act of 1907 permitted appeal of decisions dismissing in-
dictment and orders arresting judgments). The language of- common-law pleadings
embodied in the Act of 1907 was troublesome for the new generation of judges who had
familiarized themselves with the pleadings language of the federal rules. See Double
Jeopardy, supra note 5, at 297 (difficulty courts experienced with common-law pleadings
was manifested in improper classification of acquittals within one of pigeonholes that
statutory grant of jurisdiction recognized). Since many courts improperly classified
dismissals as arrests of judgment, policy dictated that such decisions were not appropriate
matters for appeal. Id.; see also United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 281-83 (1970) (arrest of
judgment recognizing young man's conscientious objector status was not an arrest of judg-
ment within meaning of Act of 1907). Conversely, many dismissals defied categorization and
the Government therefore did not appeal. See Double Jeopardy, supra note 5, at 297
(characterizing such results as "historical accidents"). Justice Harlan referred to the 1907
Act as "a failure" and "a most unruly child that has not improved with age." Sisson, 399
U.S. at 307.
7 See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339 (1975) (legislative history suggests
that Congress decided to rely on courts to define constitutional boundaries under fifth
amendment analysis); see also supra note 6 (Criminal Appeals Act extends Government ap-
pellate right to constitutional limits). Before Congress passed the Criminal Appeals Act, the
courts decided most cases on statutory grounds. See supra note 5 (discussing statutory
limitations on Government appeals dictated by Act of 1907). In Wilson, however, the court
was free to articulate a clear statement of the policy behind the double jeopardy clause. See
Wilson, 420 U.S. at 336, 342-46 (identifies policy against multiple prosecutions for the same
offense as crucial policy behind double jeopardy clause); see also Double Jeopardy, supra
note 5, at 302 (Wilson Court first court to isolate primary policy behind double jeopardy).
' United States v. White, 673 F.2d 299, 301-02 (10th Cir. 1982) (court determines
jurisdiction to hear Government appeal and then determines appropriate standard of
review); United States v. Dixon, 658 F.2d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 1981) (same); United States v.
Burns, 597 F.2d 939, 941 (5th Cir. 1979) (same). See generally 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3919 (1976) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT &
MILLER].
674 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 67 (1982).
"o Id. at 285.
" Id. at 286. The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (Land Sales Act) requires
subdivision developers to furnish prospective buyers with material information about lots
offered for sale. Id.; see Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82
Stat. 590 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-20 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). Any developer who
furnishes false information is criminally liable for such misrepresentation. Id. § 1717. The
Land Sales Act authorizes the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to provide ex-
emptions in addition to those the statute specifically provides for. Id. § 1702(c) (Secretary
may promulgate rules exempting developers from complying with Act due to limited
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jury also found Steed guilty of mail fraud. 2 In order to win a conviction on
the charges of furnishing false statements and mail fraud, the Govern-
ment must prove a specific intent to defraud.13 At trial, Steed did not
testify. 4 The jury therefore had to determine from circumstantial
evidence whether Steed had the requisite mental state to commit the of-
fense. 5 After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the defendant moved for
character of public offering); see also id. § 1702(a) (general exemptions Land Sales Act
recognizes). The Secretary has exempted developers of subdivisions of less than 300 lots
from complying with the Land Sales Act. HUD Land Registration Requirements, 24 C.F.R.
§ 1710.14 (1974) (current version at 24 C.F.R. § 1710.14 (1982)).
11 674 F.2d at 286. Congress has forbidden the use of the mails to execute a fraudulent
scheme. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976). The essential elements of mail fraud are, first, a scheme
conceived by the defendant for the purpose of defrauding by means of false pretenses,
representations, or promises. See Gold v. United States, 350 F.2d 953, 954-56 (8th Cir. 1965)
(promise to devote full time to business enterprise constitutes misrepresentation when
promising party knows that he will make no such effort). Second, the defendant must use
the United States mails in the furtherance of the scheme. See id. at 956 (prosecution may
prove elements of mail fraud by presenting circumstantial evidence).
11 674 F.2d at 287. To convict a defendant of violating the Land Sales Act, the Govern-
ment must demonstrate that the applicant, in order to gain exemption from the Act, wilfully
and materially misrepresented the extent of the public offering. See United States v.
Steinhilber, 484 F.2d 386, 389-90 (8th Cir. 1973) (court must look to defendant's meaning of
alleged misrepresentation when determining whether defendant wilfully was misleading).
Similarly, mail fraud requires specific intent to defraud. See Williams v. United States, 278
F.2d 535, 537 (9th Cir. 1960) (drawing check against insufficient funds constitutes specific in-
tent to defraud unless defendant had reasonable expectation that deposits would cover
check at time defendant presented check for payment).
Steed was president of Parkway Development Corporation. 674 F.2d at 287. Parkway
sold 86 lots of a subdivision that were once part of a large tract of land owned by Thomas
Beasley. Id. Parkway gained an exemption from HUD based upon Steed's representations
that she intended to sell only 86 lots as part of a common promotional plan. Id.; see 15 U.S.C.
§ 1702(c) (1976 & Supp. V. 1981) (Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act allows exemp-
tions based on limited character of sales offering). The prosecution argued that Parkway
Development was part of a larger promotional plan that included lots owned by Thomas
Beasley. See 674 F.2d at 287-88. If Steed was aware of the plan to sell Beasley's remaining
lots, the jury could find that she acted with fraudulent intent. Id. at 288. Steed contended
that the evidence was insufficient to show a common promotional plan. Id. Steed further
argued that the evidence was insufficient to show fraudulent intent. Id. Steed argued that
she was ignorant of any plans to market land adjoining Steed's tract as a common promo-
tional endeavor. Id.
674 F.2d at 288.
" Id. The evidence established that Steed had experience in the land development
business. Id. The facts also showed that Beasley's 460 acre tract would not have qualified
for the HUD exemption. Id. Steed agreed that Beasley was to receive a large profit from the
sale of the 86 lot tract. Id. Steed thus knew that Beasley was participating in the profits
realized from the land that he previously owned. Id. Since Beasley participated in the pro-
fits, he qualified as one of the developers of the Parkway subdivision. See id.; 15 U.S.C.
§ 1701(5) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (developer is any person who directly or indirectly offers to
sell lots in subdivision); see also id. § 17014) (defining common promotional plan). Steed,
however, never disclosed Beasley's interest in the profits in her application to HUD. 674
F.2d at 288.
Steed employed a lawyer to prepare the exemption application. Id. The attorney
testified that he discussed the restrictions and requirements of the Land Sales Act with
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a judgment of acquittal or, alternatively, a new trial." The district court
granted the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal and dismissed
the jury's verdict on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to
convict the defendant. 1 The United States appealed the district court's
post-verdict judgment of acquittal to the Fourth Circuit under the
Criminal Appeals Act. 8
The Fourth Circuit in Steed first determined that the court had
jurisdiction to hear the Government's appeal. 9 The Steed court relied on
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Wilson 0 to determine
Steed and Beasley. Id. The attorney cautioned Steed and Beasley that the Land Sales Act
required the two developers to operate as autonomous entities. Id.
Notwithstanding the attorney's advice, Steed's promotion company sent sweepstakes
prize offerings to many prospective purchasers who showed an interest in Beasley's tract as
well as Parkway's subdivision. Id. at 289. The evidence also showed that Steed and Beasley
employed the same sales teams. Id. Based upon this circumstantial evidence, the jury con-
cluded that Steed had violated the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act by intentionally
misrepresenting the nature of the land development operation. Id. at 286-89.
"6 674 F.2d at 285. At the close of the Government's case, Steed moved for a judgment
of acquittal pursuant to rule 29(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. United States
v. Steed, 646 F.2d 136, 137 (4th Cir. 1981), vacated, 674 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 67 (1982). Rule 29(a) permits a court to enter a judgment of acquittal upon a
defendant's motion or upon the court's motion. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a). The defendant may
move for a judgment of acquittal at the close of either side's case on the ground that the
evidence is insufficient to convict. Id. See generally J. MOORE & R. CIPES, 8A MOORE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE J 29.01-29.09 (2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as MOORE]; 2 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 8, §§ 461-70. In Steed, the district court denied the defendant's motion.
646 F.2d at 137. Steed refiled the motion to acquit at the close of all the evidence. Id. The
district court submitted the case to the jury, and reserved its decision under rule 29(b). Id.
Under rule 29(b), a court may decide on the motion before the court submits the case to the
jury or after the jury returns a verdict. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(b). Steed moved for acquittal
under rule 29(c) after the jury entered the guilty verdict. 646 F.2d at 137; see FED. R. CRIo.
P. 29(c) (rule 29(c) permits defendant to move for judgment of acquittal within seven days
after court discharges jury).
17 646 F.2d at 137. In Steed, the district court also granted defendant's alternative mo-
tion for a new trial. Id.; see infra note 38 (discussing district court's order granting defend-
ant's alternative motion for new trial).
'" 674 F.2d at 285. A Fourth Circuit panel held that the court had jurisdiction to hear
the Government appeal of the district court's post-verdict acquittal. 646 F.2d at 138. The
panel then concluded that an appellate court should give absolute deference to a trial court's
assessment of the evidence. Id. at 143. The panel therefore affirmed the judgment of acquit-
tal. Id. at 142-43. The Fourth Circuit, however, granted the Government's request for an en
banc rehearing. 674 F.2d at 285 n.1.
9 674 F.2d at 285-86.
420 U.S. 332 (1975). In Wilson, the jury found the defendant guilty of converting
union funds to his own use. Id. at 333. The defendant then moved for an acquittal not-
withstanding the jury's verdict. Id. The trial court granted the defendant's motion on the
grounds that the delay between the commission of the offense and the indictment prejudiced
the defendant's right to a fair trial. Id. See generally Trapaga, Recent Supreme Court Deci-
sions on Double Jeopardy, 18 REv. D. P. 267 (1979) (Wilson case is seminal decision defining
scope of Government appeals that are not barred by double jeopardy clause); Double
Jeopardy, supra note 5, at 300-07 (discussion of Wilson decision); The Supreme Court, 1974
Term, 89 HARv. L. REV. 53 (1975) (same).
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the extent of appellate jurisdiction over Government appeals of post-
verdict acquittals in criminal trials." The Wilson Court considered
whether the double jeopardy clause prohibited the Government from ap-
pealing a post-verdict judgment of acquittal.' The Court concluded that
an appeal from an acquittal would not violate the double jeopardy clause
as long as reversal would not result in a second trial.' Since the double
jeopardy clause would not prohibit the appeal, the Criminal Appeals Act
authorized the federal circuit courts to hear the appeal.u The Steed
21 674 F.2d at 285-86.
420 U.S. at 335-39. The legislative history of the Criminal Appeals Act illustrates
congressional intent to expand the scope of appellate review over Government appeals in
criminal cases. See id. (Wilson Court capsulized legislative history of Act); see also supra
note 6 (Senate Judiciary Committee intended to extend Government right to appeal to con-
stitutional limits). The Conference Committee amended the proposed bill to include
authorization to appeal "from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an
indictment or information ... except that no appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy
clause ... prohibits further prosecution." H.R. REP. No. 1768, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1970);
see 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976), supra note 6 (language in Criminal Appeals Act resembles
amendment proposed by Conference Committee). This amendment reflects Congress' desire
to eliminate all statutory barriers to Government appeals. 420 U.S. at 338-39. The Wilson
Court concluded that the changes implemented by the House Conference Committee were
consistent with the Senate's desire to extend broadly the Government's right to appeal. Id.
The Wilson Court also concluded that the Act's language suggests congressional deference
to the ability of the federal courts to define the constitutional boundaries of Government ap-
peals. Id. at 339.
In Wilson, the Supreme Court noted that the double jeopardy clause provides three
related protections. Id. at 343. The double jeopardy clause protects defendants against a sec-
ond trial for the same offense after an acquittal. Id.; North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,
717 (1969). The clause also forbids a second prosecution after conviction. Pearce, 395 U.S. at
717. Finally, the double jeopardy prohibition disallows multiple punishments for the same
offense. Id. See generally Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on
Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1001 (1980) (discussion of
Pearce). The Wilson Court noted that the interests underlying the three protections provided
by the double jeopardy clause are similar. 420 U.S. at 343; see supra note 1 (identifiable in-
terests include preservation of adjudicated decisions, prevention of continued state harrass-
ment of acquitted defendants and avoidance of multiple prosecutions for same offense).
' 420 U.S. at 344. The Wilson Court reasoned that a defendant could not invoke the
double jeopardy prohibition to benefit from legal errors by district courts when appellate
courts could correct the error without subjecting the defendant to another trial. Id. at 345.
A reversal of the district court's post-verdict judgment of acquittal merely would reinstate
the jury's conclusion. Id. at 344-45. Review of such an order does not offend the constitu-
tional policy against multiple prosecutions. Id. at 345; see also supra note 7 (policy against
multiple prosecutions is crucial policy behind double jeopardy). Numerous Supreme Court
cases have upheld the Government's right to appeal an order favoring the defendant. See,
e.g., United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97 (1978) (Government may appeal after judge
grants motion to dismiss unless dismissal constitutes acquittal); United States v. Green, 350
U.S. 415, 416 (1956) (permitting Government to appeal from order arresting judgment after
jury returned verdict against defendant); United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 504
(1955) (appellate court had jurisdiction to hear Government's appeal from order arresting
judgment); United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824) (Government may ap-
peal court-ordered mistrial when manifest necessity exists for appeal).
" See supra note 23 (double jeopardy clause forbids reprosecution for same offense).
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court reasoned that since reversal of the trial judge's post-verdict ac-
quittal merely would reinstate the jury's guilty verdict against Steed
and would not require a second trial, the court had jurisdiction to review
the trial court's post-verdict judgment of acquittal.'
The Steed court next considered the standard of review required to
assess the district court's post-verdict acquittal based on insufficiency of
the evidence. 8 Relying on the traditional power of federal trial judges to
protect criminal defendants from jury abuse, the defendant argued that
the appellate court must give absolute deference to the district court's
rulingY The Steed court explained, however, that absolute deference to
the district court's finding would frustrate the purposes behind the
Criminal Appeals Act.' The Fourth Circuit found that the Supreme
Court's decision in Glasser v. United States2 provided the proper stand-
ard of review of the trial court's post-verdict acquittal." In Glasser, the
Supreme Court held that an appellate court must sustain a jury's guilty
verdict if substantial evidence supports the verdict.3 The reviewing
court must weigh the evidence in the light most favorable to the Govern-
ment.2 The standard of review, the Steed court stated, is the same
674 F.2d at 285-86.
26 Id. at 286.
= Id. The Steed court noted that a standard of absolute deference to a district court's
ruling would achieve symmetry in the disposition of all acquittal judgments based on insuffi-
ciency of the evidence. Id. The Supreme Court has determined that the prosecution may not
appeal judgments of acquittal entered before the case goes to the jury. See Fong Foo v.
United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (per curiam) (double jeopardy clause prohibits
Government appeal of court's pre-verdict acquittal because such order is final termination
of trial). An absolute deference standard would treat post-verdict acquittals in the same
way the Fong Foo Court treated pre-verdict acquittals. See United States v. Dixon, 658
F.2d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 1981) (dictum) (court criticizes absolute deference standard adopted by
Fourth Circuit panel in superseded Steed decision).
2 674 F.2d at 286; see infra text accompanying notes 88-97 (standard of absolute
deference forces appellate court to abandon its reviewing function). The Steed court ex-
plained that the standard of absolute deference conflicted with the congressional intent
reflected in the Act's legislative history. 674 F.2d at 286; see supra notes 6, 22 (discussion of*
legislative intent). In the Criminal Appeals Act, Congress expressed its preference for ap-
pellate review. Id. Congress did not intend to provide the trial judge with the power con-
clusively to assess the evidence. Id.
315 U.S. 60 (1942). In Glasser, the jury returned guilty verdicts against two United
States attorneys for conspiring to defraud the government. Id. at 63. Defendant Glasser ap-
pealed the conviction, claiming that the trial court denied him effective counsel by appointing
Glasser's attorney also to represent his co-conspirator. Id. at 67. The Supreme Court held
that the appointment violated Glasser's right to effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 76; see
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (accused in criminal prosecutions has right to assistance of counsel).
See generally, Comment, Deprivation of Right to Assistance of Counsel by Appointment of
Attorney Representing Co-Conspirator, 9 U. Cn. L. REv. 733 (1942).
o 674 F.2d at 286.
a' 315 U.S. at 80.
Id. According to Glasser, appellate courts should not weigh the evidence or deter-
mine the credibility of witnesses. Id. The jury weighs conflicting testimony, determines the
credibility of witnesses, and draws factual inferences. Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344,
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whether the defendant or the Government brings the appeal."
Applying the Glasser standard of review, the Steed court found that
the district court erred in dismissing the jury's guilty verdict.' The
Fourth Circuit conceded that the evidence of the requisite mental state
was circumstantial. 5 However, the Steed court concluded that the cir-
cumstantial evidence showed beyond a reasonable doubt that Steed had
the requisitie mental state. 8 The court held that the evidence, viewed in
the light most favorable to the Government, supported the verdict. 7 The
Fourth Circuit, therefore, remanded the case for reinstatement of the
jury's verdict."
373 (1906); United States v. Beck, 615 F.2d 441, 448 (7th Cir. 1980). Appellate courts should
attach no significance to the fact that the district court considers a jury verdict improper
due to jury inconsistency, compromise, or compassion. 615 F.2d at 488.
1 674 F.2d at 286. The Glasser standard considers whether a jury verdict has substan-
tial evidentiary support, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Govern-
ment. 315 U.S. at 80; see supra notes 31 & 32 and accompanying text. The Glasser standard
is the recognized standard of review in the Fourth Circuit when a defendant brings an ap-
peal questioning the sufficiency of the evidence. See infra notes 82-87 and accompanying
text (discussing Fourth Circuit's adoption of Glasser standard when assessing defendant's
appeal on grounds of evidentiary insufficiency). The Fourth Circuit in Steed concluded that
the function of the appellate court remains unchanged whether the defense or prosecution
brings an appeal. 674 F.2d at 286.
674 F.2d at 285.
Id. at 288; see supra note 15 (discussing circumstantial evidence upon which jury
based its verdict).
- 674 F.2d at 286-89. The Steed court determined that ample evidence existed from
which the jury could have found the defendant guilty of violating the Land Sales Act and
committing mail fraud. Id. at 289; see supra notes 13, 15 (facts and evidence available to
jury).
674 F.2d at 286-89.
Id. at 290. In addition to finding that the district court erred in dismissing the jury's
guilty verdict, the Steed court determined that the Fourth Circuit had jurisdiction to
review the district court's conditional grant of a new trial. Id. The Fourth Circuit noted that
rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was inapplicable in this appeal. See id. at
289 (rule 33 was amended in 1966 and therefore rule 33 was not applicable to situation aris-
ing under Criminal Appeals Act of 1970); supra note 6 & 7 (Criminal Appeals Act extends
Government's right to appeal to new limits). Rule 33 provides that a trial court may grant a
defendant's motion for a new trial when the court finds that a new trial is necessary in the
interests of justice. FED. R. CRIM. P. 33. See generally 2 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8,
§§ 551-59. The Supreme Court has held that the final judgment rule is the same in criminal
and civil cases. Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 518 (1956); see also ABA COMM. ON
SENTENCING AND REVIEW, Approved draft, at 1 (1969) (essential character of appellate
criminal procedure has been shaped by civil appeals). The final judgment rule in Anglo-
American jurisprudence holds that a party may appeal to an appellate court only from a
final judgment. Poston Springfield Brick Co. v. Brockett, 183 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Mo. 1944); see
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) (appeal to federal appellate courts must be from final decisions of
district courts). See generally Crick, The Final Judgment As a Basis For Appeal, 41 YALE
L. J. 539 (1932). The Fourth Circuit, therefore, looked to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
50(c)(1) to determine the scope of the final judgment rule when a trial court issues a post-
verdict acquittal and conditionally grants a new trial. 674 F.2d at 289.
Rule 50(c)(1) permits a party to move for a conditional grant of a new trial at the same
time the party requests a motion notwithstanding the verdict. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(c)(1); see
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The dissent disagreed with the majority's extension of the Glasser
standard to Government appeals from post-verdict acquittals. 9 The dis-
sent contended that Congress did not intend that the Glasser standard
should govern appeals from post-verdict acquittals." Congress, rather,
was silent regarding the standard of review for Government appeals."
According to the dissent, Congress therefore has reserved to the courts
the duty to develop the appropriate standard of review.42 The dissent
concluded that a standard of absolute deference to the trial court's judg-
ment best protects the traditional right of criminal defendants to have
post-verdict acquittals given absolute finality. 3
FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b) (judgment notwithstanding verdict is judgment entered by order of
court when jury has returned verdict favorable to opposing party). The moving party or-
dinarily presents the two motions simultaneously. 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 2539.
By making the alternative motion for a new trial, the party asks the court to allow the mov-
ing party a new trial if the court decides or rules against the party's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. Id. Under rule 50(c)(1), federal appellate courts can review con-
ditional grants of a new trial without affecting the finality of the judgment. 674 F.2d at 289.
The Fourth Circuit in Steed therefore concluded that it had jurisdiction to review the condi-
tional grant of a new trial. Id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 50(c)(1), advisory committee note
(once trial court conditionally grants motion for new trial and reverses judgment, new trial
shall proceed unless appellate court has ordered otherwise). Under the rule, the appellate
court can reinstate the jury verdict, reversing the conditional grant of a new trial. 674 F.2d
at 289. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the court could apply to criminal appeals a final
judgment analysis under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. The Fourth Circuit
therefore had jurisdiction to review the alternative grant of a new trial. Id.
After addressing the jurisdictional issue, the Steed court considered whether the trial
court's conditional grant of a new trial-was appropriate. Id. at 289-90. The defendant argued
that the admission of certain evidence was fatally prejudicial and therefore the order grant-
ing a conditional new trial was appropriate. Id. at 290. The district court admitted the
testimony of three witnesses who reported on misrepresentations made to them by Steed's
salesman. Id. Steed argued that she was not responsible for the salesman's misconduct. Id.
The Fourth Circuit rejected the defendant's argument, holding that the probative value of
the evidence outweighed any possible prejudice. Id. The court accordingly reversed the con-
ditional grant of a new trial. Id.; see id. at 289 n.9 (language in footnote suggests that
district court granted conditional trial because court believed case was ripe for appellate
review).
" 674 F.2d at 290-92 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 290 (Phillips, J., dissenting). The dissent explained that Congress could impose
standards of review upon the federal courts and has done so in administrative areas. Id. at
291. The dissent noted however that Congress has been reluctant to do so in criminal areas.
Id.
" 674 F.2d at 291 (Phillips, J. dissenting).
4. Id. (Phillips, J., dissenting). When the legislature has failed or refused to impose
standards of appellate review, the appellate courts traditionally have defined the ap-
propriate standards of review. Id.
" 674 F.2d at 292 (Phillips, J., dissenting). The dissent suggested a standard of review
based on the principle of finality that attends fact-based judgments of acquittal by trial
courts. Id. at 291. The dissent contended that the finality principle did not evolve out of the
double jeopardy prohibition. Id. The dissent argued that the concept of finality exists as a
fundamental right of defendants, independent of double jeopardy considerations. Id. The
dissent therefore argued that the Criminal Appeals Act does not upset the historical right
of criminal defendants to have fact-based determinations accorded finality. See id. at 292.
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Although the Supreme Court has not ruled upon the precise jurisdic-
tional question at issue in Steed, the Fourth Circuit's holding is consist-
ent with recent Supreme Court decisions construing the Criminal Ap-
peals Act and the double jeopardy clause."' According to United States
v. Wilson,45 courts may assume jurisdiction over Government appeals as
long as reversal will not subject the defendant to a second trial for the
same offense. 6 In Wilson, the defendant, in a post-verdict motion, re-
quested dismissal of the jury's guilty verdict on the ground that the
delay between the commission of the offense and the indictment pre-
judiced the defendant's right to a fair trial.47 The district court granted
the defendant's motion and the Government appealed the order.48 The
Supreme Court allowed the appeal since the appeal would not subject
the defendant to reprosecution for the same offense but merely would
reinstate the jury's guilty verdict.49 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit in
The dissent also suggested that appellate review should not extend beyond the correction of
legal errors. See id. at 290. Appellate courts should not disturb a trial court's conclusion
that the evidence was factually insufficient to convict. See id.
" See infra notes 45-63 and accompanying text (discussion of Supreme Court analysis
for determining extent of appellate jurisdiction over government appeals of criminal cases).
Wilson instructs appellate courts to focus on the avoidance of retrial as the defendant's only
substantial interest when considering the constitutionality of a Government appeal. See
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 344 (1975) (double jeopardy clause not offended when
no threat of multiple prosecution). This approach draws a distinction between an acquittal
by verdict entered by trier of fact and a judgment of acquittal setting aside a guilty verdict.
Double Jeopardy, supra note 5, at 311. An appeal by the Government will lie if the record
reveals that a court-ordered acquittal has displaced a guilty verdict entered by the trier of
fact. See United States v. Rose, 429 U.S. 5, 5 (1976) (per curiam) (Government may appeal
post-verdict suppression of evidence when jury has returned guilty verdict); United States
v. Morrison, 429 U.S. 1, 3 (1976) (per curiam) (Government may appeal district court's sup-
pression of evidence after court has convicted in nonjury trial); United States v. Wilson, 420
U.S. 332, 352-53 (1975) (Government may appeal post-verdict judgment of acquittal based on
district court finding that preindictment delay was prejudicial). The double jeopardy clause
forbids appellate review when the trier of fact returns a verdict of not guilty. See United
States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896) (prosecution may not appeal acquittal based on jury
verdict); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978) (double jeopardy clause
precludes second trial once reviewing court has found evidence legally insufficient);
Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 78 (1978) (defendant cannot be retried after acquittal
based on erroneous exclusion of evidence); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430
U.S. 564, 575-76 (1977) (double jeopardy clause precludes reprosecution after district court
acquits on basis of insufficiency of evidence when jury is deadlocked); Fong Foo v. United
States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (double jeopardy clause prohibits retrial after court's pre-
verdict acquittal).
420 U.S. 332 (1975).
" Id. at 344-45; see supra note 7 (Wilson Court's investigation of legislative history of
Criminal Appeals Act to determine congressional intent); notes 20-23 (double jeopardy
clause not offended when no threat of reprosecution exists); see also supra note 5 (statutory
grants of jurisdiction prior to Criminal Appeals Act of 1970); note 6 (Criminal Appeals Act
of 1970).
47 Wilson, 420 U.S. at 333.
48 Id.
41 Id. at 352-53.
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Steed properly assumed jurisdiction over the Government's appeal
because review of the district court's post-verdict acquittal carried no
threat of multiple prosecution .5  Therefore, the Fourth Circuit's treat-
ment of the jurisdictional issue arising in Steed is faithful to the Wilson
analysis for determining the extent of appellate jurisdiction over
Government appeals in criminal cases."
The Supreme Court has alluded to the Government's general right
to appeal rulings dismissing guilty verdicts entered by the trier of fact
when the trial court has found the evidence insufficient to convict.2 In
United States v. DiFrancesco,' the Supreme Court noted in dictum that
the double jeopardy clause does not bar a Government appeal from a rul-
ing in favor of the defendant after a jury has returned a guilty verdict.
The Court supported this observation by citing circuit court cases that
have recognized Government appeals of post-verdict acquittals based on
the insufficiency of the evidence. 5 The Supreme Court, therefore, im-
50 Steed, 674 F.2d at 285-86.
, Id.; see supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text (Steed court's application of
Wilson analysis).
" See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text (discussion of recent Supreme Court
decision alluding to Government's right to appeal post-verdict judgments based on evi-
dentiary insufficiency).
w 449 U.S. 117 (1980). In United States v. DiFrancesco, a district court convicted
Eugene DiFrancesco of two racketeering offenses. Id. at 122. In a subsequent hearing, the
trial court determined that the defendant was a "special dangerous offender" within the
meaning of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. Id.; see Organized Crime Control Act,
Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575-76 (1976)). The court
sentenced DiFrancesco to two concurrent ten-year terms on the racketeering offenses. 449
U.S. at 122. The United States sought review of the criminal sentences through its
statutory right to appeal under the Organized Crime Control Act. Id. at 123; see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3576 (1976) (permits Government to appeal sentencing of special dangerous offenders). The
Supreme Court held that the fifth amendment does not bar prosecutorial sentence appeals
authorized by statute. 449 U.S. at 142-43. See generally The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95
HARV. L. REV. 112 (1981) (synopsis of DiFrancesco).
' United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130 (1980).
' Id. (citing United States v. Rojas and United States v. DeGarces). In United States
v. Rojas, 554 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1977), a jury returned a guilty verdict against the defendant
for making false claims on an income tax return. Id. at 940. Upon the jury's discharge, the
defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to rule 29(c) of Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Id. at 942; see FED. R. CRiM. P. 29(c) (rule 29(c) permits defendant to
move for judgment of acquittal after jury is discharged). Relying on United States v.
Wilson, the Rojas court concluded that although the double jeopardy clause forbids multiple
prosecutions for the same offense, the clause does not forbid all Government appeals. 534
F.2d at 941. The Rojas court noted that the double jeopardy clause prevents the possibility
of a second trial with a second trial's attendant expense and anxiety. Id. The court concluded
that the potential danger of retrial does not exist when an appellate court reviews post-
verdict judgment of acquittal since an appellate reversal merely would reinstate the jury's
verdict. Id. The Rojas court therefore asserted jurisdiction over the Government's appeal.
Id. The Rojas court further concluded that the case before the bar was distinguishable from
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co. Id. at 941-42; see
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plicitly has recognized the Government's statutory right to appeal post-
verdict judgments of acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence. "
Although the Fourth Circuit did not distinguish Steed from the
Supreme Court's decision in Burks v. United States,7 Steed is
distinguishable from a situation in which a reviewing court makes a rul-
ing on evidentiary sufficiency." In Burks, the defendant appealed an ap-
pellate order remanding the case for acquittal or, alternatively, for a
new trial after the reviewing court determined that the evidence was in-
sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict. 9 The Supreme Court held that
the double jeopardy clause precludes a second trial once the reviewing
court has found the evidence insufficient to support the jury's verdict.
The Court concluded that such a finding operates as a judgment of ac-
quittal." Under a Wilson analysis, the acquittal in Burks was final
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 575-76 (1977) (deadlocked jury pro-
hibited Government from appealing trial court's acquittal on basis of evidentiary insuffici-
ency). The Rojas court suggested that jurisdiction over Government appeals is dependent
upon the existence of a jury verdict that an appellate court can reinstate. See 554 F.2d at
941-42; see also Westen, supra note 22, at 1063 (prohibition against retrial is based on jury's
prerogative to acquit or convict defendant after evaluating evidence).
In the United States v. DeGarces, 518 F.2d 1156 (2d Cir. 1975), the Government appealed
a post-verdict acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence. Id. at 1156-57. In asserting
jurisdiction over the Government appeal, the DeGarces court relied on the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, United
States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978). 518 F.2d at 1159. In Jenkins, the Supreme Court noted
that a Government appeal is appropriate as long as appellate review carries no threat of a
second trial. 420 U.S. at 365 (dictum reaffirming Wilson). The Court also noted that the
prosecution may appeal judgments of acquittal that displace jury verdicts. Id. (dictum).
' See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text (discussion of DiFrancesco).
57 437 U.S. 1 (1978). In Burks v. United States, the defense presented prima facie proof
of the defendant's insanity by offering expert testimony. Id. at 2-3. Upon the defendant's ap-
peal of his conviction, the Sixth Circuit found that the prosecution failed to rebut the insani-
ty defense. Id. at 3. The court of appeals reversed the conviction because of evidentiary in-
sufficiency and remanded the case to the trial court to enter a judgment of acquittal or to
order a new trial. Id. See generally The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 108
(1978) (Burks case comment); Comment, Constitutional Criminal Law - Double Jeopardy-
Appellate Court AcquittalAccorded Same Finality as Trial Court Acquittal; RetrialPermit-
ted after Defendant Seeks a Dismissal, 53 TUL. L. REv. 598 (1979) (brief discussion of Burks).
" See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text (discussion of Burks).
19 Burks, 437 U.S. at 3-5.
Id. at 18. In Burks, the Supreme Court concluded that the double jeopardy clause
forbids a retrial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to
strengthen its case. Id. at 11. The Court also concluded that since courts must accord finali-
ty to a jury's verdict of acquittal, appellate courts may not order retrial when an appellate
court has decided as a matter of law that a jury could not have returned a guiltyverdict. Id.
at 16. The Burks Court noted that a defendant does not waive his right to a judgment of ac-
quittal by also seeking a new trial as one of his remedies. Id. at 17.
CI Id. at 18; see also United States v. Cross, 655 F.2d 50, 50 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam)
(appellate court directed judgment of acquittal on remand when court found evidence insuf-
ficient to convict); United States v. Becton, 632 F.2d 1294, 1295-96 (5th Cir. 1980) (appellate
1983]
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because the order for a new trial violated the double jeopardy prohibi-
tion against multiple prosecutions for the same offense.2 In Steed,
however, the district court's judgment of acquittal was appealable
because review of the ruling contained no threat of reprosecution."
The jurisdictional analysis in Steed is consistent with the Fourth
Circuit's resolution of the double jeopardy issue arising in United States
v. Burroughs." In Burroughs, the Fourth Circuit re-examined the
Government's request for appellate review of a post-verdict judgment of
acquittal in light of the Wilson decision. 5 The district court in Burroughs
granted the defendant's post-verdict motion for acquittal on the ground
that the prosecution failed to prove a requisite element of the statutory
offense.6 The Fourth Circuit assumed jurisdiction over the
Government's appeal because reversal by the reviewing court merely
would reinstate the jury's guilty verdict. 7 Moreover, review would not
subject the defendant to reprosecution."
The Fourth Circuit's treatment of the jurisdictional issue in Steed
also is consistent with other circuits that expressly have permitted
Government appeals of post-verdict acquittals based on insufficiency of
court did not entertain interlocutory appeal from order for new trial after hung jury when
defendant claimed that evidence was insufficient to convict).
The Supreme Court, however, has permitted retrial after a state appellate court set
aside a conviction on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2213 (1982). The Tibbs Court distinguished Burks, explain-
ing that a judgment of acquittal based on the insufficiency of the evidence rests on the
premise that no rational fact finder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. at 2216. A reversal on weight of the evidence, however, draws the ap-
pellate court into questions of credibility. Id. The Tibbs Court suggested that an appellate
court's post-verdict resolution of conflicting evidence in favor of the defendant does not
have the same force as an appellate acquittal based on evidentiary insufficiency because the
former is a factual determination while the latter is a legal determination. See id. at 2218-19.
62 See supra notes 6, 7, 19-25 and accompanying text (Wilson analysis for determining
whether appellate court has jurisdiction over Government appeals of post-verdict
judgments of acquittal).
' 674 F.2d at 285.
" 564 F.2d 1111 (4th Cir. 1977); see supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text (Steed
jurisdictional analysis).
"8 United States v. Burroughs, 537 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (withdrawing
United States v. Burroughs, 510 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1976)), aff'd, 564 F.2d 1111 (4th Cir. 1977).
In Burroughs, a jury returned guilty verdicts against the defendants for wilfully intercept-
ing oral communications. 564 F.2d at 1112.
61 537 F.2d at 1157. The district court in Burroughs granted the defendant's motion for
acquittal because the court determined that the prosecution failed to prove an element
needed to preserve the constitutionality of the statutory offense. Id. The prosecution sought
review of the post-verdict acquittal on the grounds that the trial court's statutory inter-
pretation was erroneous. Id. The Fourth Circuit dismissed the Government appeal. 510 F.2d
at 967 (Table). The prosecution refiled its request for an appeal and the Fourth Circuit
asserted jurisdiction based upon the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Wilson.
537 F.2d at 1157; see Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975).




the evidence. 9 In United States v. Rojas,"0 the Ninth Circuit permitted
an appeal because no additional fact-finding proceeding would be
necessary if the Government succeeded upon appeal.71 The Rojas court
concluded that a successful Government appeal of a post-verdict judg-
ment of acquittal based on evidentiary insufficiency would not subject
the defendant to a second trial.72 If an appellate court finds that the judg-
ment of acquittal was improper, the appellate court merely will reinstate
the guilty verdict.7" If the district court order was appropriate, the ap-
pellate court will allow the post-verdict acquittal. 4 The Rojas analysis is
faithful to the approach the Supreme Court has used since the enact-
ment of the Criminal Appeals Act.75
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the proper standard of review for
assessing post-verdict acquittals based on the insufficiency of the
evidence.7" Although the Fourth Circuit also had not considered the stan-
dard of review issue prior to Steed, the court's adoption of the Glasser
standard is consistent with other circuits that have addressed the issue.
7
" See infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text. The Steed analysis is indicative of the
approach other circuits that have addressed the same jurisdictional issue have adopted. See
United States v. White, 673 F.2d 299, 302 (10th Cir. 1982) (jurisdiction over Government ap-
peal of post-verdict acquittal based on evidentiary insufficiency was proper because review
contained no threat of multiple prosecution for same offense); United States v. Dixon, 658
F.2d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 1981) (same); United States v. Burns, 597 F.2d 939, 941 (5th Cir. 1979)
(same); United States v. Blasco, 581 F.2d 681, 684 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 966
(1978) (same).
11 554 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1977). In Rojas, the jury found the defendant guilty of six
counts of tax fraud. Id. at 940. The defendant moved for a motion to acquit after the
discharge of the jury. Id.; see FED. R. GRIM. P. 29(c) (rule 29(c) permits defendant to move for
judgment of acquittal within seven days after jury is discharged). The trial court granted
the defendant's motion for acquittal. 554 F.2d at 940. The prosecution appealed the post-
verdict acquittal on the basis of the Criminal Appeals Act. Id. at 940-41; see supra note 6
(Criminal Appeals Act permits Government appeals whenever constitutionally permitted).
" 554 F.2d at 941.
72 Id.
" See generally 2 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 469.
"Id.
" See supra notes 19-25, 46-50 and accompanying text (Supreme Court approach since
Criminal Appeals Act).
76 See Steed, 674 F.2d at 285 (Supreme Court has not ruled on precise jurisdictional
question at issue in Steed).
" See United States v. White, 673 F.2d 299 (10th Cir. 1982); infra notes 78-80 and ac-
companying text (discussion of Fifth Circuit decision that applied Glasser standard to post-
verdict acquittal based on insufficiency of evidence). In White, the jury found the defendant
guilty of mail fraud. 673 F.2d at 300. After the discharge of the jury, the court granted the
defendant's motion for acquittal on the basis that the evidence did not support the guilty
verdict. Id. at 301. The White court asserted jurisdiction over the Government appeal and
then considered the proper standard of review by which to assess the trial court's order. Id.
In White, the Tenth Circuit concluded that courts, when considering a motion for a post-
verdict acquittal, must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government and
then determine whether substantial evidence exists so that the jury properly may find the
accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 301; accord United States v. Dixon, 658
1983]
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In United States v. Cravero,8 the Fifth Circuit applied the Glasser stan-
dard when reviewing the district court's post-verdict judgment of acquit-
tal based on the insufficiency of the evidence."9 In Cravero, the Fifth Cir-
cuit suggested that the Glasser standard of review recognizes the right of
juries to determine the credibility of witnesses.0 The application of the
Glasser rule to Government appeals in criminal cases therefore reflects
the traditional deference accorded to jury verdicts."
While the application of the Glasser standard to Government ap-
peals of post-verdict acquittals is a recent development, the Fourth Cir-
cuit often has used the Glasser standard when reviewing appeals by
defendants challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.2 For example, in
F.2d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Burns, 597 F.2d 939, 941 (5th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Blasco, 581 F.2d 681, 684 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 966 (1978); United
States v. Rojas, 554 F.2d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 1977). According to White, such a standard does
not permit courts to acquit after a jury has returned a guilty verdict unless the evidence is
so meager that a reasonable jury could not find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 673 F.2d at
302. The White court reversed the district court decision and remanded the case for the
reinstatement of the jury verdict. Id. at 305.
In White, the Tenth Circuit held that such a standard was indistinguishable from the
standard of review enunciated in Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 837 (1947). 673 F.2d at 301. In Curley, the court held that the proper rule
when passing upon a motion for a directed verdict recognizes the jury's right to weigh
evidence and determine credibility. 160 F.2d at 232. After giving the jury full play to per-
form its traditional function, the court must determine whether a reasonable mind might
conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
78 530 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1976).
71 Id. at 669-70 (5th Cir. 1976). In Cravero, the jury found the defendant guilty of subor-
nation of perjury, obstruction of justice, and conspiracy. Id. The trial court then granted the
defendant's motion for acquittal on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to con-
vict. Id. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Wilson, the Cravero
court asserted jurisdiction over the Government appeal of the trial court's order. Id. at 669.
The Cravero court then ruled on the appropriate standard of review to assess the order of
the trial court. Id. at 669-70.
Id. at 670 (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311 (1966)) (established
safeguards of Anglo-American legal system leave veracity of witnesses to be detected by
cross examination and credibility to be determined by properly instructed jury). According
to Cravero, the trial judge possesses no expertise in determining who speaks the truth. Id.
at 670.
" See supra notes 32, 80 & 81 and accompanying text (Glasser standard protects jury
prerogatives).
82 See, e.g., United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1019-21 (4th Cir. 1982) (standard
applicable when defendant appeals manslaughter conviction on ground that evidence was in-
sufficient); United States v. Sherman, 421 F.2d 198, 199-200 (4th Cir. 1970) (applying Glasser
standard when defendant appealed from conviction of attempted murder), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 914 (1970); Jelaza v. United States, 179 F.2d 202, 205 (4th Cir. 1950) (applying standard
in defendant's appeal from tax evasion conviction).
Prior to the Criminal Appeals Act of 1970, the Government could not appeal court-
ordered judgments of acquittal entered after a jury had returned a guilty verdict. See
Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 133 (1904); see also supra notes 4 & 5 (discussing
statutory extent of Government appeals prior to Act); notes 6 & 7, 19-26 and accompanying
text (considering effect Act had on Government appeals in criminal cases).
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United States v. Pomponio," the defendants appealed seeking reversal
of their convictions for federal income tax evasion." When reviewing the
defendant's contention that the evidence did not support the verdict, the
Fourth Circuit applied the Glasser standard of review.' The court
limited the scope of its review to whether the evidence substantially
supported the jury's verdict, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Government.8 The Pomponio court implied that the
Glasser standard protects the fact-finding function of a jury precisely
because the standard requires appellate courts to sustain a jury's ver-
dict unless the evidence does not support the verdict. 7
In Steed, the dissent discussed a standard of absolute deference to
the trial court's order as an alternative to the Glasser standard of
review." An absolute deference standard promotes consistency by
treating all court-ordered acquittals equally, irrespective of when the
court orders the acquittal. 9 The absolute deference standard, however,
is inconsistent with the purposes behind the Criminal Appeals Act." In
United States v. Dixon,9 the Third Circuit criticized the absolute
deference standard that the Steed dissent suggested.2 The Dixon court
noted that a standard of absolute deference renders the Act's statutory
grant of appellate jurisdiction ineffective. By according absolute
deference to the trial court's assessment of evidentiary sufficiency, the
absolute deference standard substitutes the trial judge's ruling for
review of that ruling by an appellate court.' A standard of absolute
deference, therefore, forces appellate courts to forego their reviewing
function and blindly to accept the trial judge's post-verdict acquittal. 5 In
the Criminal Appeals Act, on the other hand, Congress registered its
preference for appellate review once an appellate court has assumed
563 F.2d 659 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 (1978).
Id. at 661.
Id. at 663.
Id.; see supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (Glasser standard).
See Pomponio, 563 F.2d at 663.
See Steed, 674 F.2d at 292 (Phillips, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 39-43 and ac-
companying text (Steed dissent).
" See supra note 27 (symmetry resulting from absolute deference standard).
' See supra note 28 (adverse effect absolute deference standard would have on
Criminal Appeals Act).
" See 658 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1981). In Dixon, the jury found the defendant guilty of mail
fraud. Id. at 186. The trial court granted the defendant's post-verdict motion for acquittal
because the evidence was insufficient to convict. Id. The Third Circuit asserted jurisdiction
over the Government appeal of the court-ordered acquittal and reinstated the jury's ver-
dict. Id. at 187, 193.
"Id. at 188. (Dixon court criticized standard suggested by vacated Steed opinion and
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proper jurisdiction over the appeal.98 A standard of absolute deference
conflicts with congressional intent because such a standard precludes ef-
fective review.9"
In Steed, the Fourth Circuit properly assumed jurisdiction over the
Government appeal of the trial court's post-verdict acquittal based on in-
sufficiency of the evidence.98 By asserting jurisdiction over the Govern-
ment appeal, the Fourth Circuit is consistent with the Supreme Court
and other circuits that have applied the double jeopardy analysis of the
Wilson court.99 Recognizing the traditional deference accorded to jury
verdicts, the Fourth Circuit applied the appropriate standard of review
for assessing the trial court's post-verdict judgment of acquittal.1 0 By
adopting the Glasser standard of review, the Fourth Circuit has followed
the lead of other circuits that have ruled on the appropriate appellate
standard of review."' By rejecting the standard of absolute deference,
the Fourth Circuit has recognized that such a standard of review is in-
consistent'with purposes behind the Criminal Appeals Act. 2 In United
States v. Steed, the Fourth Circuit has reinforced the traditional inter-
pretations of double jeopardy and appellate review.9 3
JAMES FITZSIMMONS POWERS
C. Jury Instructions and the Nonessential Essential Element
The Supreme Court has stated that the due process clause of the
Constitution' protects a criminal defendant against conviction except
" See 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976) (Criminal Appeals Act allows appellate review whenever
constitutionally permitted); see also supra note 6 (Criminal Appeals Act); notes 7, 20-23
(United States v. Wilson is seminal Supreme Court decision on Criminal Appeals Act).
" See supra note 6 & 22 (legislative history of Act reflects intention of Congress to ex-
tend Government right to appeal to constitutional limit).
" See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit analysis in Steed).
" See supra notes 44-75 and accompanying text (analysis of Supreme Court and circuit
court decisions).
"® See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit adoption of Glasser
standard).
101 See supra notes 76-87 and accompanying text (analysis of circuit court decisions that
have adopted Glasser standard).
"I' See supra notes 28, 88-97 and accompanying text (absolute deference standard
precludes effective appellate review because standard is automatic).
10' See supra notes 19-38 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit in Steed assumed
jurisdiction over Government's appeal and then applied Glasser standard).
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment to the Constitution provides in part
that a person cannot be convicted of a crime or deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. Id.
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upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to con-
stitute the crime with which the defendant is charged.2 The constitu-
tional protection against conviction without due process of law there-
fore requires that the jury must find that the government has proved
all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt before the jury
can reach a guilty verdict.' To ensure that the jury is capable of deter-
mining whether the government has met its burden of proof, the trial
judge must instruct the jury upon all essential elements of the offense
charged.4 A jury instruction that fails to present all the essential
elements of the offense may result in a reversal of the conviction on ap-
peal, if the appellate court determines that the failure to instruct the
jury prevented the defendant from receiving a fair trial.' In United
2 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); accord Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,
216 (1977) (due process clause requires prosecution prove all elements of offense beyond
reasonable doubt). In Winship, the Supreme Court stated for the first time that the due pro-
cess clause of the Constitution requires the application of the reasonable doubt standard.
397 U.S. at 364. The Supreme Court stated that the reasonable doubt standard is indispens-
able because the standard requires the trier of fact to reach a subjective state of certainty
regarding the facts at issue to establish guilt. Id. In Patterson, the Supreme Court ruled
that the reasonable doubt standard applies to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment. 432 U.S. at 215. The Patterson Court declined to require that the states prove the
nonexistence of all affirmative defenses. 432 U.S. at 211; cf. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.
684, 701-02 (1975) (state must prove every ingredient of an offense beyond a reasonable
doubt and may not shift burden of proof to defendant).
I Byrd v. United States, 342 F.2d 939, 940-41 (D.C. Cir. 1965). In Byrd, the defendant
appealed from a robbery conviction, alleging that the trial court failed to instruct the jury
on the essential elements of the offense. Id. at 940. In overturning the conviction, the Byrd
court stated that failure to send the case to the jury without instruction on the elements of
the offense which the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt was fundamental
error. Id. at 941.
See United States v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240, 249 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Salliey,
360 F.2d 699, 702 (4th Cir. 1966) (instructions to jury must include essential elements of of-
fense charged). In Clark, the Second Circuit held that the trial court's instructions to the
jury must be complete and understandable, particularly with respect to essential elements
of the alleged crime that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 475 F.2d at
249; see United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1198 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979
(1979). In Giese, the Ninth Circuit stated that a trial judge must ensure that the jury
understands all the grounds upon which the jury can return a conviction. Id. at 1198. The
primary purpose of jury instructions is to inform the jurors about principles of law that the
jurors must apply in deciding the factual issues. United States v. Wolfson, 573 F.2d 216, 221
(5th Cir. 1978). In United States v. Persico, the Second Circuit stated that the purpose of
jury instructions is to instruct the jury clearly and adequately to permit the jury to perform
its function of determining guilt. 349 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1965). The Persico court then stated
that the function of the jury is to make an independent determination of the facts, together
with an application of the law, as charged by the court, to those facts found by the jury. Id.
' United States v. Houston, 547 F.2d 104, 108 (9th Cir. 1976). When an appellate court
determines that a failure to instruct the jury on an essential element of an offense has im-
paired a substantial right of the defendant, the appellate court will assign error and reverse
the conviction. See United States v. Bosch, 505 F.2d 78, 82 (5th Cir. 1974) (failure to instruct
jury on essential elements of crime is reversible error); United States v. DeMarco, 488 F.2d
828, 832 (2d Cir. 1973) (failure to charge essential element of offense affects defendant's
19831
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States v. McCaskill,' the Fourth Circuit considered whether failure of
the trial judge to instruct the jury on all the essential elements of aiding
and abetting a violation of the Federal Bank Robbery Act (the Act)7 war-
ranted a reversal of the defendant's conviction.'
In McCaskill, the defendant and two accomplices robbed a bank in
Bessemer City, North Carolina.9 The defendant was the driver of the
getaway car." The defendant parked the car a short distance from the
bank and waited while his accomplices robbed the bank." Upon comple-
tion of the robbery, the accomplices joined the defendant in the getaway
vehicle and the defendant drove out of town. 2 A policeman in a patrol
car observed the men leaving town and pursued the trio.3 A high speed
rights and warrants reversal); United States v. Small, 472 F.2d 818, 819 (3rd Cir. 1972)
(where instructions fail to specify every essential element of crime, failure constitutes
reversible error).
' 676 F.2d 995 (4th Cir. 1982).
7 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1976). Under the Federal Bank Robbery Act (the Act), entering a
bank with the intent to commit a felony is a criminal offense. Id. The Act also provides that
taking property from a bank by force, violence, or intimidation is a federal offense. Id. at
§ 2113(a)(1). Subsequent subsections of the Act provide that removal of property from a
bank with the intent to steal or purloin or receipt of any property stolen from a bank is a
criminal offense. Id. at § 2113(b),(c). The term "steal or purloin," in § 2113(b) of the Act, en-
compasses a wide variety of acts of theft, including furtive or stealthy conduct, or conduct
that involves trickery. See United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 678, 681 (8th Cir. 1978)
(definition of steal or purloin).
Section 2113(d) of the Act proscribes the act of armed robbery. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d)
(1976). Section 2113(d) will impose an increased penalty on the defendant if a bank robber
assaults a person or places a person's life in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon or
device. Id. A majority of courts have recognized that § 2113(d) does not create an offense
separate and distinct from §§ 2113(a) and (b). Note, The Federal Bank Robbery Act-The
Problem of Separately Punishable Offenses, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 101, 107 (1976); see
United States v. Tomaiolo, 249 F.2d 683, 696 (2d Cir. 1957) (simple bank robbery under
§§ 2113(a), (b) and armed bank robbery under § 2113(d) merge into one substantive crime);
Ward v. United States, 183 F.2d 270, 272 (10th Cir.) (armed bank robbery not separate and
distinct offense), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 864 (1950); Coy v. United States, 156 F.2d 293, 294
(6th Cir.) (offenses merge into a single substantive crime), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 841 (1946);
McLean v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 1036, 1038 (E.D.N.C. 1978) (§ 2113(d) does not create
separate or distinct offense from offenses described under other of Act). But see United
States v. Bizzard, 615 F.2d 1080, 1081-82 (5th Cir. 1980) (offenses are separate and distinct
under § 2113)). Section 2113(d) provides for increased punishment if certain aggravated cir-
cumstances are present. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (1976); see United States v. Thomas, 521 F.2d
76, 79-81 (8th Cir. 1975) (assault and endangering life with dangerous weapon required to
constitute aggravating circumstances under § 2113(d)).




12 Id. at 1000. The accomplices seized a car parked beside the bank and drove to where
the defendant was waiting in the getaway vehicle. Id.
" Id. A witness observed the defendant in the getaway vehicle driving up an alley
behind the bank. Id. Upon stopping at the drive-up window to cash a check, the witness saw
that the bank was being robbed. Id. The witness immediately drove to the police station,
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automobile chase ensued, during which one of the accomplices shot at
the pursuing patrol car." The defendant's vehicle then overturned and
the three men surrendered."5 Police arrested all three men and charged
them with violations of the Federal Bank Robbery Act. 6 Following his
arrest, the defendant confessed to an F.B.I. investigator." In his confes-
sion, the defendant admitted that he and his accomplices planned to rob
the bank and that he knew that the accomplices were carrying guns.18
The government filed charges against the defendant in the United
States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina for
violation of the Federal Bank Robbery Act. 9 At trial, the defendant sub-
mitted a request for jury instructions pertaining to the elements of an
offense under subsection 2113(d) of the Act." The defendant requested
the judge to instruct the jury that the prosecution must prove that the
defendant knew of and participated in the bank robbery.2' In addition,
the defendant requested an instruction that the prosecution must prove
that the defendant knew that his accomplices were armed and intended
told the police about the robbery, and described the vehicle in the alley behind the bank. Id.
The police broadcast this information over the radio. Id. While rushing to the reported
scene of the robbery, a police officer observed a car matching the description on the radio
and he pursued. Id.




" Id. at 999. The defendant in McCaskill admitted in his confession to an FBI in-
vestigator that the defendant had met with his two accomplices for several days before the
robbery. Id. The defendant confessed that the three men discussed prior bank robberies and
the plan to rob the bank in Bessemer City. Id. The defendant then admitted that during the
planning stage the defendant discovered that his accomplices were armed with pistols. Id.
19 Id.; 18 U.S.C, §§ 2113(a),(b),(d) (1976); see supra note 7 (discussion of Federal Bank
Robbery Act). The indictment charged the defendant with aiding and abetting an armed
bank robbery. 676 F.2d at 997. Section 2 of title 18 of the United States Code provides that a
person who aids or abets the commission of a crime is subject to punishment as a principal.
18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1976). Section 2 does not define a specific crime, but provides for punish-
ment of a person who aids and abets the commission of a substantive crime defined in
another statute. Id.; United States v. Campbell, 426 F.2d 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1970). To convict a
defendant of aiding and abetting, therefore, the government first must prove the commis-
sion of a substantive crime. Id. The generally recognized rule is that the government then
must prove that the defendant had knowledge of the substantive offense and acted with the
intent to further the commission of the offense. Nye-Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613,
619 (1949) (defendant must participate in venture, intend to bring venture about, and desire
venture to succeed); Diaz-Rosendo v. United States, 364 F.2d 941, 944 (9th Cir. 1966) (since
guilt not established by mere association, defendant knowingly must participate in venture);
Moore v. United States, 356 F.2d 39, 43 (5th Cir. 1966) (defendant must seek to make ven-
ture succeed by his actions); United States v. Williams, 391 F. Supp. 741, 742 (D.C. Pa. 1975)
(defendant must have knowledge and intent to facilitate commission of offense); see Com-
ment, Jury Instruction in Aiding and Abetting Cases, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 774, 775 (1968)
(elements that constitute crime of aiding and abetting).
1 676 F.2d at 996.
21 Id.
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to use the weapons and that the defendant intended to aid the ac-
complices in using the weapons.' The district court judge stated that he
would give the defendant's requested instructions in substance to the
jury.'
At the completion of the trial, the judge explained to the jury the
elements of an offense under subsection 2113(d) of the Act." The judge
further instructed the jury that if the government proved the elements
of a subsection 2113(d) offense, the jury also must find that the defendant
aided and abetted the accomplices in the commision of the robbery.' The
judge explained the circumstances under which the jury could find that
the defendant had aided and abetted the other bank robbers." At the
conclusion of his charge to the jury, the judge asked the defendant's
counsel for any objections to the instructions or any requests for addi-
tional instructionsY Defendant's counsel declined to object or to request
other instructions.' The jury then found the defendant guilty of aiding
2 Id.
2 Id.
2 Id. at 997; see 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (1976) (elements of aggravated armed robbery of-
fense); supra note 7 (elements of an offense charged under section 2113(d)). The judge in-
structed the jury that section 2113(d) required the government to prove that the robbers
had entered the bank and threatened or intimidated persons in the bank with a weapon or
what appeared to be a weapon. 676 F.2d at 997. The judge also instructed the jury that
under § 2113(d) the jury. must find that the robbers had assaulted bank employees in the
course of the robbery by placing the employees' lives in jeopardy through the use of or
threatened use of deadly weapons. Id. The Act requires that the instruction to the jury ex-
plain the additional elements that transform a simple bank robbery under § 2113(a) into the
aggravated offense of armed robbery under § 2113(d). See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (1976) (ag-
gravated offense of armed robbery); Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 8 (1978) (use of
dangerous weapon or device enhances punishment under § 2113(d)); supra note 7 (descrip-
tion of § 2113 offenses).
' 676 F.2d at 997; see supra note 19 (description of aiding and abetting statute).
2 676 F.2d at 997. In McCaskill, the trial court's jury instruction accurately described
the offense of aiding and abetting. Id.; see United States v. Campisi, 306 F.2d 308, 310 (2d
Cir.) (description of aiding and abetting offense), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 925 (1962). The Mc-
Caskill trial court instructed the jury that the commission of a substantive crime such as
bank robbery was necessary for an aiding and abetting conviction. 676 F.2d at 997. The Mc-
Caskill trial judge then instructed the jury that it must find that the aidor and abettor had
knowledge of the planned bank robbery and actively desired that the robbery succeed to
hold the defendant liable as a principal. Id.; see Campisi, 306 F.2d at 311 (proper aiding and
abetting instruction).
See 676 F.2d at 997.
2 See id. In McCaskill, the Fourth Circuit noted that since the defendant's counsel did
not object at the close of the jury instruction, the trial court's failure to give the defendant's
requested instruction would warrant reversal only if the failure was clear error. Id.
Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a defendant to make any
objections to the jury instructions at the close of the charge to the jury. FED. R. CRIM. P. 30.
Failure to object will preclude the defendant from raising the issue on appeal unless the ap-
pellate court rules that the lower court instruction was a plain error or defect that substan-
tially would affect the rights of the accused. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) (rule 52(b)). Courts have
restricted use of the rule 52(b) plain error rule to exceptional cases involving a miscarriage
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and abetting the robbery in violation of the Federal Bank Robbery Act.9
The defendant appealed the conviction to the Fourth Circuit."
The Fourth Circuit in McCaskill rejected the defendant's argument
that the trial judge instructed the jury erroneously. 1 The defendant
relied on United States v. Short" and United States v. Sanborn' to sup-
port his contention in McCaskill that the district court's failure to re-
quire the jury to find that the defendant knew that the accomplices were
armed and that they intended to use weapons in the course of the rob-
bery was plain error. 4 The Fourth Circuit noted that both Short and
of justice or a substantial prejudicial effect on the defendant's rights. Wright v. United
States, 301 F.2d 412, 414 (10th Cir. 1962); see United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160
(1936) (instruction adversely affected fairness, integrity, and reputation of judicial system);
United States v. Harper, 579 F.2d 1235, 1239 (10th Cir.) (courts will not review unless in-
struction amounts to fundamental denial of rights of accused), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 968
(1978); United States v. Jackson, 569 F.2d 1003, 1006 (7th Cir.) (instruction had probable im-
pact on jury's verdict), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907 (1978); United States v. Coppola, 486 F.2d
882, 884 (10th Cir. 1973) (court will not review unless error so basic and fundamental that in-
justice would result), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 948 (1974).
676 F.2d at 996. The jury in McCaskill found the defendant guilty of violations of
sections (a), (b), and (d) of the Act. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a),(b)(d) (1976) (text of Federal
Bank Robbery Act).
1 676 F.2d at 996.
31 Id. at 1001.
" 463 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 (1974). In United States v. Short,
the trial court's jury instruction stated that the jury could find the accused guilty of aiding
and abetting in violation of § 2113(d) of the Act if the accused knew that his accomplices
planned to rob a bank. See id. at 1172. The defendant's counsel objected, stating that the
jury instruction failed to include as an essential element the defendant's knowledge that his
accomplices were armed. See id. The trial court overruled the defendant's objection and
stated that knowledge that the accomplices were armed was not an essential element of the
crime. See id. The trial court's instruction stated that the jury therefore could find the
defendant guilty, regardless of whether the defendant knew that his accomplices were armed
when they robbed the bank. See id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit in Short found prejudicial
error in the trial court's instruction that the defendant's knowledge that his accomplices
possessed weapons was not an essential element of the crime charged. Id. The Short court
therefore reversed the conviction on the ground that the trial judge's instructions specifi-
cally omitted an essential element of the crime. Id.
' 563 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1977). In United States v. Sanborn, the jury found the defendant
guilty of aiding and abetting the commission of an armed robbery under § 2113(d). See id. at
489; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (armed bank robbery offense). The Sanborn trial court
refused the defendant's requested jury instruction that in order to convict, the jury must
find that the defendant knew his accomplices possessed weapons to be used in the robbery.
See 563 F.2d at 490. The defendant objected to the refusal. Id. On appeal, the First Circuit
reversed, holding that the government must prove that the defendant had notice that his ac-
complices were likely to use weapons in the bank robbery. Id. at 491. The Sanborn court
also suggested that a refusal to instruct the jury as the defendant requested was error,
even though the jury could infer that the defendant knew his accomplices would use a
weapon in the bank robbery based on the defendant's knowledge that an accomplice
possessed a weapon prior to the commission of the offense. Id.
1 676 F.2d at 997. The Fourth Circuit noted that because the defendant did not object
to the jury instructions at the close of the district judge's charge, failure properly to in-
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Sanborn entitle a defendant charged with aiding and abetting under
subsection 2113(d) to an instruction that a conviction requires the defend-
ant to have knowledge that the accomplices who perpetrated the rob-
bery were armed." The Fourth Circuit therefore held that the rule
stated in Short and Sanborn provides that the prosecution must show
that a person charged as an aidor and abbettor must know that his ac-
complices were armed and therefore likely to jeopardize lives in the
course of the robbery by the use of weapons.36 The Fourth Circuit stressed,
however, that Short and Sanborn entitle the defendant to such an in-
struction only if defendant's counsel makes a timely objection to the
failure to instruct and the essential facts are in dispute. 7 The Fourth
Circuit therefore stated that both Short and Sanborn were
distinguishable from McCaskill28
The Fourth Circuit stated that the rulings in both Short and San-
born apply only to situations in which the evidence showing the defend-
ant's knowledge that his accomplices were armed and likely to use their
weapons is in dispute. 9 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the Short and
Sanborn courts would rule differently if the evidence of the defendant's
knowledge were not in dispute." The McCaskill court then noted that
the evidence showing that the defendant in McCaskill had the requisite
knowledge was not in dispute." The majority stated that the defendant
struct the jury will warrant reversal of a conviction only if such failure is plain error. Id.;
see supra note 28 (circumstances under which plain error will warrant conviction reversal).
1 676 F.2d at 998.
36 Id.
Id.
Id. The Fourth Circuit in MeCaskill stated that if the evidence is not in dispute
regarding the knowledge of the aidor and abettor, the question resolved in Short and San-
born did not arise. Id. The Fourth Circuit cited several cases as support for this statement
in McCaskill. Id. at 998 n.5; see United States v. Ferreira, 625 F.2d 1030, 1032 (1st Cir. 1980)
(defendant must know weapon would be used or that weapons were likely to be used in
order to convict); United States v. Methvin, 441 F.2d 584, 586 (5th Cir.) (defendant not guilty
where intent to participate in bank robbery was formed without knowledge that pistol
would be used), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 839 (1971).
" 676 F.2d at 998; see United States v. Short 463 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Sanborn, 563 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1977).
" 676 F.2d at 998. In Short, the Ninth Circuit noted that no direct evidence showed
that the accused knew his accomplice was armed or that the accomplice intended to use the
weapon in the robbery. United States v. Short, 493 F.2d at 1171. The question of the defend-
ant's knowledge arose when the jury asked the judge if the law required the aidor and abet-
tor to know that the accomplice had a gun for the aidor and abettor to be guilty under
§ 2113(d). Id. at 1171-72. The trial judge then gave the instruction that the Ninth Circuit in
Short found to be erroneous. Id. at 1172; see supra note 32 (discussion of Short). Similarly, in
Sanborn, no direct evidence indicated that the defendant knew of the existence or planned
use of a weapon in the robbery. United States v. Sanborn, 563 F.2d at 490. The First Circuit
in Sanborn held that denial of the defendant's request for instructions was reversible error.
Id. at 491; see supra note 33 (discussion of Sanborn).
676 F.2d at 999. The Fourth Circuit stated that the rule in Short and Sanborn requir-
ing a jury instruction regarding a defendant's knowledge that weapons would be used in an
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admitted in his coifession to an F.B.I. investigator that the defendant
knew his accomplices planned to carry guns when they robbed the
bank. 2 The defendant also admitted that he and his accomplices had
planned the robbery and that they had agreed to split the proceeds of
the robbery. 3 The F.B.I. agent repeated the defendant's admissions at
trial and the defendant did not impeach or repudiate the agent's
testimony." The Fourth Circuit stated that overwhelming evidence of a
planned armed robbery existed. 5 The court found no dispute concerning
the defendant's knowledge that his accomplices intended to use their
weapons." The McCaskill majority also found that the trial court's in-
structions, viewed as a whole, adequately covered under the facts of the
case all the elements of the crime of aiding and abetting an armed bank
robbery."7 The Fourth Circuit therefore held that the district court's
failure to give the defendant's requested instructions was not error and
did not warrant a reversal of conviction. 8
armed robbery did not apply where evidence of that knowledge was not in dispute. Id. at
998. The Fourth Circuit noted that the evidence was not in dispute because the McCaskill
defendant admitted and never denied that he knew his accomplices previously had robbed
banks, that his accomplices were armed with pistols, and that he and his accomplices planned
to rob the bank in Bessemer City. Id. at 999.
42 Id.
43 Id.
" Id. The McCaskill dissent contested the majority's contention that the defendant
never disputed the statements made in his confession to the FBI investigator. Id. at 1003-04
(Ervin, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the defendant disclaimed any knowledge of
his accomplices' weapons possession on the day of the robbery until the high speed
automobile chase. Id. at 1004; see supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text (high speed auto
chase).
, 676 F.2d at 999. The McCaskill majority stated that the evidence of a planned armed
robbery was overwhelming because the defendant knew that his accomplices had been carry-
ing guns for several days, that the defendant and his accomplices planned to holdup a bank,
and that the accomplices possessed the guns necessary to carry out this plan. Id.
11 Id. at 1001. But see supra note 44 (McCaskill dissent contended that defendant
denied knowledge that accomplices were armed at time of bank robbery).
11 676 F.2d at 1003. Courts generally recognize the rule that an appellate court must
examine the jury instructions as a whole to determine whether the instruction created the
probability that the jury rendered an improper verdict. United States v. Thurman, 417 F.2d
752, 753 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1026 (1969); see United States v. Precision Metal
Laboratories, Inc., 593 F.2d 434, 443 (2d Cir. 1979) (to determine adequacy of charge, court
must view charge in entirety); United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 114 (D.C. Cir.) (ap-
pellate court must examine instructions as a whole), cert. denied, Ehrlichman v. United
States, 431 U.S. 933 (1976).
"s 676 F.2d at 1001, 1003. In addition to holding that failure to instruct was not error,
the Fourth Circuit in McCaskill held that reversal of the defendant's conviction was not
warranted because failure to instruct was not plain error. Id. at 1001. The Fourth Circuit
held that the defendant's contention that the trial court's failure to give an adequate in-
struction warranted conviction reversal did not meet the standard of the plain error rule.
Id. at 1002; see supra note 28 (discussion of plain error rule). The McCaskill majority stated
that the plain error exception did not apply in McCaskill because the defendant knew his ac-
complices were armed and that the instruction therefore did not impair substantially the
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Judge Ervin dissented, stating that the majority permitted a convic-
tion of a defendant without requiring that the government prove beyond
a reasonable doubt every element of the charged offense.49 The Mc-
Caskill dissent argued that the jury convicted the defendant of armed
robbery on the basis of the same evidence necessary to convict for aiding
and abetting simple bank robbery. The dissent stated that by affirming
the defendant's conviction, the McCaskill majority ignored the rule
established in United States v. Short5 and United States v. Sanborn."
The McCaskill dissent rejected the majority's rationale that since un-
contested direct evidence existed that the defendant had the requisite
knowledge for a conviction, the jury instructions need not contain a re-
quirement of proof of that knowledge.' The dissent noted that all
evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, disputed or undisputed,
must go to the jury for consideration. 4 The dissent therefore argued
that the undisputed direct evidence showing the McCaskill defendant's
knowledge must go to the jury for a determination of whether the defend-
ant knew his accomplices were armed when they robbed the bank.5 The
dissent stated that a finding by the jury on the element of the defendant's
knowledge was essential to a conviction under the facts in McCaskill."
In determining that failure to instruct the jury on an essential ele-
ment of the crime was not error, the McCaskill majority relied on the
defendant's rights. Id.; see supra notes 41, 45 (evidence showing defendant guilty of aiding
and abetting armed robbery).
" 676 F.2d at 1003 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
o Id.
"' 493 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir. 1974); see supra text accompanying notes 32-40 (discussion of
rule outlined in Short).
52 563 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1977); see supra text accompanying notes 33-40 (discussion of
rule outlined in Sanborn).
676 F.2d at 1003, 1004 (Ervin, J., dissenting). The McCaskill dissent gave a broader
interpretation than the majority to the rulings in Short and Sanborn. Id. at 1003-05. The
dissent advocated a mandatory instruction requiring the government to prove that the
defendant knew his accomplices intended to use the weapons in the commission of the rob-
bery. Id. at 1004. The dissent also argued that the evidence showing the defendant's
knowledge was in dispute and that the majority therefore should have applied the Short
and Sanborn rulings to the McCaskill facts. Id. at 1004, 1005; see supra text accompanying
note 44 (dissent argument that McCaskill evidence was in dispute); cf. majority opinion (Mc-
Caskill evidence not in dispute).
' 676 F.2d at 1003 (Ervin, J., dissenting). The dissent cited several cases to support
the argument that the McCaskill court should consider all the evidence in deciding suffici-
ency of evidence. Id.; see Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (jury must weigh
direct and circumstantial evidence in the same manner); United States v. Barrera, 547 F.2d
1250, 1257 (5th Cir. 1977) (test for sufficiency of evidence on appeal the same whether
evidence direct or circumstantial); United States v. Andrino, 501 F.2d 1373, 1378 (9th Cir.
1974) (circumstantial evidence not inherently less probative than direct evidence); Vuckson
v. United States, 354 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1966) (direct evidence not superior to cir-
cumstantial evidence).




lack of dispute over the direct evidence that established the essential
elements of the offense." The Fourth Circuit's holding that direct,
unrefuted evidence showing the presence of an essential element of the
offense eliminates the requirement that the judge instruct the jury on
every essential element is inconsistent with Supreme Court and other
circuit court opinions. 8 In Holland v. United States," the Supreme Court
stated that circumstantial evidence is no different from direct
evidence. 5 The Holland Court held that both circumstantial and direct
evidence can lead to a wholly incorrect result, and that consequently the
jury must determine the sufficiency of both types of evidence in the
same manner. In United States v. Barrera,62 the Fifth Circuit held that
the jury should make no distinction between circumstantial and direct
evidence when judging whether the evidence shows the existence of
every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The McCaskill
court stated that the jury did not need to determine the sufficiency of
undisputed direct evidence, and therefore implied that the jury need only
consider the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence. 4 The Fourth
Circuit's distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence
therefore is inconsistent with Holland and Barrera.65 To maintain con-
sistency with existing case law, the McCaskill court should have ruled
that the jury must determine the sufficiency of the undisputed direct
evidence.68
17 676 F.2d at 999.
1 See id. at 1001; infra text accompanying notes 58-63 (Fourth Circuit inconsistent
with Supreme Court and other circuit holdings).
348 U.S. 121 (1954).
Id. at 140. In Holland, the defendants appealed from a conviction for intentionally at-
tempting to evade income taxes. Id. at 124. The defendants contended that the trial court's
refusal to instruct that if the government presents circumstantial evidence, the evidence
must be so convincing that the evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis other than
that of guilt. Id. at 139. The Supreme Court rejected the defendants' argument, stating that
where the trial court properly instructs the jury on the standards for reasonable doubt, no
reason exists to give the defendant's requested additional instruction on circumstantial
evidence. Id. at 139-40.
' Id. at 140; see supra note 54 (McCaskill dissent treatment of Holland).
547 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 1255. Appealing from a conviction for possession of narcotics with intent to
distribute, the defendant in Barrera contended that the government's circumstantial
evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. Id. at 1252. The Fifth Circuit stated that
the reasonable doubt standard applies to both circumstantial and direct evidence. Id. at
1255. The Barrera court then reversed the conviction, stating that the prosecution's
evidence failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed or
distributed narcotics. Id. at 1257.
676 F.2d at 1001, 1003.
' Id. at 1001; see supra text accompanying notes 58-62 (Fourth Circuit inconsistent
with existing case law).
" See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text (McCaskill dissent contention that
Fourth Circuit should have ruled that jury must determine sufficiency of undisputed direct
evidence).
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In refusing to rule that failure to instruct the jury regarding an
essential element of the offense was error,67 the Fourth Circuit also was
inconsistent with other circuits. In United States v. Clark,68 for example,
the trial judge failed to require a jury finding of specific intent where
the defendant was charged with possession of narcotics with intent to
distribute.69 In holding that failure to instruct warranted reversal of the
defendant's conviction, the Second Circuit in Clark stated that the trial
court's instructions with respect to the essential elements of the alleged
crime are of paramount importance.0 In United States v. Hiscott,7 the
Eighth Circuit held that the district court's failure to instruct the jury
on each essential element of the crime of auto theft was reversible
error.7 ' The Hiscott court stated that a federal trial judge must define
accurately the essential elements of the offense charged in the jury in-
structions and that a trial court failure to give adequate jury instruc-
tions is grave error." The Fourth Circuit held in McCaskill that the trial
court was not required to instruct the jury on each essential element of
the crime. 4 The McCaskill court's ruling is inconsistent with the Clark
and Hiscott decisions, both of which clearly state that failure to instruct
the jury on every essential element is error.75
The Fourth Circuit's failure to follow United States v. Short" and
e 676 F.2d at 1001, 1003.
475 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1973).
6' Id. at 242. In Clark, the defendant was arrested while carrying 211 grams of heroin
and 18 grams of cocaine. Id. The defendant was charged with and convicted of violations of
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
475 F.2d at 242. On appeal, the Second Circuit found that the trial court's failure to require
the jury to make a finding of specific intent constituted plain error and warranted convic-
tion reversal. Id. at 251.
"0 Id. at 248.
" 586 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1978). In Hiscott, the jury convicted the defendant of auto
theft in violation of the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2313 (1976) (effective January 25, 1948). 586
F.2d at 1272; see 18 U.S.C. § 2313 (1976) (Dyer Act provides penalty of no more than $5,000
or five years imprisonment or both for theft of motor vehicle or aircraft moving in in-
terstate commerce). The defendant in Hiscott appealed to the Eighth Circuit, contending
that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on an essential element of the offense under
the Dyer Act warranted reversal of the defendant's conviction. See 586 F.2d at 1272. The
trial court's instruction stated that the government must prove that the defendant willfully
sold or disposed of the stolen vehicle after the vehicle had moved in interstate commerce.
Id. at 1273. The Hiscott court noted that an essential element of an offense under the Dyer
Act requires that the vehicle be in the stream of interstate commerce at the time of the of-
fense. Id. at 1274; see Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2313 (1976) (requirements of Act). As soon as the
stolen vehicle stops in a particular state, future dealings with the vehicle by an individual do
not constitute a violation of the Dyer Act. 586 F.2d at 1274. The Hiscott court held that the
trial court's instruction incorrectly defined an essential element of the offense and therefore
the Eighth Circuit reversed the conviction. Id. at 1275.
7 586 F.2d at 1275.
73 Id.
7 676 F.2d at 1001, 1003.
1 See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text (discussion of Clark and Hiscott).
7' 493 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir. 1974); see supra note 32 (discussion of Short).
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United States v. Sanborn"7 because the evidence in McCaskill was not in
dispute78 also is inconsistent with the rule in other circuits. In United
States v. Natale,79 the Second Circuit held that failure to instruct the
jury on each element of the offense of conspiracy to collect extensions of
credit by extortionate means was reversible error, even when some of
the elements were not in dispute." In United States v. King,8 the trial
court failed to instruct on each element of the offense when the defend-
ant was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine." The King court
held that a judge who fails to instruct the jury upon the essential
elements of the offense charged commits fundamental error, regardless
of the strength of the evidence.' The Fourth Circuit ruling in McCaskill
that a lack of dispute over the evidence lessened the requirement that
the trial judge must instruct the jury upon each element of the crime
therefore directly contradicts Natale and King.4
The Fourth Circuit in McCaskill should have ruled that the trial
court's failure to instruct the jury on each essential element of the crime
was error. The McCaskill court then could have addressed the issue of
whether the failure to instruct was plain error warranting reversal of
the armed bank robbery conviction85 without being inconsistent with ex-
563 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1977); see supra note 33 (discussion of Sanborn).
676 F.2d at 997.
71 526 F.2d 1160 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 950 (1976).
' Id. at 1167. In Natale, the defendants were convicted of "loan sharking" in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 894 (1976). 526 F.2d at 1165; see 18 U.S.C. § 894 (proscribing collection of ex-
tensions of credit by extortion-ate means). The Natale court instructed the jury that the
essential elements of a § 894 offense required the government to prove the existence of
loans with principal and interest outstanding. 526 F.2d at 1165. The government also must
prove that the defendants actually collected or attempted to collect money due, and that the
defendants used extortionate means to collect the loans. Id. The trial judge then stated to
the jury that in his opinion no dispute in the evidence existed concerning the first two
elements of the offense. Id. On appeal to the Second Circuit, the defendants contended that
the trial judge's comment amounted to a directed verdict on the first two elements of the of-
fense. Id. at 1166, 1167. After stating that failure to charge each separate element of an of-
fense may be plain error, the Natale court held that the trial court instructed the jury on all
the elements and that the trial judge's comment fell far short of a directed verdict. Id. at
1167; accord United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 1131, 1134 (2d Cir. 1974) (failure to charge
each element of offense is plain error).
'4 521 F.2d 61 (10th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 63.
'4Id. The Tenth Circuit noted in United States v. King that if an indictment charges a
defendant with conspiracy, a court can convict the defendant only if the defendant com-
pletes an overt act with one or more of the conspirators. Id. The trial judge in King failed to
instruct the jury that the government must prove that an overt act had taken place. Id. The
Tenth Circuit held that failure to instruct the jury on an essential element of the conspiracy
offense warranted conviction reversal. Id.; see Findley v. United States, 362 F.2d 921, 922
(10th Cir. 1966) (trial court failure to instruct jury on necessary elements of offense affects
substantial rights of accused and is plain error).
' See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text (discussion of Natale and King).
See 676 F.2d at 1001, 1002 (McCaskill court considers whether trial court jury in-
struction warrants conviction reversal under the plain error rule in the absence of defen-
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isting case law.8" The Fourth Circuit's refusal to find error in the trial
court's failure to instruct ignores the holdings of relevant cases in other
circuits," and is inconsistent with the Supreme court ruling in In re Win-
ship.88
By affirming the conviction in McCaskill, the Fourth Circuit has
lessened the requirement that the jury must receive instructions on the
essential elements of an offense, although the McCaskill court has in-
dicated that the Fourth Circuit would not require the instruction only
when undisputed direct evidence shows the existence of the essential
element. 9 When the trial court specifically has refused to give a jury in-
struction requiring proof of an essential element of the crime, however,
the Fourth Circuit will not uphold the conviction." Finally, the Fourth
Circuit has indicated in McCaskill a willingness to uphold a conviction in
the absence of a specific instruction requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of an essential element if the instruction as a whole adequately
covers the elements of the offense. 1
ALFRED PITTMAN TIBBETTS
D. Waiver of a Statutory Right to Speedy Trial Under the IAD •
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IAD)1 established a
statutory system to facilitate the orderly disposition of outstanding de-
tainers and the charges underlying the detainers.' The pre-IAD method
dant's timely objection at trial); supra note 28 (discussion of plain error rule); supra note 48
(Fourth Circuit's treatment of plain error rule in McCaskill).
See supra notes 59-82 and accompanying text (comparison of McCaskill decision with
other circuit opinions).
87 Id.
8 397 U.S. 358 (1970); see supra note 2 (discussion of Winship).
" 676 F.2d at 1001; see supra text accompanying notes 39-48 (jury need not receive in-
struction on essential element if direct unrefuted evidence shows existence of essential
element).
" 676 F.2d at 998; see supra text accompanying notes 35-38 (refusal to instruct on
essential element is reversible error).
" 676 F.2d at 1003; see supra text accompanying note 47 (instruction as a whole ade-
quately outlines essential elements).
1 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-8 (1976).
2 Id.; see United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 343-344 (1978). A detainer is a notice to
prison authorities that charges against a particular inmate are pending in another jurisdic-
tion. 436 U.S. at 359. A detainer does not require the immediate transfer of a prisoner but
simply notifies prison authorities that charges are pending in another jurisdiction. Id. Of-
ficials who lodge a detainer later may effectuate the actual transfer of a prisoner pursuant
to a written request for custody. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. IV(a) (1976).
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for disposing of detainers created numerous problems for state and
federal prisoners.' The pre-IAD system resulted in frequent disruptions
to rehabilitation due to repeated interjurisdictional transfers of
See United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 738 (2d Cir. 1977), affd sub nom. United
States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978). The pre-IAD detainer system did not require
authorities to comply with any procedural prerequisites, such as the filing of a formal indict-
ment, before lodging a detainer. Id. at 738; see also Crow v. United States, 323 F.2d 888, 889
(8th Cir. 1963). In Crow, authorities filed a detainer based on a complaint, not an indictment.
Id. The ease with which virtually any prosecutor could lodge a detainer led to prosecutorial
abuse. See Note, Convicts-The Right to a Speedy Trial and the New Detainer Statutes, 18
RUTGERS L. REv. 828, 835 & n.59 (1964) (more than half of all detainers allowed to lapse)
[hereinafter cited as Right to a Speedy Tial. Authorities sometimes lodged detainers to in-
crease the severity of a prisoner's punishment without ever intending to prosecute the
charge underlying the detainer. See People v. Kenyon, 39 Misc. 2d 876, 879, 242 N.Y.S.2d
156, 159 (1963) (intention of prosecutor to hold untried detainers for "future ammunition");
Cane v. Berry, 356 P.2d 374, 375 (Okla. Crim. App. 1960) (allegations that detainer lodged to
harrass and prevent prisoner from obtaining parole).
The pre-IAD detainer system created numerous sentencing problems for prisoners.
See United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 739 (2d Cir. 1977) (sentencing judge may lengthen
sentence for one offense if outstanding detainer charges prisoner with related offenses),
affd sub nom. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978). Sometimes a prisoner's total
sentence for all related offenses exceeded the first sentencing judge's intended punishment.
See United States v. Candelaria, 131 F. Supp. 797, 800 (S.D. Cal. 1955). In Candelaria, state
authorities lodged a detainer against a federal prisoner, charging the prisoner with the
same offense for which he already was imprisoned. Id. at 799. The prisoner faced further
sentencing upon completion of his federal prison term. Id. at 799-800. In addition, the lack of
a co-ordinated system of disposing of detainers eliminated the possibility of concurrent
sentencing. See State v. Milner, 61 Ohio Op. 2d 206, 149 N.E.2d 189, 190 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958)
(no action taken on detainers until prisoners placed on parole); Comment, The Detainer
System and the Right to a Speedy Trial, 31 U. CH. L. REV. 535, 540-44 (1964) (prosecutors
may fail to pursue speedy disposition of detainers to avoid possibility of concurrent sentenc-
ing).
The uncertainty regarding the possible continuation of a prisoner's incarceration in
another institution created difficulties in formulating parole and rehabilitation programs.
See United States ex rel. Giovengo v. Maroney, 194 F. Supp. 154, 156 (W.D. Pa. 1961). In
Maroney, prison officials barred a prisoner faced with an outstanding detainer from work-
ing outside the institution. Id. In addition, detainers sometimes precluded the granting of
parole. See Donnelly, The Conneticut Board of Parole, 32 CONN. B.J. 26, 47 (1958) (detainer
bars parole by preventing offender from living in community under supervision). The ex-
istence of outstanding detainers also adversely affected a prisoner's attitude towards
rehabilitation. See Right to a Speedy Trial, supra, at 836 & n.67. The existence of a detainer
created personal anxiety rendering the prisoner unwilling to cooperate with prison
authorities. Id.
Finally, the filing of detainers imposed numerous hardships on a prisoner. See
Maroney, 194 F. Supp. at 156. In Maroney, authorities automatically held a prisoner faced
with an outstanding detainer under maximum security. Id. Prisoners faced with outstanding
detainers also experienced denial of preferred work assignments and desirable living
quarters. See Yackle, Taking Stock of Detainer Statutes, 8 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 88, 91 (1975)
(prisoner assigned maximum security status resulting in restricted freedom of movement).
Penal authorities sometimes denied transfers to minimum security areas and visits to dying
relatives and funerals because of the existence of outstanding detainers. Note, Detainers
and the Correctional Process, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 417, 419 n.13 (citing policy statement by
Washington Dep't of Institutions) [hereinafter cited as Detainers].
1983]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
prisoners for trial.4 In addition, the pre-IAD system failed to provide for
the speedy disposition of outstanding detainers.' Articles IV(e)6 and (c)'
of the IAD are the legislative attempts to solve the problems under the
pre-IAD system.' Article IV(e) requires authorities who obtain tem-
porary custody of a prisoner from another jurisdiction to try the
prisoner before returning him to the sending jurisdiction.' Article IV(c)
requires the receiving jurisdiction to try the prisoner within 120 days of
his arrival in the receiving jurisdiction. ' A court may extend the 120 day
time period only if the government shows good cause for granting a con-
tinuance in open court.1 Although a violation of either Article IV(e) or
IV(c) of the IAD requires dismissal of the outstanding indictment,"
See United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 742 (2d Cir. 1977) (continuity of prisoner's
rehabilitation program interrupted due to several interjurisdictional transfers to answer
outstanding detainers), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978); De-
tainers, supra note 3, at 422 (transfer from institution to institution may be harmful to
prisoner's rehabilitation).
See United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 738 (2d Cir. 1977), affd sub nom. United
States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978). Prior to the enactment of the IAD, the lodging of a de-
tainer did not require authorities to take any immediate action. Id. at 738 & n.13. Frequently
authorities did not try a prisoner on outstanding charges until after the prisoner completed
his original sentence. Id. at 740, n.19; see Pellegrini v. Wolfe, 225 Ark. 459, 466, 283 S.W.2d
162, 164 (sending jurisdiction may delay trial by denying receiving jurisdiction's request for
extradition); People v. Gryarly, 23 Ill. 2d 313, 315, 178 N.E.2d 326, 328-29 (1961) (state
authorities lodged detainer never intending to prosecute).
6 See 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. IV(e) (1976) (lAD's antishuttling provision). Article IV(e)
states that a receiving jurisdiction's failure to try a prisoner before returning the prisoner
to the sending jurisdiction shall result in the dismissal, with prejudice, of the outstanding in-
dictment, information or complaint. Id.
' See id.; art. IV(c). Article IV(c) states that a trial under the IAD must commence
within 120 days after prisoner arrives in the receiving jurisdiction. Id. Article IV(c) provides
an exception to the 120 day limit, allowing a court that has jurisdiction over a case to grant
a reasonable continuance if the government or the defendant shows good cause in open
court with either the prisoner or his counsel present. Id.
' See United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 742 (2d Cir. 1977) (Article IV(e) aimed
primarily at decreasing number of times authorities transfer prisoners to answer outstand-
ing detainers), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978); United States ex
rel. Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d 830, 834 (3rd Cir. 1975) (Article IV broadened to secure
prisoner's right to a speedy trial).
' 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. IV(e) (1976); see supra note 6 (antishuttling requirements for
receiving jurisdiction under Art. IV(e) of IAD).
"I 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. IV(c) (1976); see supra note 7 (speedy trial requirements under
Art. IV(c) of IAD).
" 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. IV(c) (1976); see United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 743 (2d
Cir. 1977) (open court requires an adversarial proceeding in which prisoner or his attorney
may defend prisoner's right to speedy trial), affd sub nom. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S.
340 (1978).
" See 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. IV (1976). A violation of Art. IV(c) requires a dismissal of
the indictment, information or complaint that formed the basis of the detainer. Id. at art. V.
A violation of Art. IV(e) also requires a court to dismiss the outstanding indictment with
prejudice. Id. at art. IV(e).
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courts frequently determine that a prisoner "waived" his rights under
the IAD and uphold the indictment."
The standard for an effective waiver traditionally has varied accord-
ing to the nature of the right at stake.14 The requirement of a "knowing
and intelligent" waiver generally applies to rights that promote the fair
ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial.15 Rights that affect trial
fairness typically include the constitutional right to counsel" or the right
to a trial.17 In contrast to the requirement of a knowing and intelligent
waiver, individuals may waive other constitutional or statutory rights
without knowing that the right exists. 8 A waiver of rights that do not af-
13 See, e.g., United States v. Black, 609 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1979) (prisoner waived
rights under Art. IV(e) of IAD by requesting transfer to original site of state custody before
final disposition on outstanding federal charges), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 847 (1980); Camp v.
United States, 587 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1978) (valid guilty plea operates as waiver of Art.
IVe) antishuttling provision); United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1174 (5th Cir. 1977)
(prisoner waived IAD speedy trial right under Art. IVc) by failing to raise issue at trial or
earlier on appeal), cert denied, 436 U.S. 943 (1978).
" See generally Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 478,
482 (1981) [hereinafter cited as General Theory]. Rubin suggests that a prisoner may waive
rights in two ways. Id. at 483 & n.33. An explicit waiver involves a conscious decision to not
exercise a right. Id. Knowledge and intent provide evidence of explicit waivers. Id. Courts
generally require an explicit waiver of rights that protect trial fairness such as the sixth
amendment right to counsel. Id. at 491. A defendant implicitly may waive rights that do not
affect trial fairness. Id. at 496. An implicit waiver occurs when a defendant fails to assert a
right or acts inconsistently with the right. Id. at 483. An implicit waiver does not require an
intentional relinquishment of a known right. Id.; see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529-30
(1972) (defendant implicitly waives constitutional right to a speedy trial by failing to assert
right before trial).
15 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938). In Johnson, the Supreme Court held
that a defendant did not lose his sixth amendment right to counsel simply by failing to claim
the right. Id. at 464. The purpose of the right to counsel is to prevent convictions resulting
from an accused's ignorance of the law. Id. at 462-63. A determination that a defendant loses
the right to counsel by ignorantly failing to assert the right defeats the purpose of the sixth
amendment. Id. at 463; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Johnson Court held that a waiver of
the right to counsel therefore must involve the intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right. 304 U.S. at 464-65. The Johnson Court listed various facts and cir-
cumstances, including the accused's background, experience and conduct, relevant to an
evaluation of the knowing and intelligent nature of the waiver. Id. The Johnson Court
remanded the case to determine whether the prisoner knowingly and intelligently waived
the right to counsel. Id. at 469.
16 304 U.S. at 468; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
" Guthrie v. United States, 517 F.2d 416, 418 (9th Cir. 1975); see U.S. CONST. amend.
VI.
NS See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 246 (1973). In Schneckloth, the defend-
ant "waived" the fourth amendment search warrant requirement. Id. at 220. Police stopped
Schneckloth, who was driving his brother's automobile, and requested permission to search
the car. Id. The police did not have a warrant to search the car. Id. Schneckloth, who was
unaware of his right to refuse the officer's request, consented to the search. Id. The police
found stolen checks and introduced the checks into evidence at Schneckloth's trial. Id.
Schneckloth claimed that the officer's warrantless search of the automobile violated the
fourth amendment and moved to exclude the evidence. Id. at 219. The Supreme Court held
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feet trial fairness may occur when a defendant acts in a manner inconsis-
tent with the right involved, 9 fails to make a timely objection," or volun-
tarily pleads guilty.' In Odom v. United States," the Fourth Circuit con-
sidered whether a prisoner, who was unaware of the statutory right to a
speedy trial under Article IV(c) of the IAD, nevertheless waived his
right to a speedy trial by allowing his attorney to seek a trial date conti-
nuance and by later accepting a plea bargain.2 3
In Odom, a grand jury in Maryland indicted Odom while Odom was
serving a sentence for another offense in Kentucky.24 Federal authorities
in Maryland lodged a detainer against Odom and transferred Odom on
January 15, 1981 to Maryland for arraignment.' The district court in
Maryland set Odom's trial date for March 2, 1981.6 On February 4th
that Schneckloth waived his fourth amendment rights by consenting to the automobile
search and affirmed Schneckloth's conviction. Id. at 246. The Schneckloth Court held that
the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver generally applied only to constitutional
rights that protect the fairness of a criminal trial. Id. at 237 & n.18. The Supreme Court
reasoned that Schneckloth's fourth amendment right against unreasonable searches and
seizures did not relate to trial fairness. Id. at 242. Schneckloth therefore waived his fourth
amendment right even though he was unaware of the right's existence. Id. at 246.
11 See id. at 243 n.31 (consent search waives claims regarding fourth amendment viola-
tions); infra note 60 (inconsistent actions waive IAD rights).
2 See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977), reh. denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977). A
defendant may waive constitutional rights by failing to raise a timely objection. Id. at 87.
Loss of the right is not dependent upon a knowing and intelligent waiver. Id. at 93-94
(Burger, C.J., concurring). In Wainwright, the defendant filed a habeas corpus petition ob-
jecting to the admissability at trial of a defendant's post arrest confession. Id. at 75. The
defendant challenged the voluntariness of the confession and asserted a lack of understand-
ing of the Miranda warnings issued prior to defendant's confession. Id. The Wainwright
Court held that the defendant had waived his right to object to the introduction of the in-
culpatory statemdnts by failing to object to the admission into evidence at trial. Id. at 86-87;
see also R. Cipes, 8 MOR's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.01 (2d ed. 1978) (a defendant waives
rights by failing to raise defenses and objections based on nonjurisdictional defects in in-
stitution of prosecution before trial).
21 See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973). A guilty plea waives claims
relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the
guilty plea. Id. A prisoner may attack collaterally the voluntary and intelligent character of
the guilty plea by showing that the advice of prisoner's counsel was not within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Id. A guilty plea does not waive those
claims that attack the power of the court to try a defendant. Menna v. New York, 423 U.S.
61, 62 & n.2 (1975) (per curiam) (double jeopardy violation constituted jurisdictional defect
not amenable to "waiver"); Blackledge v.- Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 31 (1974) (guilty plea does not
waive due process violation that resulted in jurisdictional defect).
1 674 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3982 (U.S. June 14, 1982) (No.
81-6731).
Id. at 229; see infra note 61 (prisoner's inconsistent actions waive IAD rights).
4 674 F.2d at 229.
Id. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, an arraignment consists of
either the reading of an indictment or information or the stating of the charge to the defend-
ant. FED. R. CRIM. P. 10. During the arraignment, the court also calls upon the defendant to
enter a plea. Id.
2 674 F.2d at 229.
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Odom's attorney filed a notice of defense based on Odom's mental condi-
tion and moved to suppress certain evidence. 7 The evaluation of Odom's
psychiatric condition was incomplete at the time of the pretrial con-
ference on Feb. 18, 1981.' Odom's attorney requested a continuance to
allow time for completion of the psychiatric evaluation. 9 At the pretrial
conference, the district court judge rescheduled Odom's trial for May 18,
1981 with the consent of both counsel. To validate the new trial date,
counsel for both parties later prepared a formal motion for a continuance
under the Speedy Trial Act (STA).1 The district court in Odom officially
granted the continuance in accordance with section 316(h) (8) (A) of the
STA.Y The continuance formally set the trial date for May 18, 1981,
three days beyond the 120 day time period provided under Article IV(c)
of the IAD.'
In April 1981, Odom's attorney informed Odom of a possible defense
based on the violation of Article IV(c).3 4 Odom subsequently entered into
a plea bargain agreement and the court scheduled rearraignment for
May 18th.Y On May 18th Odom withdrew from the plea bargain agree-
ment and requested a new attorney.38 The district court granted Odom's
request for a new attorney and Odom's motion for a continuance to
prepare a defense.3 1 Odom's new attorney moved to dismiss the indict-
ment on the ground that the district court, by granting the first contin-
uance, illegally rescheduled Odom's trial date three days beyond the
statutory time limit under Article IV(c). 8 Odom's attorney further
27 Id.
' See id. Odom's doctors were unable to complete Odom's psychiatric evaluation due
to a delay in obtaining relevant hospital records. Id. at 229 & n.1.
See id. On February 10, Odom's attorney sent a letter to the trial judge and a copy
to Odom, stating the reason for the delay in completion of Odom's psychiatric evaluation. Id.
Odom's attorney estimated that the doctors performing the psychiatric evaluation would
need another four to six weeks to review completely Odom's records. Id.
3 Id.; see supra note 7 (requirements for granting trial date continuance).
, 674 F.2d at 229; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Odom's attorney recited
the need to obtain additional information about Odom's mental condition and the need for
additional time to dispose of pretrial motions as grounds for the continuance. 674 F.2d at
229. Although in Odom, only the government's attorney signed the formal motion for a con-
tinuance, the motion stated that both counsel requested a continuance until May 18, 1981.
Id. Neither counsel, however, had considered the IAD speedy trial provision when re-
questing the continuance. Id.
3 674 F.2d at 229; see 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) (1976) (STA's requirements for granting
trial date continuances); infra note 42 (different requirements for granting continuance
under STA and IAD).
674 F.2d at 229; see supra note 7 (speedy trial requirements under Art. IV(c) of IAD).




Id. at 229-30; see supra note 12 (violation of Art. IV(c) requires dismissal of indict-
ment with prejudice).
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asserted that the initial granting of the continuance violated the open
court requirement under Article IV(c) 9 The district court dismissed the
indictment on the grounds that the original granting of the continuance
violated Article IV(c)'s open court provision and that Odom had not made
a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a speedy trial.4 0 The
government appealed the district court's dismissal of Odom's indictment
to the Fourth Circuit.4
1
The Fourth Circuit held that Odom had waived his IAD right to a
speedy trial and reinstated the indictment. 4'2 The Odom court reasoned
that a prisoner may waive IAD rights because IAD rights are purely
674 F.2d at 229-30; see infra note 42 (circuit courts' interpretation of "open court"
under Art. IV(c) of IAD).
4' 674 F.2d at 230; see supra note 15 (rationale underlying requirement of knowing and
intelligent waiver of rights).
41 674 F.2d at 230.
42 Id. After the Fourth Circuit held that Odom had waived his speedy trial right, the
Fourth Circuit presented two other reasons for reinstating Odom's indictment.-Id. at 230-32.
Odom asserted that the initial granting of the trial date continuance violated the open court
requirement under Art. IV(c). Id. at 230. Odom argued that the open court provision re-
quired a judge on the bench. Id.; see Stroble v. Anderson, 587 F.2d 830, 839 (6th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979). In Stroble, a court clerk who was unaware of the IAD's
protections granted a continuance. 587 F.2d at 839. The Stroble court condemned the infor-
mal granting of a continuance and held that open court means a judge on the bench. Id. at
840. In Odom, a judge in his chambers granted a continuance during a pretrial conference.
674 F.2d at 231. Odom asserted that the granting of the continuance during a pretrial con-
ference did not comply with the Stroble court's requirement of a judge on the bench. Id.
The district court agreed that the original granting of the continuance violated Art. IV(c)
and dismissed Odom's indictment. Id. at 230. The Fourth Circuit in Odom construed the
term "open court" to include a judge in his chambers during a pretrial conference and
therefore reinstated the indictment. Id. at 231. The Fourth Circuit stated that the open
court provision was the legislative attempt to protect prisoners from ex parte trial date ex-
tensions. Id.; see also United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 743 (2d Cir. 1977) (the Ford court
concluded that term "open court" provided protection against gradual erosion of prisoner's
speedy trial rights during ex parte hearings), affd sub nom. United States v. Mauro, 436
U.S. 340 (1978). In Odom, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the presence of Odom's attorney
before a judge at a pretrial conference created an adversarial proceeding that sufficiently
protected Odom's rights. 674 F.2d at 231.
The Fourth Circuit in Odom also reconciled the different continuance requirements
regarding a prisoner's right to a speedy trial under the IAD and the Speedy Trial Act
(STA). 674 F.2d at 231-32; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (1976) (Speedy Trial Act). Under the
STA, proceedings to determine mental competency and the disposition of pretrial motions
toll the time period in which a court must try a prisoner. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(1)(A), (F)
(1976). The STA also allows continuances or trial date extensions where the "ends of justice
outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." Id. at
§ 3161(h)(8)(A). Prior to trial, the district court in Odom granted Odom's attorney's request
for a trial date continuance in compliance with the STA. 674 F.2d at 229. The Fourth Circuit
decided that a continuance granted in accordance with the STA criteria also meets the
IAD's "good cause" requirements and that a harmonious interpretation of the two Acts re-
quired dismissal of Odom's speedy trial claim. Id. at 231. The Odom court concluded that the
original continuance complied with the IAD's good cause requirement and provided another
reason for reinstating the outstanding indictment. Id.
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statutory and do not affect the court's jurisdiction.43 The Fourth Circuit
then addressed the appropriate standard of waiver of IAD rights." The
Odom court rejected the requirement of a knowing and intelligent
waiver of IAD rights.45 The Fourth Circuit stated that the Supreme
Court's decision in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte" limited the requirement
of a knowing and intelligent waiver to constitutional, rather than
statutory, rights." The Odom court reasoned that the requirement of a
knowing intelligent waiver therefore was inapplicable to IAD rights,
which are purely statutory.48 The Odom court also relied on the decisions
of other circuit courts to support the conclusion that a prisoner who is
unaware of his 1AD rights waives rights when he acts in a manner incon-
sistent with the provisions of the IAD.49 The Fourth Circuit characterized
Odom's attorney's request for a trial date continuance and Odom's accep-
tance of a plea bargain as acts inconsistent with the IAD's protections."0
The Odom court reasoned that Odom's inconsistent actions waived his
IAD speedy trial right.-1
Circuit courts agree that a prisoner may waive IAD rights.2 The ma-
jority of circuit courts also reject the requirement of a knowing and in-
"3 674 F.2d at 230; see Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974). In Blackledge, the
Supreme Court stated that since a defendant may not waive jurisdictional defects, a defend-
ant may collaterally attack violations that affect the sentencing court's power to hear the
claim. 417 U.S. at 30. In Blackledge, the Supreme Court granted a prisoner habeas corpus
relief on the grounds that a double jeopardy violation deprived the sentencing court of
jurisdiction to hear the claim. Id. at 31; see also Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 (1975)
(no waiver of double jeopardy violation).
" 674 F.2d at 230; see supra note 14 (appropriate standard of waiver varies according
to right protected).
'" 674 F.2d at 230; see supra note 15 (requirement of knowing and intelligent waiver of
right to counsel).
" 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
'7 674 F.2d at 230.
" Id.; see 412 U.S. at 236 (knowing and intelligent standard of waiver inapplicable to
fourth amendment warrant requirement).
" 674 F.2d at 230; see United States v. Black, 609 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1979)
(prisoner's affirmative request for transfer may waive Art. IV(e) rights), cert denied, 449
U.S. 847 (1980); United States v. Eaddy, 595 F.2d 341, 344 (6th Cir. 1979) (prisoner who re-
quests transfer before final disposition of charges waives Art. IV(e) right); Camp v. United
States, 587 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1978) (guilty plea waives Art. IV(e) right); United States v.
Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1170 (5th cir. 1977) (prisoner who requests transfer later estopped
from asserting violation of Art. IV(e) and prisoner who fails to make a timely objection
waives Art. IV(c} rights), cert denied, 436 U.S. 943 (1978).
674 F.2d at 230; see supra text accompanying notes 29 & 35.
674 F.2d at 230.
5' See United States v. Eaddy, 595 F.2d 341, 344 (6th Cir. 1979). The Eaddy court
decided that IAD rights exist for the protection of the prisoner. Id. Since IAD rights benefit
the prisoner, the prisoner may waive IAD rights. Id. Furthermore, IAD rights are non-
jurisdictional and subject to waiver by forfeiture or default under the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Id. at 346; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 12; supra note 20 (loss of rights through
procedural default); see also United States v. Black, 609 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1979) (non-
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telligent waiver of IAD rights." Courts that reject a knowing and
intelligent waiver of IAD rights rely on Schneckloth to limit the require-
ment of knowing and intelligent waiver to certain constitutional rights.-
Only the Second Circuit has approved the requirement of a knowing and
intelligent waiver of Article IV(e) rights under the IAD.55 In Mauro v.
United States" authorities transferred a prisoner from state to federal
custody pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequedum 7 The
federal authorities later returned the prisoner to state custody without
first trying the prisoner on the federal indictment." The district court
held that federal authorities had violated Article IV(e) and ordered
dismissal of the federal indictment. 9 The Second Circuit affirmed the
dismissal and noted that the prisoner had not knowingly and intelligently
waived his rights under Article IV(e).6
In considering the appropriate standard of waiver of IAD rights,
four circuit courts have held that a prisoner waives Article IV(e) rights
by acting in a manner inconsistent with the provisions of the IAD.6 In
constitutional IAD rights do not protect trial fairness and may be waived), cert. denied, 448
U.S. 847 (1980); Camp v. United States, 587 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1978) (guilty plea waives
nonjurisdictional, statutory IAD rights); United States v. Palmer, 574 F.2d 164, 167 (3rd Cir.
1978) (IAD violation not fundamental defect which precludes waiver by guilty plea); United
States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 742 (2d Cir. 1977) (lAD rights benefit prisoner and are
waivable), affd sub nom. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978); United States v.
Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1174 (5th Cir. 1977) (lAD violations are nonfundamental defects that
prisoner waives through procedural default), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 340 (1978); United States
v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1174 (5th Cir. 1977) (lAD violations are nonfundamental defects
that prisoner waives through procedural default), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 943 (1978).
1 See United States v. Black, 609 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1979) (knowing and in-
telligent standard of waiver inapplicable to Art. IV(e) rights), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 847
(1980); United States v. Eaddy, 595 F.2d 341, 344 (6th Cir. 1979) (prisoner may waive IAD
right without knowing that the right exists); Camp v. United States, 587 F.2d 397, 400 (8th
Cir. 1978) (requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver inapplicable to IAD rights that
are purely statutory).
See Camp v. United States, 587 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1978) (IAD rights are only
statutory set of procedural rules that do not require a knowing and intelligent waiver);
supra note 53 (circuit courts' rejection of knowing and intelligent waiver standard).
I See Mauro v. United States, 544 F.2d 588, 591 n.3 (2d Cir. 1976) (requirement of
knowing and intelligent waiver of IAD rights upheld), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 340
(1978).
544 F.2d at 591 n.3.
5 Id. at 590. In Mauro, the Second Circuit held that a writ of habeas corpus ad prose-
quedum was a detainer within the meaning of the IAD. Id. at 592. On appeal, however, the
Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's decision and held that a writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequedum was not a detainer. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 361 (1978). The
Supreme Court stated that unlike a detainer, a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequedum re-
quired the immediate presence of the prisoner in the jurisdiction where the prisoner com-
mitted the offense. Id. at 358.
544 F.2d at 590.
59 Id.
Id. at 591, n.3.
6' See United States v. Black, 609 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1979) (prisoner's affirmative
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United States v. Black 2 and United States v. Ford,6 3 federal authorities
lodged detainers and obtained temporary custody over prisoners from
state institutions.' Before trial on the federal charges, the prisoners in
both Black and Ford affirmatively requested a return to state custody.'
Federal authorities violated Article IV(e) by returning the prisoners to
state custody pursuant to the prisoners' requests.6 Although the
prisoners in Black and Ford were unaware of the rights under Article
IV(e) both the Ninth Circuit in Black and the Second Circuit in Ford held
that the prisoners' requests for transfers were acts inconsistent with the
IAD and therefore waived Article IV(e) rights under the IAD. "
In United States v. Scallion6 a prisoner requested to be returned to
state custody while awaiting trial on federal charges.69 The Fifth Circuit
held that the prisoner was estopped from later asserting a violation of
Article IV(e). In United States v. Eaddy," the Sixth Circuit agreed with
the Scallion court's decision that a prisoner's inconsistent actions
operate as a waiver.7 2 The Sixth Circuit, however, did not find that
request for transfer was contrary to Art. IV(e), the antishuttling provision, and waived
rights under Art. IV(e)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 847 (1980); United States v. Eaddy, 595 F.2d
341, 344 (6th Cir. 1979) (same); United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 742 (2d Cir. 1977) (same),
aff'd sub nom. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1980); United States v. Scallion, 548
F.2d 1168, 1170 (5th Cir. 1977) (prisoner who requests transfer estopped from later asserting
violation of Art. IV(e)), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 943 (1978).
6 609 F.2d 1330 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 847 (1980).
6 550 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1977), affd sub nom. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340
(1980).
" United States v. Black, 609 F.2d at 1332; United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d at 735.
609 F.2d at 1332; 550 F.2d at 735. In Black, the prisoner requested a return to state
custody on three different occasions before trial on the federal charges. 609 F.2d at 1332. In
Ford, the prisoner requested permission to return to state custody to facilitate preparation
for trial. 550 F.2d at 735. Both the Black and the Ford courts held that the prisoners' re-
quests for a transfer to state custody waived Art. IV(e) rights. 689 F.2d at 1334; 550 F.2d at
742.
, 609 F.2d at 1332; 550 F.2d at 735; see supra note 6 (Art. IV(e) requires receiving
jurisdiction to try prisoner before returning prisoner to sending jurisdiction).
609 F.2d at 1334; 550 F.2d at 742. Although the prisoner in Ford waived his rights
under Art. IV(e) of the IAD, the Second Circuit held that the government's failure to comply
with the speedy trial provision of Art. IV(c) nevertheless required dismissal of the federal
indictment. 550 F.2d at 743. In Black, however, the Ninth Circuit upheld the federal indict-
ment. 609 F.2d at 1335.
548 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 443 (1978).
Id. at 1170. In Scallion, the prisoner requested permission to return to state custody
for a parole hearing. Id.
70 Id. The Scallion court held that a court may estop a prisoner who acted inconsistently
with Art. IV of the IAD from later asserting a violation of Art. IV(e). Id. The court also held
that a prisoner may waive Art. IV(c) rights by failing to make a timely objection. Id. at 1174.
595 F.2d 341 (6th Cir. 1979).
r See id. at 345. The Eaddy court agreed with the Fifth Circuit's holding in United
States v. Scallion that a prisoner who is unaware of his IAD rights waives Art. IV(e) rights
by requesting permission to return to state custody before final disposition of federal
charges. Id.; see Scallion, 548 F.2d at 1170. The Eaddy court, however, decided that the
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Eaddy had waived his rights under Article IV(e) of the IAD.3 In Eaddy,
authorities shuttled the prisoner between state and federal custody on
two occasions prior to a final disposition of federal charges. 4 Eaddy did
not object to the transfer. 5 The Eaddy court concluded that although a
prisoner's affirmative request for transfer may waive Article IV(e)
rights, a prisoner does not lose Article IV(e) rights by failing to state a
preference regarding his place of incarceration."'
One circuit court specifically has characterized a guilty plea as an in-
consistent action that may waive IAD rights.7 7 In Kowalak v. United
States,7 the Sixth Circuit stated that a prisoner's guilty plea was an in-
consistent action which may waive both Article IV(c) and Article IV(e)
rights of the IAD.7 9 In Kowalak, the prisoner's counsel, who was unaware
of the IAD rights, encouraged the prisoner to plead guilty." The Sixth
Circuit remanded the Kowalak case to determine whether the prisoner
had received effective assistance of counsel." The Kowalak court held
that a prisoner who does not receive effective assistance of counsel may
later withdraw the guilty plea."2 The Kowalak court further stated that a
withdrawal of the guilty plea invalidated the waiver of IAD rights based
on the prisoner's guilty plea. 3
In Odom v. United States, the Fourth Circuit correctly held that
Odom had waived his rights under the IAD.u The Fourth Circuit's rejec-
tion of the standard of a knowing and intelligent waiver in Odom is con-
sistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Schneckloth v.
prisoner in Scallion would not have taken advantage of the Art. IV(e) right even if the
prisoner had known of the right. 595 F.2d at 345. See Scallion, 548 F.2d at 1170 (prisoner re-
quested return to prepare for parole hearing). The Eaddy court concluded that waiver oc-
curs when facts indicate that a prisoner would not have requested compliance with the IAD
provision even if the prisoner had been aware of the applicable IAD rights. 595 F.2d at 345.
7 595 F.2d at 345.
Id. at 343.
Id. In Eaddy, the prisoner's counsel indicated that it was not important where of-
ficials held the prisoner pending trial on federal charges. Id at 345. The Eaddy court decided
that failure to state a preference regarding a place of incarceration did not waive Art. IV(e)
rights. Id.
78 Id.
" See Kowalak v. United States, 645 F.2d 534, 534 (6th Cir. 1981) (guilty plea is incon-
sistent act that may waive IAD rights).
78 645 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1981).
" See id. at 537. The Kowalak court stated that pleading guilty and standing trial
operate as affirmative requests for treatment contrary to the procedures proscribed by Art.
IV(c) and IV(e) of the IAD. Id.
Id. at 537.
" See id. at 538. The Kowalak court noted that a counsel's failure to advise a prisoner
of rights under the IAD was not per se ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.
82 Id.
8 Id.
674 F.2d at 230.
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Bustamonte.8 In Schneckloth, the defendant "waived" the fourth amend-
ment requirement of a search warrant when he consented to a police
search of his brother's automobile. 6 Schneckloth was unaware of his
right to refuse a warrantless searchY The Supreme Court held that
generally the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver only ap-
plied to constitutional rights that preserve a fair trial.' A defendant
may waive other rights, such as the fourth amendment right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, without being aware of the right's
existence.89 IAD rights are statutory and therefore are not included in
the category of rights that require a knowing and intelligent waiver
under the Schneckloth analysis.
In addition to Schneckloth, the majority of circuit courts support the
Fourth Circuit's decision in Odom that a prisoner's inconsistent actions
may waive Article IV(c) rights of the IAD.19 The other circuit courts
which held that a prisoner's inconsistent actions actually waived IAD
rights involved violations of Article IV(e), the antishuttling provision."
Although Odom involved an alleged waiver of the Article IV(c) speedy
trial right,3 Schneckloth permits the application of an inconsistent ac-
81 412 U.S. 218 (1972); 674 F.2d at 230; see supra note 18 (Supreme Court's limited ap-
plication of knowing and intelligent waiver to consititutional rights that protect trial
fairness).
' 412 U.S. at 220.
Id. at 222.
Id. at 237.
" Id. at 242. The Schneckloth Court held that the fourth amendment right against
warrantless searches, unlike the sixth amendment right to counsel, does not protect the
fairness of the fact finding process. Id.
" See supra text accompanying notes 53 & 54 (statutory rights, such as IAD rights, do
not require a knowing and intelligent waiver).
91 United States v. Black, 609 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 847
(1980); United States v. Eaddy, 595 F.2d 341, 344 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Ford, 550
F.2d 732, 742 (2d Cir. 1977), affd sub nom. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978);
United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1170 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 943
(1978); see supra text accompanying note 61 (inconsistent actions waive IAD rights). But see
United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 591 n.3 (2d Cir. 1976) (requirement of knowing and in-
telligent waiver of IAD rights), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 340 (1978). The Second Cir-
cuit is the only circuit court that specifically has approved the requirement of a knowing
and intelligent waiver of IAD rights. 544 F.2d at 591 n.3. In a case after Mauro, however,
the Second Circuit also held that a prisoner may waive IAD rights by pleading guilty,
regardless of the prisoner's awareness of the right. Edwards v. United States, 564 F.2d 654,
653 (2d Cir. 1977).
,1 United States v. Black, 609 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 847
(1980); United States v. Eaddy, 595 F.2d 341, 344 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Ford, 550
F.2d 732, 742 (2d Cir. 1977), affd sub nom. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978);
United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1170 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 943
(1978); see supra note 61 (inconsistent actions waive Art. IV(e) rights).
1 674 F.2d at 230. Two circuit courts have discussed waiver of Article IV(c) rights in
terms of procedural default, not inconsistent actions. See United States v. Eaddy, 595 F.2d
19831
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tion rationale for waiver of all statutory rights, including Article IV(c) as
well as Article IV(e) rights. 4
The Fourth Circuit also characterized Odom's plea bargain as an in-
consistent action that waived the Article IV(c) right. 5 Although circuit
courts agree that guilty pleas waive nonjurisdictional defects, including
IAD violations,96 only the Sixth Circuit in Kowalak v. United States, has
specifically characterized a guilty plea as an inconsistent action.2
Assuming that the Fourth Circuit correctly characterized Odom's plea
bargain as an inconsistent action, the Fourth Circuit nevertheless failed
to consider Odom's withdrawal from the plea bargain before trial. 8 The
Kowalak court specifically stated that the withdrawal of a plea in-
validated the waiver based on the guilty plea.9 In Unted States v.
Palmer,"' the Third Circuit also stated that a prisoner's guilty plea
waived IAD rights unless the prisoner was willing to revoke the plea
and rely on the sufficiency of the IAD motion. 1 In Smith v. United
341, 346 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1174 (5th Cir. 1977). In
Scallion, the Fifth Circuit stated that a prisoner may waive the right to a speedy trial under
Art. IV(c) by failing to make a timely objection. 548 F.2d at 1174. The Scallion court,
however, dismissed the prisoner's claim on the ground that the IAD does not apply to a writ
of habeas corpus ad prosequedum. Id. at 1173. In United States v. Eaddy, the Sixth Circuit
stated that a prisoner may waive both Art. IV(e) and (c) rights through procedural default.
595 F.2d at 346. The Eaddy court compared IAD violations to violations of other rights that
defendants must raise prior to trial under the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12, Id.;
FED. R. CRIm. P. 12. Pursuant to rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure a defend-
ant loses the right to object to nonjurisdictional violations by failing to object to the alleged
violation prior to trial. 595 F.2d at 346. In Eaddy, however, the prisoner did not waive Art.
IV(c) rights since, prior to trial, the prisoner persistently requested a speedy trial. Id. The
Eaddy court held that although the prisoner did not submit the speedy trial request in the
form required under the IAD, the prisoner's requests nevertheless provided sufficient
notification to the government of the speedy trial claim and precluded the government's
assertion of waiver. Id.
'4 412 U.S. 218, 237 (1972); see supra note 18 (defendant's consent results in loss of
fourth amendment right against warrantless searches regardless of defendant's
unawareness of right).
"' 674 F.2d at 229.
"6 See Kowalak v. United States, 645 F.2d 534, 537 (6th Cir. 1981) (guilty plea may
waive both Art. IV(e) and (c) rights under IAD); Camp v. United States, 587 F.2d 397, 399
(8th Cir. 1978) (valid guilty plea waived all IAD violations); United States v. Palmer, 574
F.2d 164, 167 (3rd Cir. 1978) (prisoner's refusal to withdraw from plea bargain resulted in
waiver of Art. IV(e) rights, cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907 (1978); Edwards v. United States, 564
F.2d 652, 653 (2d Cir. 1977) (prisoner may waive Art. IV(e) rights by pleading guilty).
Kowalak v. United States, 645 F.2d 534, 537 (6th Cir. 1981).
674 F.2d at 230.
645 F.2d at 538. The Kowalak court stated that a prisoner may withdraw a guilty
plea before trial if the prisoner had not received effective assistance of counsel. Id. The
Kowalak court concluded that withdrawal of the plea revoked the waiver of any IAD rights.
Id.
100 574 F.2d 164 (3rd Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907 (1978).
10' Id. at 167. In Palmer, the Third Circuit determined that the prisoner had made a ra-
tional and voluntary decision to accept the benefits of pleading guilty. Id. at 166. The
prisoner moved to dismiss the indictment on grounds of an Article IV(e) violation but was
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States,0 2 the Eleventh Circuit specifically noted that once a court rejects
a plea agreement, the court can reinstate the rights that the defendant
had surrendered under the agreement."3 Courts, however, may refuse to
reinstate Article IV(c) rights of the IAD when the prisoner's acceptance
of the plea bargain actually contributed to the trial delay and subse-
quent violation of Article IV(c). °4 In Odom, however, the granting of the
first continuance rescheduled the trial date beyond the statutory time
limit, prior to Odom's acceptance of the plea bargain."5 Since the plea
bargain did not contribute to the violation of Article IV(c), Odom's
withdrawal from the plea bargain invalidated the waiver and loss of any
rights based on the plea agreement."6
The Fourth Circuit correctly rejected the requirement of a knowing
and intelligent waiver of IAD rights.107 Although the Second Circuit has
approved the knowing and intelligent standard of waiver,108 the Supreme
Court and majority of circuit courts have rejected the requirement of a
knowing and intelligent waiver in favor of the decision that a
defendant's inconsistent actions may waive statutory rights. 9 The
Fourth Circuit's reliance on Odom's withdrawn plea, however, is
misplaced."' If a prisoner withdraws from a plea bargain before trial, the
prisoner may regain the rights previously waived under the plea
bargain.' The Fourth Circuit's holding in Odom, however, is not depen-
unwilling to withdraw his plea. Id. The Palmer court held that the guilty plea waived all Ar-
ticle IV(e) rights. Id. The Palmer court noted that a finding of waiver of IAD rights did not
frustrate the purposes of the IAD. Id. at 168-69. The Palmer court reasoned that dismissal
of an indictment after a prisoner refused to withdraw a guilty plea would frustrate congres-
sional intent. Id.
670 F.2d 145 (11th Cir. 1982).
103 Id. at 148 n.6. The Smith court stated that a court may return a prisoner to his pre-
agreement position by allowing a withdrawal of the guilty plea under the agreement. Id.
," See Santabello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 267 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(defendant may withdraw plea that has not disadvantaged government).
105 674 F.2d at 229.
"0 See Kowalak v. United States, 645 F.2d 534, 538 (6th Cir. 1981) (withdrawal of guilty
plea invalidates waiver); United States v. Palmer, 574 F.2d 164, 166 (3rd Cir. 1978) (refusal
to withdraw guilty plea waives Art. IV(e) rights), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907 (1978).
107 674 F.2d at 230.
"0 Mauro v. United States, 544 F.2d 588, 591 n.3 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds,
436 U.S. 340 (1978). But see Edwards v. United States, 564 F.2d 652, 653 (2d Cir. 1977) (guilty
plea precludes collateral attack of IAD violation, regardless of prisoner's awareness of IAD
right when pleading guilty).
" Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); United States v. Black, 609 F.2d
1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 847 (1980); United States v. Eaddy, 595 F.2d
341, 344 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 742 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'd sub nom.
United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978); United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1170
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 943 (1978); see supra notes 18 & 52 (rejection of re-
quirement of knowing and intelligent waiver of statutory rights).
110 674 F.2d at 230; see supra notes 99 & 106 (withdrawn plea invalidates waiver).
I,, See Smith v. United States, 670 F.2d 145, 148 n.6 (11th Cir. 1982) (reinstatement of
prisoner's rights upon rejection of plea agreement).
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dent upon the validity of the plea bargain waiver.12 Odom waived his
statutory right to a speedy trial when his attorney obtained a trial date
continuance, an act inconsistent with the provisions of the IAD."3 The
Fourth Circuit, therefore, correctly reinstated Odom's indictment."'
MICHELLE L. GILBERT
E. Waiver of Criminal Statutes of Limitation
Congress designed statutes of limitation' for criminal offenses to
limit exposure to prosecution for a fixed period of time following the
commission of a crime.' Statutes of limitation serve the dual purpose of
protecting individuals against charges when evidence has grown stale3
and encouraging law enforcement officials to act swiftly when in-
vestigating criminal cases.' Federal statutes of limitation distinguish
between capital and noncapital offenses by providing that a grand jury
may return an indictment for a capital offense at any time without
limitation.' A separate federal statute of limitations dealing with non-
" 674 F.2d at 230.
113 Id.
'1 Id.; see supra note 61 (inconsistent actions waive IAD rights).
See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (statute of limitations bars trial and
punishment of any noncapital offense unless grand jury returns indictment within five years
of the offense); id. § 3281 (grand jury may return indictment at any time for any offense
punishable by death). Section 3282 is a general statute of limitations applicable to all crimes
that do not carry their own time limitations. See id. § 3282 (noncapital crimes carry five-
year statutes of limitations except as otherwise provided by law).
2 See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322-23 (1971) (statute of limitations pro-
vides primary guarantee against bringing stale criminal charges); Toussie v. United States,
397 U.S. 112, 114-15 (1970) (purpose of limitations statutes is to limit exposure to criminal
prosecution); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 122 (1966) (same).
See Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-15 (1970) (statute of limitations pro-
vides protection when basic facts may have become obscured by passage of time); United
States v. Wild, 551 F.2d 418, 423-24 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (same), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916 (1977).
See generally Note, The Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law: A Penetrable Barrier to
Prosecution, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 630, 632-35 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Statute of Limita-
tions].
4 See Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-15 (1970) (statute of limitations en-
courages law enforcement officials promptly to investigate suspected criminal activity);
United States v. Wild, 551 F.2d 418, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
' See 18 U.S.C. § 3281 (1976) (grand jury may return indictment at any time without
limitation for any offense punishable by death). The fifth amendment requires that a grand
jury initiate a federal prosecution for a capital crime by an indictment. U.S. CONST. amend.
V; see Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960) (fifth amendment limits defendant's
jeopardy to offenses charged by grand jury). The purpose of the grand jury is to determine
whether probable cause exists that the defendant has committed a crime and whether the
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capital offenses bars prosecution unless a grand jury returns an indict-
ment within five years of the offense."
In United States v. Williams,7 the Fourth Circuit considered
whether the defendant could waive the five-year statute of limitations
for noncapital offenses8 and whether the defendant's request for a jury
instruction on a lesser included offense constituted a waiver of the
limitations statute for the lesser offense.' In Williams, a grand jury
returned a first degree murder indictment in 1981 against Stephen
Jerome Williams for the 1975 killing of Kathleen Dandois.'" At the con-
clusion of the trial, defense counsel requested that the trial judge charge
the jury on the lesser offense of second degree murder."1 Williams' at-
torney did not mention that the statute of limitations might bar a guilty
verdict for the lesser offense. 2 The trial judge gave the charge and the
jury convicted Williams of second degree murder."3 Williams appealed
his conviction to the Fourth Circuit.
1 4
government should initiate criminal proceedings. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 343-44 (1974) (function of grand jury is to determine whether probable cause exists);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686 (1972) (same). For noncapital crimes, a defendant may
waive his right to indictment by grand jury and allow proceedings to be initiated by infor-
mation. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a), (b).
' See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1976) (grand jury must return indictment within five years
from date of offense); supra note 1.
684 F.2d 296 (4th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 299-300.
'Id.
10 Id. at 298. Following the killing of Kathleen Dandois, investigators made little pro-
gress in identifying the persons responsible for her death. Id. The murder remained unsolved
for nearly three years when William Joseph Facey admitted his involvement in the murder
and implicated the defendant, Stephen Jerome Williams, as his accomplice. Id. The in-
vestigation then began anew with investigators attempting to corroborate Facey's admis-
sion. Id. Facey's testimony and corroborating evidence supporting his testimony led to the
grand jury's indictment of Williams in February 1981. Id.
11 684 F.2d at 299. Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
"[t]he defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense charged
..." FED. R. GRIM. P. 31(c). The lesser included offense doctrine developed at common law as
an aid to the prosecution in cases in which the evidence failed to establish some element of
the crime charged. See United States v. Markis, 352 F.2d 860, 866 (2d Cir. 1965) (primary
purpose of lesser included offense doctrine was to aid prosecution); 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE-CRIMINAL § 515 (1982) (same). The criminal defendant now has a
right to an instruction on a lesser included offense if the evidence would permit a jury ra-
tionally to find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater. See
Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973) (defendant entitled to lesser offense in-
struction if evidence permits jury rationally to find him guilty of lesser offense); Sansone v.
United States, 380 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1965) (listing conditions for instruction on lesser included
offense); cf. United States v. Carter, 540 F.2d 753, 755 (4th Cir. 1976) (reversible error to
refuse request for instruction on lesser included offense when evidence distinguishing
lesser offense from greater offense in dispute).
" 684 F.2d at 299.
13 Id.
" Id. at 297. Williams appealed his conviction on three grounds. Id. at 297-98. First,
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On appeal, the Fourth Circuit requested that counsel address the
problem presented by the five-year statute of limitations for second
Williams contended that insufficient credible evidence existed to support his conviction. Id.
at 297. An appellate court must sustain the verdict if substantial evidence exists, viewed in
the light most favorable to the prevailing party, to uphold the jury's decision. See Wood v.
United States, 321 F.2d 699, 701 (5th Cir. 1963) (assignment of error requires court to deter-
mine whether record as a whole is sufficient to support verdict). Williams argued that
Facey's in-court testimony was inconsistent with his prior written confession. 684 F.2d at
300. The Fourth Circuit held that the jury has the responsibility for deciding questions of
credibility and that substantial evidence existed to support the jury's verdict. Id.
Second, Williams argued that the trial judge improperly allowed the Government to ex-
pand cross-examination of the defendant to include prior acts of misconduct relating to Julia
Boo. Id. at 300-01. Williams contended that the court should not have allowed the question of
whether he committed a sexual assault on Julia Boo pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence
608(b). 684 F.2d at 301. The Federal Rules of Evidence generally prevent the admission of
character evidence solely to create an inference that a person acted on a particular occasion
consistently with his character. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a). Several exceptions exist, however,
one of which sanctions the admission of character evidence bearing upon the trust-
worthiness of a witness. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3) (evidence relating to character of
witness admissible within limits set forth in rules 607, 608, and 609). Rule 608(b) allows in-
quiry into instances of conduct other than the conviction of crimes when, in the discretion of
the court, the inquiry concerns the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.
See FED. R. EVID. 608(b). Rule 608(b) recognizes that character evidence is necessary to en-
sure the law's basic emphasis on truthfinding. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 608[05], at 621-36 (1982) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN's
EVIDENCE]. Rule 608, however, requires that the probative value of the character evidence
must outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. See United States v.
Augello, 452 F.2d 1135, 1140 (2d Cir. 1971) (court should weigh probative value of evidence
against prejudice the evidence may create in minds of jurors), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 922
(1972). The trial judge must balance the need for evidence relating to the trustworthiness of
the witness against the possible abuses that may result from the introduction of the
evidence. See WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra, 605[05], at 621-36. The defendant in Williams
argued that the question concerning Julia Boo was not relevant to his truthfulness as a
witness and that the court should not have allowed the question under rule 608(b). Brief for
Appellant at 38, United States v. Williams, 684 F.2d 296 (4th Cir. 1982). The Government
responded that the trial court admitted the character evidence under rule 404(b), not under
rule 608(b). 684 F.2d at 301. Evidence barred by rule 608 may nevertheless be admissible in
connection with some other technique of attacking the credibility of a witness. See WEIN-
STEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra, 608[01], at 607-10. Rule 404(b) sanctions the admission of evidence
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts for purposes such as proving the defendant's motive, oppor-
tunity, intent, plan, or knowledge. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). As in rule 608, the trial judge must
determine whether the danger of prejudice outweighs the probative value of the character
evidence. See WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra, 605[05], at 621-36. The Fourth Circuit in
Williams held that the trial judge admitted the question under Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b). 684 F.2d at 301. Furthermore, the Williams court determined that the trial judge did
not abuse his discretion in allowing the character evidence at trial. 684 F.2d at 301.
Third, the defendant argued that because of the delay between the murder and the in-
dictment, any prosecution would constitute a violation of due process of law. Id. Although
statutes of limitations provide the primary protection against unreasonable delay in the in-
stitution of criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court has implied that the due process
clause of the fifth amendment may require dismissal of charges if an intentional delay by
the Government, designed to gain a tactical advantage, actually prejudices the defendant.
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degree murder.'5 The Fourth Circuit specifically requested that counsel
focus on the interpretation of the limitations statute in Askins v. United
States." In Askins, a grand jury indicted the defendant for first degree
murder sixteen years after the offense." At trial the Government re-
quested that the judge charge the jury on second degree murder, a
lesser included offense having a three-year limitation period.'8 The jury
convicted the defendant of second degree murder.'9 Askins appealed the
conviction, arguing that the three-year statute of limitations for second
degree murder barred his conviction for that offense.2' The Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit set aside the sentence because
the grand jury had returned the indictment more than three years after
the defendant committed the offense.
2'
The Fourth Circuit in Williams affirmed the defendant's conviction,
holding that Williams. had waived the statute of limitations defense by
See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324-26 (1971). In order to establish a due process
violation, the defendant must demonstrate the existence of prejudice as the threshold
criterion. See United States v. Blevins, 593 F.2d 646, 647 (5th Cir. 1979 (per curiam) (pre-
judice to accused is threshold criterion). In addition to showing prejudice, the defendant also
must show that the Government designed the pre-accusation delay to harass the defendant
or to gain a tactical advantage. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324-25 (1971) (due
process clause protects against prejudicial delays to gain tactical advantage or harass defend-
ant); cf. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1977) (showing of actual prejudice
necessary but not dispositive of claim for prosecutorial delay). In Williams, the Fourth Cir-
cuit found that the defendant had shown no actual prejudice because of the delay. 684 F.2d
at 302. In addition, the court noted that the delay was the result of a lack of obtainable
evidence, not to gain a tactical advantage. Id. at 301.
15 684 F.2d at 298. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow an appellate court to
take cognizance of an issue not raised or decided in the trial court if the error is plain and af-
fects substantial rights. See FED. R. CRIlM. P. 52(b).
" 684 F.2d at 298; see Askins v. United States, 251 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
251 F.2d at 910. In Askins, a grand jury indicted the defendant for first degree
murder in 1939. Id. A jury found that the defendant was of unsound mind and committed
him to a mental hospital. Id. The United States Attorney made a formal entry on the record
declaring that he would not prosecute the case further while the defendant was in the men-
tal hospital. Id. The mental hospital released the defendant in 1952 and in 1954 the grand
jury reindicted him for first degree murder. Id.
18 Id.; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3281, 3282 (1976).
" 251 F.2d at 910.
Id. A 1954 amendment changed the limitations period from three to five years for
noncapital offenses.
" 251 F.2d at 913. The Askins court noted that the indictment was timely for first
degree murder. Id. at 911. The District of Columbia Circuit, however, set aside the defend-
ant's conviction because the statute of limitations had run for second degree murder. Id. at
913. The Askins court reasoned that for the court to sentence the defendant for second
degree murder, a grand jury would have to had indicted the defendant within three years of
the offense. Id at 912. The District of Columbia Circuit noted that the case would be dif-
ferent if the statute of limitations applied to the indictment itself. Id. at 913. Since Askins
was charged with first degree murder, to which no limitation period applies, the defendant
could not have known that the defense was available until after the jury convicted him of sec-
ond degree murder. Id.
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requesting the charge on second degree murder." The Williams court
distinguished Askins by noting that unlike the defendant in Askins,
Williams requested the charge on second degree murder.' The Fourth
Circuit reasoned that the statute of limitations was not jurisdictional24
but rather was an affirmative defense that Williams waived by re-
questing the instruction on the lesser included offense of second degree
murder.25 The Williams court, therefore, held that the statute of limita-
tions did not bar the punishment for the lesser included offense.26
Relying on Askins, the dissent in Williams argued that the statute of
limitations specifically precluded punishment of Williams for second
degree murder since the grand jury did not return an indictment within
five years of the crime. The dissent maintained that Williams neither
expressly nor impliedly waived the limitations statute by requesting a
charge on the lesser included offense.28 The dissent concluded that the
five-year statute of limitations barred Williams' trial and punishment for
second degree murder.29
The Supreme Court has not provided the federal circuit courts with
adequate direction regarding whether a criminal defendant may waive
the statute of limitations."0 Primary authority for courts holding that the
684 F.2d at 299-300.
Id. at 299.
24 See generally WRIGHT, supra note 11, § 193. If the statute of limitations is a jurisdic-
tional objection rather than an affirmative defense, a court can take notice of the objection
at any time during the pendency of the proceedings. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2). Most
courts have treated the issue of waiver as dependent on whether the statute of limitations
is jurisdictional or is an affirmative defense. See generally 8 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
12.0311] (2d ed. 1977); 1 R. ANDERSON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE §§ 179, 185 (1957);
WRIGHT, supra note 11, § 193 at 705-08. If the court adopts the jurisdictional approach, the
running of the statute of limitations extinguishes the court's power to try the case and no
action or agreement of the parties can supply the requisite jurisdiction. See Mitchell v.
Mauer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934) (parties cannot waive or overcome lack of federal jurisdic-
tion by agreement); United States v. Issacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1140 (7th Cir. 1974) (same).
' 684 F.2d at 299-300. The Fourth Circuit noted that if the court had not given the re-
quested charge, Williams would have been faced with either a verdict of guilty or not guilty
on a capital offense. Id. at 299. The Williams court stated that the requested charge was in
Williams' best interest. Id. In implying a waiver of the statute of limitations, the Fourth Cir-
cuit reasoned that Williams should not be able to receive the benefits of his requested
charge and later complain of the result. Id.
Id. at 299-300.
Id. at 302 (Hall, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the interpretation of the
limitations statute in Askins was a precise statement of the law. Id. The dissent stated that
the majority opinion overstepped judicial bounds by creating an exception to the limitations
statute that Congress did not intend. Id. at 303.
Id. (Hall, J., dissenting). The dissent in Williams argued that the record did not sup-
port a finding that Williams knowingly waived the statute of limitations defense. Id.
Williams was not aware of the statute of limitations issue until the Fourth Circuit requested
counsel to discuss the issue at oral argument. Id.
Id. (Hall, J., dissenting).
' See infra notes 31-35.
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statute of limitations is an affirmative defense is an 1872 Supreme Court
case decided under the common-law rules of pleading.31 In United States
v. Cook, 32 the Court held that the defendant could not raise the statute
of limitations by demurrer, but instead had to raise it as a defense at
trial.w The Court cited Cook in Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police" in
holding that the statute of limitations was an affirmative defense 'that
the defendant must raise at trial.' The Court, however, did not address
directly the issue of waiver in either Cook or Biddinger.0 As a result, the
treatment of a waiver of criminal statutes of limitations varies among
the federal circuits.Y
The District of Columbia Circuit in United States v. Wild" inter-
preted the Supreme Court's holding in Cook to mean that a statute of
limitations defense did not involve the jurisdiction of the court. 9 In
Wild, the defendant signed a statement waiving the statute of limita-
tions in order to continue plea negotiations and escape indictment.
When the negotiations broke down, a grand jury indicted the defendant
United States v. Cook, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 168 (1872).
S2 Id.
Id. at 179-80. The Supreme Court in United States v. Cook maintained that the
failure of the indictment to show on its face that a grand jury had returned the indictment
within the statutory period should not bar the prosecution from proving that the defendant
fell within an exception to the statute. Id. Even absent such an exception, the Court held,
the prosecution should have the opportunity to prove that the defendant committed the of-
fense within the statutory period. Id. at 180. The Cook Court held, therefore, that the defend-
ant must raise the statute of limitations as a defense so that the prosecution might answer
the pleading. Id. at 179-80. The Court in Cook, however, did not address directly whether.
the defendant could waive the limitations statute. See United States v. Wild, 551 F.2d 418,
422 (D.C. Cir.) (Court in Cook made no mention of effect of statute's expiration on a court's
subject matter jurisdiction), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916 (1977). Since the Court in Cook did
not treat directly the waiver issue, courts have viewed Cook's relevance to the waiver ques-
tion inconsistently. Compare United States v. Wild, 551 F.2d 418, 421-22 (D.C. Cir.) (Cook
determined that the statute of limitations was not jurisdictional), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916
(1977) and United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 718-19 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
843 (1965) with United States v. Harris, 133 F. Supp. 796, 799 (W.D. Mo. 1955) (Cook was not
concerned with question of jurisdiction), affd on other grounds, 237 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. 1956).
The court in Harris interpreted Cook as deciding only a procedural issue which assured the
Government an opportunity to demonstrate that an exception to the statute applied. 133 F.
Supp. at 796.
3 245 U.S. 128 (1917).
' Id. at 135. Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police involved an extradition proceeding
in which the statute of limitations issue was only peripheral. See id. at 130. The Court in
Biddinger provided no rationale other than the citation to Cook. See 245 U.S. at 135.
u See supra notes 33-35.
See infra notes 38-81 (discussing federal circuits' treatment of waiver of statute of
limitations).
" 551 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916 (1977).
' Id. at 421-22; see 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 178.
40 551 F.2d at 420. The Government was prepared to go to the grand jury prior to the
expiration of the statute of limitations. Id.
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but the limitations statute had run." The District of Columbia Circuit
held that the expiration of the limitations statute did not constitute a
jurisdictional bar to prosecution but was a defense that the defendant
waived by signing a written waiver with advice of counsel. 2 The court
noted that the Government was ready to seek an indictment before the
statute of limitations had run." Therefore, the court reasoned, the
Government had fulfilled the statutory policy of encouraging prompt in-
vestigation of criminal activities." The court also found that the delay
did not handicap the defendant in preparing his defense on account of a
lapse in time or a destruction of evidence because the defendant was on
notice that the Government intended to proceed against him. 5 The Wild
court, however, confined its holding to situations when a defendant, with
the advice of counsel, executes an express written waiver before the
statute expires. 6
In United States v. Levine, 7 the Third Circuit followed Wild in
holding that a criminal defendant may waive the statute of limitations
defense. 8 In Levine, the defendant signed a written waiver of the
statute of limitations defense in order to continue plea negotiations. 9 A
year after the negotiations broke down and after the limitations statute
had run, a grand jury returned an indictment against the defendant."'
The defendant argued that the statute of limitations barred his indict-
ment." The Third Circuit, however, determined that the defendant's
written waiver constituted a valid waiver of the statute of limitations
defense.2
'1 Id. at 421.
42 Id. at 424-25.
's Id. at 420.
"Id.
'5 Id. The District of Columbia Circuit in Wild noted that the delay in Wild's indict-
ment was the result of the defendant's attempts to obtain a beneficial disposition of his case
by means of plea bargaining. Id. The Wild court found that the defendant's responsibility
for the delay was of prime importance in holding that the defendant waived the limitations
defense. Id.
" Id. at 419.
'7 658 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1981).
4' Id. at 120. The Levine court noted that the defendant had knowingly and intelligently,
with the aid of counsel, waived the limitations defense. Id. at 121. The Third Circuit found
that the execution of a valid waiver forecloses the assertion of a statute of limitations
defense. Id.
'" Id. at 114.
'Id.
, Id. at 115.
Id. at 121-22. The Third Circuit in Levine recognized that due process aspects of the
limitation statutes come into play if no time limitation exists on the defendant's waiver of
the statute of limitations. Id. at 122 n.12; cf. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 787 (due
process attack on preindictment delay raised before statutory period has run). The Levine
court determined that the district judge should deal with any possible prejudice resulting
from the lack of any time limitations on the defendant's waiver. 658 F.2d at 122 n.12.
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Other circuits have determined that a defendant may waive the
statute of limitations by pleading guilty.' The Second Circuit in United
States v. Doyle' held that a plea of guilty to an indictment is an admis-
sion of guilt and a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects. 5 The court in
Doyle held that the defendant waived the statute of limitations defense
by entering a guilty plea. The Ninth Circuit has also determined that a
guilty plea constitutes a waiver of the limitations statute.57
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Williams is consistent with the prior
Fourth Circuit decision in Vance v. Hedrick.' In Vance, a jury convicted
the defendant under the West Virginia recidivist statute.5 The
recidivist statute requires that a court, upon receiving notice of a third
felony conviction by a criminal defendant, must institute recidivist pro-
ceedings against the defendant."5 The defendant's trial on the recidivist
charge must occur before the expiration of the court term of the defend-
ant's last felony conviction.6 In Vance, the recidivist trial did not occur
in the court term required by statute because the defense counsel
sought more time for preparation.2 The defendant sought a writ of
See infra text accompanying notes 54-57.
348 F.2d 715 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965).
Id. at 719. In Doyle, the government obtained an indictment against Doyle on July 2,
1962. Id. at 716. During the course of subsequent plea bargaining, Doyle requested that the
indictment remain sealed. Id. at 717. After negotiations broke down, the Government
unsealed the indictment on August 6, 1963, after the expiration of the applicable five-year
statute of limitations. Id. With renewed plea bargaining, Doyle entered a guilty plea to one
count and the Government moved to dismiss the remaining counts against Doyle. Id. Doyle
appealed his conviction on this one count, arguing that the Justice Department had unsealed
the indictment after the limitations statute had run, and therefore the district court decis-
ion was in error. Id. The Second Circuit, in an opinion affirming the district court opinion,
held that an unqualified plea of guilty bars further consideration of all but the most fun-
damental premises for the conviction. Id. at 718-19. The Second Circuit found that under
Cook, Doyle's statute of limitations and speedy trial claims did not rise to this level. Id. The
court, therefore, held that the defendant waived the statute of limitations defense by
pleading guilty. Id.
Id.; see supra note 55.
' See United States v. Akmakjian, 647 F.2d 12, 14 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). In
Akmakjian, the defendant entered a plea of guilty and the district court accepted his plea.
Id. at 13. Four years later, the defendant friled a petition to set aside his guilty plea on the
ground that the statute of limitations barred his indictment. Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the conviction, holding that the statute of limitations is nonjurisdictional and that the ac-
tions of the defendant constituted a waiver of the limitations defense. Id. at 13.
See 659 F.2d 447 (4th Cir. 1981).
' Id. at 448; see W. VA. CODE § 61-11-19 (1977). The West Virginia recidivist statute re-
quires a life sentence after three felony convictions. See 659 F.2d at 448; W. VA. CODE
§ 61-11-19 (1977).
See 659 F.2d at 448; W. VA. CODE § 61-11-19 (1977).
61 See 659 F.2d at 448; W. VA. CODE § 61-11-19 (1977).
659 F.2d at 448. In Vance v. Hedrick a jury convicted the defendant in August 1975
in the circuit court of Logan County of breaking and entering. Id. at 447-48. This conviction
was the defendant's third felony conviction and the court set August 27, 1975 as the court
date for the recidivist proceedings as required by statute. Id.; see supra note 59. The terms
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habeas corpus, arguing that the court had no jurisdiction to try him on
the recidivist charge since the trial did not occur within the time period
required by statute. 3 The Fourth Circuit noted that the time require-
ment under the West Virginia recidivist statute is comparable to the
time requirements of the statute of limitations." The Vance court noted
that most federal courts have held that a criminal defendant may waive
the statutes of limitation.' The court held that the defendant waived
the time limitation under the recidivist statute by -requesting a con-
tinuance.66 The Vance court noted that allowing a defendant who has not
waived the limitations defense to raise the defense at trial adequately
protects the defendant against the assertion of stale claims.
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Williams conflicts with decisions of
the Sixth and Tenth Circuits. In Benes v. United States,69 the Sixth Cir-
cuit held that a timely indictment was a prerequisite to the court's
power to hear the case." In Benes, the Government had charged the
defendant with tax fraud prior to the expiration of the limitations
period.7 The defendant, however, instituted a civil suit to enjoin the
of the trial courts in West Virginia run for four months. See 659 F.2d at 448. In August 1975,
the circuit court of Logan County was nearing the end of the court's May term. Id. In Vance,
defense counsel moved for a continuance of the trial date in order to investigate the
truthfulness of the charge in the indictment that Vance had two prior felony convictions. Id.
The court granted a continuance until October, as requested by defense counsel. Id. In Oc-
tober 1975 a jury convicted the defendant under the recidivist statute. Id. The Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed Vance's conviction. Id.; see State v. Vance, 262
S.E.2d 423 (W. Va. 1980). Vance then sought a writ of habeas corpus in the original jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. 659 F.2d at 449. The Supreme Court
denied the writ in a formal summary order containing no explanation. Id. Vance next sought
habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West
Virginia. Id. The district court awarded the writ and the warden appealed. Id.
659 F.2d at 449.
Id. at 451-52. The Vance court noted that the time requirement under the recidivist
statute is different from the time requirement under a statute of limitations in that under
the recidivist statute the time period will vary depending upon the time in the court term a
trial occurs. Id. at 452. If a trial on the charge occurs early in the four-month court term, lit-
tle likelihood exists of encountering problems with the time requirement. Id. If the trial oc-
curs late in the term, the limitations period is very short. Id. The Vance court noted that, in
fairness to a defendant, the time requirement under the recidivist statute should be subject
to waiver. Id. The defendant may need more time to prepare adequately for the recidivist
trial. Id.
See 659 F.2d at 452 (listing courts holding statute of limitations is affirmative
defense).
"' 659 F.2d at 452. The Fourth Circuit noted in Vance that the trial would have occur-
red before the expiration of the May term but for the fact that defense counsel sought more
time for preparation. Id.
67 Id.
See infra text accompanying notes. 69-83.
276 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1960).
Id. at 109.
7' Id. at 108. In Benes v. United States the defendant filed his income tax return for
1948 on January 20, 1949. Id. The indictment stated that January 20, 1949 was the date of
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Government from presenting certain evidence to the grand jury.' As a
result of the civil action, the Government agreed not to pursue the
criminal charge before resolution of the civil litigation. 3 After settle-
ment of the civil case, the grand jury returned an indictment against the
defendant.7 4 The statute of limitations, however, had run and the defend-
ant contended that the limitations period barred his prosecution."5
Treating the limitations period as jurisdictional, the Sixth Circuit held
that the limitations statute barred the indictment." The Benes court
reasoned that the purpose of criminal statutes of limitation is to afford
immunity from punishment.77 The Sixth Circuit held that criminal
statutes of limitation create a bar to prosecution and the court refused
to allow prosecution of the defendant after the statute had run.
7 8
In Waters v. United States,9 the Tenth Circuit held that the statute
of limitations defense was jurisdictional and not subject to waiver." The
defendant in Waters first asserted the limitations defense on a motion to
vacate his sentence. 1 In deciding whether the defendant could waive the
limitations defense, the court recognized a distinction between the pro-
cedural statutes of limitation in civil cases and substantive bars to prose-
cution in criminal cases.2 The court noted that the purposes of criminal
statutes of limitation are more comprehensive than those of civil
statutes and represent a legislative assessment that after the lapse of a
designated period of time, society's interest in the prosecution of
criminals is secondary to the defendant's right to a fair trial.,
the commission of the offense. Id. The applicable statute of limitations was six years from the
date of the offense. Id.; see 26 U.S.C. § 3748(a) (1939) (current version at I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)
(1976)). The Government filed the complaint in Vance on March 12, 1954, ten months before
the expiration of the statute of limitations. 276 F.2d at 108.
7 276 F.2d at 108. The defendant filed suit on April 12, 1954, to enjoin the United
States Attorney from presenting to the grand jury any of the documentary evidence obtained
from the defendant or his corporation that pertained to the alleged offense. Id.
7 Id.
71 Id. The grand jury returned an indictment against the defendant on September 12,
1955. Id. at 102.
71 Id. at 108-09. The grand jury returned the indictment six years, seven months, and
twenty-three days after the commission of the alleged offense. Id. at 108.
76 Id.
7 Id.
71 Id. at 108-09. The Sixth Circuit in Benes held that the defendant did not waive the
criminal statutes of limitation by entering into an agreement with the prosecution. Id. at
109.
328 F.2d 739 (10th Cir. 1964).
Id. at 742-43.
" Id. at 740. The defendant first raised the statute of limitations defense on appeal. Id.
at 742. The Tenth Circuit considered whether the limitations statute is an affirmative
defense that the defendant must plead at or before trial as in civil cases, or whether the
statute constitutes a jurisdictional bar to prosecution and punishment. Id.
Id. at 743; see infra note 83.
328 F.2d at 743. Unlike civil statutes of limitation, criminal limitation statutes
specify a time limit beyond which an irrebuttable presumption arises that the delay would
19831
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
The Fourth Circuit in Williams correctly determined that a criminal-
defendant may waive the statute of limitations defense. 4 The defendant
in a criminal case may have compelling reasons in his own best interests
for waiving the statute of limitations. 5 A defendant facing trial on a
charge with a long statute of limitations might wish to waive the shorter
statute on a lesser included offense in order to avoid trial or punishment
for the greater crime. 6 Employment of a jurisdictional approach
deprives the trial court of essential discretionary authority to determine
the validity of a waiver when the waiver does not contravene public
policy. Courts, however, should provide adequate safeguards to assure
that a waiver of the statute of limitations does not violate a defendant's
right to a fair trial.8
The Fourth Circuit in Williams failed to apply the correct standard
for a valid waiver of the statute of limitations. In instances in which the
trial rights of a criminal defendant are in jeopardy, the Supreme Court
prejudice the defendant's right to a fair trial. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322
(1971). Statutes of limitation are the primary form of protection afforded a criminal defendant
against prejudice resulting from pre-indictment delay. Id. Moreover, society may be
healthier if the government charges a suspected criminal within a specified period of time
after the commission of the alleged offense or to relieve the suspected criminal of the never-
ending possibility of public accountability for a past accusation. See Askins v. United
States, 251 F.2d 909, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
See infra text accompanying notes 85-88.
8 See, e.g., 551 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916 (1977). The defendant in
United States v. Wild made an informed decision to waive the statute of limitations when
the limitations statute was about to run in order to gain time for plea bargaining. See 551
F.2d at 425. In addition, a criminal defendant may desire to waive the statute of limitations
in order to undergo a trial to clear his good name. See generally Note, Waiver of the
Statute of Limitations in Criminal Proceedings: United States v. Wild, 90 HARv. L. REv.
1550, 1554-55 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Waiver of Statute of Limitations].
88 See generally Waiver of Statute of Limitations, supra note 85, at 1554-55.
See generally Note, The Statute of Limitations in a Criminal Case: Can it Be Waived?,
18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 823 (1977). One commentator has suggested that courts abandon the
distinction between jurisdictional and affirmative defenses in favor of a case-by-case
analysis focusing on the language of the applicable statute of limitations and the public
policies behind the limitation statute's enactment. Id. Under this approach, if the trial court
determines that the defendant's waiver meets certain prerequisites, the court will conclude
that the waiver is valid. Id. at 840. The prerequisites necessary for a valid waiver require
that the defendant made the waiver knowingly and intelligently, that he made the waiver
for his benefit and after consultation with counsel, and that the defendant's waiver did not
handicap his defense or contravene any other public policy reasons motivating the enact-
ment of the limitation statutes. Id.; see also Padie v. State, 594 P.2d 50, 55-57 (Alaska 1979)
(adopting case-by-case analysis).
I See, e.g., United States v. Levine, 658 F.2d 113, 120-21 (3rd Cir. 1981) (knowing and
intelligent waiver of statute of limitations valid); United States v. Wild, 551 F.2d 418, 425
(D.C. Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916 (1977). Waivers of limitation statutes, like guilty
pleas, involve the relinquishment of important trial rights related to the trial process and
require the advice of counsel and an understanding of the consequences of a waiver. 551
F.2d at 425; cf. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 159 (1957) (court must advise accused
pleading guilty absent explicit waiver). See infra text accompanying notes 89-99.
" See infra text accompanying notes 90-99.
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has required a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights." The rationale
for requiring a knowing and intelligent waiver is to preserve the integrity
of the trial process." Since a waiver of the statute of limitations relates
integrally to the trial process and in fact authorizes the state to initiate
prosecution, any waiver of the limitations defense should be a knowing
and intelligent waiver." The right to a speedy trial involves many of the
same considerations as the statute of limitations. Both the right to a
speedy trial and the statute of limitations shield the defendant from
endless anxiety about possible prosecution and from impairment of the
ability to mount a defense. 4 By encouraging speedy prosecution, the
right to a speedy trial and the statute of limitations afford society pro-
tection against unincarcerated offenders, and insure against a diminu-
tion of the deterrent value of immediate convictions and the capacity of
the government to prove its case.95 In Barker v. Wingo, the Supreme
Court held that a waiver of the right to a speedy trial must be knowing
and intelligent. 7 The protection of rights similar to the statute of limita-
tions in Barker suggests that any waiver of the statute of limitations
should receive the same protection of the knowing and voluntary stand-
ard. The Fourth Circuit in Williams, however, failed to afford the defend-
ant the safeguards of a knowing and voluntary waiver. 8 The factual
See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237 (1973) (knowing and intelligent
relinquishment of rights required when trial rights of defendant in jeopardy). The most
critical situation bearing upon the fairness of the trial process which requires a knowing and
intelligent waiver is the right to counsel, both at trial, see Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506,
512-13 (1962) (waiver of right to counsel must be knowing and intelligent) and at the enter-
ing of a guilty plea, see Boyd v. Dulton, 405 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1973) (waiver of right to counsel at
guilty plea must be knowing and intelligent). The Supreme Court has determined that other
trial rights also warrant the protection of the knowing and intelligent waiver standard. See,
e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 517 (1972) (right to speedy trial); Barber v. Page, 390
U.S. 719, 723 (1968) (right to confrontation of witnesses); Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184, 190 (1957) (right against double jeopardy); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317
U.S. 269, 271 (1942) (right to jury trial).
" See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 238-39 (1973) (requirement of inten-
tional relinquishment designed to protect fairness of trial).
See generally Waiver of Statute of Limitations, supra note 85, at 1554-55.
' See United States v. Levine, 658 F.2d 113, 119 (1981); infra text accompanying notes
94-95.
, See United States v. Levine, 658 F.2d 113, 119 (1981).
Id.; United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320-25 (1971); see supra text accompany-
ing notes 3-4 (describing policies behind statute of limitations).
407 U.S. 514 (1972).
' Id. at 528. In Barker, the Supreme Court found that the defendant waived his right
to a speedy trial and that the waiver was knowing and voluntary. Id. at 528. The Court also
noted that prejudice was minimal since the defendant made no claim of injury to his ability
to mount a defense. Id. at 534.
", See 684 F.2d at 299. The record in Williams does not support a finding that Williams
knowingly waived the statute of limitations defense. See id. at 302 (Hall, J., dissenting).
Williams was not aware of the statute of limitations issue until the Fourth Circuit requested
counsel to discuss the issue at oral argument. Id.
1983]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
record in Williams does not give rise to the implication that the defend-
ant knowingly waived the statute of limitations defense.9
The Fourth Circuit found that the defendant impliedly had waived
the limitations defense when the defendant requested an instruction on
the lesser included offense.' The Supreme Court, however, has sug-
gested that a lesser included offense instruction may be necessary con-
stitutionally to enhance or preserve the jury's essential factfinding func-
tion.1"' Any attempt to deprive the jury of the opportunity to find a
defendant guilty of the precise offense the jury may believe the defend-
ant committed is inconsistent with principles of procedural fairness."' A
lesser included offense instruction minimizes the risk of undermining
See supra note 98.
10 684 F.2d at 299-300; see supra note 25.
101 See 412 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1973). In Keeble v. United States the Supreme Court held
that an Indian charged with a federal crime under the Major Crimes Act had a right to an
instruction on a lesser included offense even though the Act did not confer federal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant for the lesser crime. 412 U.S. at 214. The Court reasoned that a
lesser included offense instruction minimized the risk of undermining the reasonable doubt
standard by providing a third option to a choice between conviction and acquittal. Id. at
212-13. The Keeble Court explained that if the prosecution has not established beyond a
reasonable doubt every element of the offense charged and if the court does not offer a
lesser included offense instruction, the jury must, as a theoretical matter, return a verdict
of acquittal. Id. at 212. The Court in Keeble, however, recognized that when one of the
elements of the offense charged remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of
some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of conviction. Id. at 212-13. The
lesser included offense instruction, the Court noted, prevents the defendant's exposure to
the risk of an unwarranted conviction. Id. at 212.
Moreover, in Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980), the Supreme Court held that a court
may not impose the death sentence after a jury verdict of guilt if the court did not permit
the jury to consider an alternative verdict of guilt of a lesser included offense. 447 U.s. at
638. The Court in Beck noted that a defendant in a criminal case has a right to adequate in-
structions on his theory of defense, provided evidence exists before the jury to support such
a theory. Id. at 635.
The defendant has a right to an instruction on a lesser included offense if the evidence
would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the
greater. See 412 U.S. 205, 208; supra note 11 (describing lesser included offense). Although
the language in rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is in discretionary
terms, the rule is mandatory in the sense that if evidence exists to support a lesser included
offense and the defendant requests such a charge, the court has no discretion to refuse to
give the instruction. See Mooa, supra note 24, 31.03; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(c).
Even before Keeble and Beck, the Supreme Court recognized the fundamental import-
ance of the lesser included offense option in capital cases. See Stevenson v. United States,
162 U.S. 313, 323 (1896) (reversing conviction for murder on ground that trial judge's er-
roneous refusal to give instruction on lesser included offense of manslaughter curtailed
power of jury to determine from evidence whether crime was murder or manslaughter). The
Court has acknowledged that instructions can control the outcome of cases on other occa-
sions. See Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970). In Price, the Court found that an erroneous
murder instruction may have induced the jury to find the defendant guilty of the less
serious offense of voluntary manslaughter rather than to continue to debate his innocence.
Id. at 331.
1'0 See supra note 101.
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